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Philip G. Schrag*
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repayment plans and options, and for guiding me to many helpful documentary materials. In the
course of talking with other law school financial aid advisors. I learned how much is. LammertReeves is admired in her professional community, and I came to understand the wel-dzsered basis
of her high standing there. The research for this Article was supported in pat by a grant from the
Open Society Institute, and in part by writing grants from Georgetown University Lav. Center,
which were made available by Dean Judith Areen. I am grateful for both sources of assistance. I
also appreciate the enormously important contributions of my student research assistants, Lewis
Walton, Benjamin Gardner, and Tai-yeu Hsia. Thanks are due, as well. to Professor Lisa Lerman of
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hundreds of students at Georgetown and Catholic Universities, ninety-eight financial aid advsors,
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questionnaires; and to several officials of the Department of Education %hotook time to explain to
Mr. Hsia and me the methods of the Department's income-contingent calculations. I also appreciate
the outstanding work of Decision Research Inc., vhich computed the data from the student and
financial aid advisor surveys, and I am grateful for the valuable comments by Stephen Brown,
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Mark Kantrowitz. Mr. Kantrowitz created a Web-based version of the income-contingent loan
calculator that Mr. Hsia and I developed so that the charts in this Article could be compiled. See
Mark Kantrowitz, Income Contingent Repayment Calculator,FinAid: The SmartStudent Guide to
Financial Aid, at http'/wv,v.finaidorg/calculatorsicr.phtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2001) (providing
the FimAid income-contingent repayment calculator). HnAid is a nonprofit, public interest
distributor of loan information for students; it provides a clear, up-to-date explanation of student
loans and various calculators through which students compute monthly payments and total costs of
various types of loans. See id.If for some reason that Wcb site ceases to be opcrational, the HsiaSchrag Microsoft Excel spreadsheet through which the same calculations can be performed isalso
posted. See Tai-yeu Hsia & Philip G. Schiag, Income-Contingent Lean Repaymcnt and Stea13
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http.//data.law.georgetovaedu/faculty/shragfloanrepayment.tml (last modified July 20, 2000).
The FinAid version is, however, much more user friendly and I therefore recommend that version.
The research reported in this Article will be published in book form under the title, REPAY AS YOU
EARN: THE GOVERNMNT'S FLAWED PROGRAM TO HELP STDTuS HAVE PUBmC SEPvIC
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858
VIII. AF ERWORD ...............................................
Many idealistic law school graduates feel precluded from taking
legal aid and other low-paying public service jobs because they have
incurred high educational debt, often exceeding $100,000. In 1993,
however, Congress created an "income-contingent" debt repayment
option that was intended to enable high-debt, low-income graduates,
including lawyers, to afford accepting public service positions.' This
program caps loan repayments at a reasonable percentage of the
graduates' incomes, and it forgives any remaining balance at the end of
twenty-five years.2 To date, this program has failed to meet the needs of
public interest lawyers. It is rarely used. Law students are largely
unaware of it. Those who do know about the program, including law
school financial aid advisors and the minority of law students who have
heard of the plan, are suspicious of it. The main problem is that the
twenty-five year repayment term is too long a period to be considered
seriously by people just starting their careers, even though the plan also
offers subsidies. This Article argues that the Secretary of Education
should use existing statutory authority to shorten the term to a more
realistic fifteen years, at a relatively low cost. It also argues for other
reforms, including better marketing of this program by the United States
Department of Education ("Department").
Even as presently constituted, this program is potentially valuable
for some law graduates who do not presently use it. As a long-term
repayment measure, it would be particularly advantageous, offering
generous subsidies for those whose schools do not have Loan
Repayment Assistance Programs ("LRAPs") and who start at quite low
salaries, expect only modest income increases over time, and want to
spend their full careers in public service. For those who want to spend a
few years in public service early in their careers, this federal program
could be useful as a temporary measure, and it permits students to
convert to more conventional repayment plans when their incomes
increase substantially.
With assistance from the Author and Tai-yeu Hsia, FinAid (a public
interest organization that helps students understand the loan system) has
created a World Wide Web ("Web") based calculator that enables
readers of this Article to determine for themselves how the incomecontingent repayment plan would affect their repayment obligations and

1. See generally infra Part 13L
2. See infra note 180 and accompanying text: discussion infra Part IlH.B.
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their total costs. An explanation of this calculator and its location on the
Web are included in this Article.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most law students graduate with very high educational debt. For
some, the debt can without exaggeration be described as "staggering," in
the sense that repayment according to a "standard" ten-year schedule
would leave the graduate with full-time employment but scant
discretionary income. Such a graduate can survive only by sacrificing
consumer goods and services, postponing having a home and a family,
and accruing additional credit card debt. The loan repayment problem is
greatest for law students who would like to be self-sacrificing up to a
reasonable point: those who decide to go to law school because they
want to serve the public as "public interest" lawyers, such as staff
attorneys at legal aid organizations. These students enter law school
aware that public interest lawyers are paid only a small fraction as much
as big-firm lawyers.3 But only as they accumulate law school debt do
they realize that loan repayment obligations significantly increase the
pressure to take high-paying private sector jobs. As graduation
approaches, many of these students feel, with some bitterness, that
because of their law school debt, they have no choice but to abandon
their original goals and to seek employment with large corporate law
firms, where starting salaries (including bonuses) often exceed $90,000
and now sometimes exceed $160,000.'
Approximately a third of the nation's law schools have LRAPs to
subsidize loan repayment for graduates who decide to work in public
interest jobs.' But most law schools do not have such programs, and
some programs are not funded well enough to meet students' needs.6
In 1993, with strong encouragement from the newly elected
President, Bill Clinton, Congress seemed to come to the aid of graduates
who faced the prospect of high debt and low incomes. When it
established a program of direct lending to students by the Department, it
created an "income-contingent repayment option" through which annual
repayment of most educational debt would be capped at a fraction of the

3. See David L. Chambers, The Burdens of EducationalLoans: The Impacts of Debt on Job
Choice and Standardsof Living for Students at Nine American Law Schools, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
187, 192 (1992).
4. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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graduate's income! The option would be available to all graduates, not

only of law schools, but also of undergraduate colleges and other
graduate and professional schools.8 Students who paid through this plan

for many years might temporarily accumulate mounting indebtedness
because of the income-based cap on repayment. But the remaining debt
would be canceled after twenty-five years of capped repayments.

Furthermore, the graduates of schools that did not participate in the
government's direct lending program could take advantage of the option

through a consolidation loan from the federal government after
graduation.'0
Shortly after its enactment, this new law was hailed as a "radical"
change. 1 According to Steven Waldman, the Newsweek legislative
correspondent who closely followed the progress of this legislation so

that he could write a book about its progress through Congress, the law
meant [that] anyone who still hadn't paid off their loan by year twentyfive would get an enormous gift from the taxpayers. The biggest
benefit of all would go to ... doctors who work in low-income clinics
or lawyers who become public defenders-in other words, those doing
the public service jobs Clinton admired.
Eight years later, despite these apparent attractions, the income-

contingent repayment option seems not to have caught on, at least
among law graduates. Is neglect of this "program"''3 justified by its
economic disadvantages or the availability of good substitutes? Or is it
based at least in part on non-economic factors such as lack of
information about its availability, the difficulty of computing the total

cost of income-contingent borrowing, distrust of the federal government,
or fear of unconventional financial devices? To put it another way, in the
7.
8.
9.
10.

See discussion infra Part ilLB.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1) (1994).
See discussion infra Part IILB.
See discussion infra Part IILB.
11. See STEVEN ALD N, THE BI=L How THE ADVENTuRES OF CLLUNro:N's NATION;AL
SERVICE BILL REVEAL WHAT Is CORRUPr, COMIC, CYNICAL-AND NOBLE-.ABOUr WVAS HINGTON;
236 (1995). This book is a study of the interactions between Congress and the Clinton
Administration during legislative consideration of two bills: the law establishing a national scrvice
corps and the law creating a federal direct educational loan program. See generally id. app. at 25152.
12. Id. at 236. At present, the "enormous gift" is taxable, but that aspect can and should bz
changed. See infra notes 394,446 and accompanying texL
13. In this Article, the option is referred to, for convenience, as a "program." even though the
government does not do so. The United States Department of Education ("Department") regards
income-contingent repayment as one formula among several others for paying bach- student loans,
and the administration of direct lending and its repayment is the government's "program."
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future should law students who are graduating with very high debt loads
consider signing up for income-contingent repayment if they would
prefer to have public service careers, or jobs in small law firms that
serve individuals, rather than working for the large law firms that pay
the highest salaries? If the income-contingent repayment option is not
living up to its promises, at least for significant numbers of high-debt,
low income public servants, how should it be changed?
Part II of this Article explores the amount of indebtedness and the
expected incomes of recent law graduates. It examines the historic and
recent literature on the extent of their debt, relating the current economic
situation of indebted law graduates to the trends of tuition and debt in
recent decades.
Part III reviews the objectives and history of the legislation
establishing an income-contingent loan repayment option. The
legislative history demonstrates a broad consensus in favor of assisting
students who planned public interest careers. Part III also explains the
mechanics of income-contingent repayment and debt forgiveness under
the law and its implementing regulations.
Part IV reports the results of the Author's survey of law students'
knowledge of the income-contingent repayment option, and, to the
extent that they know about it, their attitudes about this method of
payment. Because students in most schools must rely on law school
financial aid advisors for information and counseling about loan
repayment options, Part IV also reports the results of the Author's
survey of law school financial aid advisors' awareness of and beliefs
about income-contingent repayment. These surveys provide statistical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that this program is poorly
understood and little used by one of the important constituencies for
whom it was intended.
The surveys reveal that while neither students nor financial aid
advisors are well informed about the income-contingent repayment
option, those who are informed shun it, though for different reasons.
Students dislike it primarily because it requires at least an initial
commitment to a twenty-five year repayment schedule. Financial aid
advisors are skeptical of it because they believe that few graduates
would use it long enough to obtain its promised subsidies. However,
52% of the financial aid advisors believe that income-contingent
repayment could be useful for at least 5% of their schools' recent
graduates.
Having surveyed in Part IV the background of opinions about this
program and the sources of the respondents' misgivings, Part V
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss3/2
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considers the income-contingent repayment option from the perspective
of some hypothetical recent graduates unhampered by either a lack of
information about the program or distortions of its cost. From the
perspective of hypothetical law students with high debt and different
plans for long-term and short-term public service, Part V demonstrates
the advantages and disadvantages of income-contingent repayment
compared with standard repayment and with other long-term repayment
plans. It also considers the effect of the availability of a law school loan
repayment assistance plan, and of marriage, on the value of using
income-contingent repayment. In addition, it directs students to a new
Web site through which they may make their own personal calculations
of how they would fare under the income-contingent plan, and through
which they can compare income-contingent and standard repayment.
Part V may enable future law students to make more rational debt
repayment and career decisions, and it may help financial aid advisors to
offer more sophisticated guidance.
Part VI asks why a plan that has been part of the federal law for
more than five years, and that could help make loan repayment
affordable for law graduates most in need of assistance, is so little
understood or used. The existence of alternative payment-reduction
plans does not adequately explain the orphan status of incomecontingent repayment. Part VI considers, as well, inadequacies in the
program itself; the impact of private lender hostility to the program and
of partisan politics; and the poor quality of public information issued by
the Department.
Part VII makes recommendations to students, to financial aid
advisors, and to policy makers in Congress, the White House, and the
Department. It offers students some advice on financial planning within
the constraints of the existing loan repayment system, and it encourages
financial aid advisors to become more familiar with how incomecontingent repayment can be useful for graduates with the highest debt
and lowest incomes, particularly those who are committed to a lifetime
of full-time public service. On the assumption that policy makers are
now or will in the future be guided by the same desire to encourage
public service that motivated legislators and President Clinton to create
income-contingent repayment in 1993, it makes several suggestions for
making this program more attractive and more visible to borrowers who
desire to become public interest lawyers.
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II. RISING COSTS AND RISING DEBT
A.

The Rising Cost of Legal Education

For nearly fifteen years, observers of legal education have warned
that the rapidly increasing cost of becoming a lawyer would eventually
have deleterious effects on the profession. In 1987, John R. Kramer,
then-Dean of Tulane Law School, noted that from 1974-75 to 1985-86,
private law school tuition had increased from an average of $2305 to an
average of $8286 (259%), and public law school tuition for in-state
students had increased from $716 to $2135 (198%)." During this same
period, the consumer price index had risen only by 120%."5
Kramer projected the trend forward to the year 2000, assuming
three different rates of tuition increases: the 11.3% historical rate for
private law schools, a more moderate 7% rate, and a low 5% rate. 6 He
assumed that students would continue to borrow at the same rate as in
the past to pay for legal education.1 7 He concluded:
Student borrowing would have to climb to at least $66,000 to cover the
73% of average private law school attendance costs (at the low
predicted rate of inflation in tuition) now covered by the [federal
guaranteed student] annual loan limit.... Because [the median]
starting salary of $36,000 in 1982 will become $82,500 in 2003,
assuming a 5% annual increase, a $66,000 debt might be barely
affordable."
But, he noted, half of the graduates would be earning less than the
median. 9
The effect of these escalating costs and debt, Kramer worried,
would be that law schools would "be filled with many more students
who, as they become lawyers, do so with the single-minded objective of
milking the profession for all it is worth in order to be able to pay
retrospectively for their legal education."2 Two years later, he noted that
faced with continuing increases in the cost of legal education, some
talented college graduates would give up their desire to become lawyers,
14. See John R. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, By Whom, and How?,
1987 DuKE L.J. 240, 242-43.
15. See id. at 243.
16. See id. at 244.
17. See generallyid. at 250-68.
18. Id. at 267.

19. See id.
20.

Id. at 240-41.
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and that students who did choose law school would "recoup their
investment by ignoring the legal needs of four-fifths of the nation in
order to service the one-fifth able to pay sizeable fees."'" "How do you
expand the range of career choice for graduating students saddled with
tens of thousands of dollars of debt burden," he asked.? "Or do you
simply tighten the corporate large firm practice noose around their necks
and yank?"3
Professor David Chambers responded contemporaneously "that in
some respects Kramer is not nearly gloomy enough."24 He noted that
Kramer failed to explore in any detail the situation of law graduates who
incurred the same law school expenses as everyone else but earned well
below the median salary.2- Chambers feared that in the future "it may
well become harder and harder to attract able beginning lawyers into
government, legal services, and 'public interest' work."' Chambers had
some empirical data to support his concern. A survey of Michigan Law
School graduates showed that "nearly half of those with debts of
$15,000 or more who were currently working in government, legal
services, public defenders or other public interest settings reported that
they had experienced moderate to great difficulty in meeting their
obligations,"2' and he predicted that with the cost of a legal education
rising more quickly than inflation, "the starting lawyer with high debts
will be substantially worse off in 1997 than in 1987.""
Kramer's 1987 predictions of the cost of attending a private law
school in the year 2000 proved accurate. : ' By 1999, the average tuition at
such a school had become nearly $21,000, 9and the average annual cost
21. John R Kramer, lWo Will Pay the Piperor Leave the Check on the Tablefor the Other
Guy, 39 J. LEGALEDUC. 655,655 (1989).
22. IL at 671.
23. Id.
24. David L. Chambers, Educational Debts and the Worsening Position of Small.Firm.
Government, and Legal-Senices Lmtyers, 39 J. LEGAL Ecc. 709, 709(1989).
25. Seeid.at709-10.
26. Id.at710.
27. Ld.at719.
28. Id. at 722.
29. Kramer predicted annual 2000-01 cost of attendance for private law school in the range of
$29,000 to $55,000. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 245. He put the cost of public law schoal
attendance in the $16,700 to $20,200 range. See id.
30. The precise private school tuition average was S20,709. See E-mail from Rick L Morgan,
American Bar Association, to the Author (June 13, 2000, 15:02 EST) (on file with author); see also
Michael A. Olivas, Payingfora Lav Degree: Trendsin Student Borrowing and the Ability to Rep r
Debt, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333, 333 tbl.1 (1999) (displaying the published figures for 1975 anJ
1997). Olivas (who is the William B. Bates Professor of Law at the University of Houstono %Iasa
trustee of the Access Group, a major private lender, and his data was supplied by Access Group. See
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of attendance (measured by tuition plus living expenses) had risen to
$32,763. 3" Even by 1997, the cost of attendance at fifty of the nation's
180 law schools had exceeded $30,000 per year, and several schools
were considerably more costly,32 causing one scholar to observe that
students entering some law schools in 2002 "will have to shoulder costs
'
of attendance of more than $155,000 for their three years of schooling."33

For students attending public law schools in their own states, in which
legislative appropriations subsidized their education significantly, the
1999 cost was considerably less than at private law schools; students

living off campus paid an average of only $18,415 for each of their three
years.' But tuition costs at such schools had been rising more quickly

than at private law schools.35

B. Debt

Lending is the engine that makes it possible for students to attend
law school.36 Approximately 86% of law students borrow to pay for their

education.37 Students take out two types of loans: (1) they incur debt that
is guaranteed by or extended by the federal government; and (2) they

also borrow commercially. Because it is less costly, they borrow first, to
the extent permitted by law, through the federal Stafford loan program."
id. at 333 & n.1. From 1997-98 to 1998-99, tuition at American Bar Association (ABA") approved
law schools increased 6%, compared to a national inflation rate of 1.6%. See id.
31. See E-mail from Rick L. Morgan to the Author, supra note 30 (noting that the cost of
living off campus while in law school for a year is an additional $12,054 (public and private law
schools combined)). By another measure, which counts into the cost of legal education the lost
wages that the student could have earned while attending law school, the cost of attendance Is
considerably greater. See Kramer, supranote 14, at 247.
32. See Olivas, supra note 30, at 334.
33. Id.
34. See E-mail from Rick L. Morgan to the Author, supra note 30 (noting the 1999 public law
school tuition for in-state residents and off-campus living expenses).
35. Average public law school tuition for in-state residents rose from $780 to $6000 between
1975 and 1997. See Olivas, supra note 30, at 333 tbl.1. Average in-state tuition rose another 6% in
1998 and a further 6% in 1999. See E-mail from Rick L. Morgan to the Author, supra note 30.
36. Some students receive money from parents for law school attendance, but even in 1987
John Kramer could write that "[m]ost students are given either more than $10,000 or nothing at all,"
and that the emergence of a large federal lending program was "encourag[ing] some parents to
abandon a previously accepted responsibility," causing students to have "to find money for legal
education themselves." Kramer, supranote 14, at 252.
37. Eighty-six percent of lawyers graduating in 1996 had borrowed. See SAMUEL M. KiPp, 111,
STUDENT BORROWING, DEBT BURDEN, AND DEFAULT: THE SPECIAL CASE OF FIRSTPROFESSIONAL STUDENTS IN THE 1990S, at 25 (Access Group, Inc. 1998). An increasingly high
percentage borrow as the cost of attendance rises; the corresponding percentage for the class of
1993 was 81%. See id.
38. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078, 1078-8 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Students with
exceptional financial need may also borrow up to $6000 per year (for graduate students) through the
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Government-guaranteed Stafford loans can be obtained from banks for
undergraduate education, for legal education, or for both, through the

Federal Family Education Loan Program ("FFELP")' known in a pre-

1992 incarnation as the federal guaranteed student loan program:i At

some universities, students may borrow directly from the federal
government, through its federal direct lending program, rather than from
banks." Stafford loans are extended at rates lower than the commercial

market would charge, and they are subject to a statutory interest rate
ceiling of 8.25%.42 Only 1% of law students borrows for college but not

for law school4 3 Fifty-three percent borrow for law school." Another
32% borrow for both levels of education."s
The Stafford loan program includes two types of loans. The first

$8500 per year that most law students borrow is subsidized," in that the
federal government pays the interest while the student is in school:

After borrowing $8500 this way, a student may also borrow up to an
additional $10,000 per year in unsubsidized Stafford loans."3 As in the

case of subsidized Stafford loans, the interest rate is linked annually to
the rate for ninety-one day Treasury bills," but the maximum rate is
Perkins Loan Program, in which the interest rate is capped at 5%. Sce id. § 10$7dd(all21 A11ii,
(c)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1999); see also ANNE STOcKWLJ, THE GUtERRIUA GUIDE TO MASTu'JxG
STuDENT LoAN DEBT 50-58 (1997) (discussing the history of financial aid). This manual, written
for students, is a well-known introductory orientation to the institutions that manage student loan
programs. It contains much useful history of federal financial aid, and it offers considerable help
with terminology and concepts. See id However, it does not describe repayment plans in detail.
39. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071 to 1087-4 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
40. See STOCKwEL, supranote 38, at 59.
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(a) (1994).
42. See id. § 1077aj)(1), (k)(1) (Supp. IV 1999) (describing original loans); id.
§ 1087e(b)(6)(C) (describing consolidation loans).
43. See Kipp, supranote 37, at 25 tbl.7.
44. See i&
45. See id.
46. Eligibility rules for subsidized Stafford loans to law students are sufficiently generous that
an estimated 95% to 97% of the Georgetom University Law Center ("Georgetowm") law students
who borrow receive subsidized Stafford funds. See E-mail from Ruth Lammut-Reeses, Assistant
Dean for Financial Aid, Georgetown University Law Center, to the Author (July 21, 2000, 12:27
EST) (on file with author).
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1077a(k)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
48. See id. § 1078-8(d)(2)(C). If the student is not eligible to borrow the full $35040 in
subsidized Stafford funds, he or she may borrow that money as part of the unsubsidized Stafford
loan. See id. § 1078-8(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
49. The rate is 1.7% more than the ninety-one day rate for the previous May %,
hila the
borrower is in school and for a short time thereafter, and 2.3% above that rate for the duration of
repayment. See id. § 1077a(j)-(k) (Supp. IV 1999). For loans that are consolidated, the interest rate
becomes fixed; itis the weighted average of the rate being paid for each of the consolidated loans at
the time they are consolidated, rounded up to the nearest higher one-eighth of 1"%, with a cap of
8.25%. See id. § 1077a(k)(l), (4).
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8.25%." However, although a student may defer paying interest on the
unsubsidized Stafford loan while in school, the unpaid interest is added

to principal (capitalized), so it will cause the size of the loan to increase.
Because the cost of attendance at many law schools exceeds the

$18,500 that may be borrowed through Stafford loans, many students
turn to private lenders to make up the difference. Typically, they turn to
private lending programs that are specifically geared to law students,

such as those offered by the Access Group, a major lender in this field.
Because the loans are not government-guaranteed, these programs
charge higher rates of interest than the banks or the government charge
on Stafford loans." But some students do not qualify to receive
sufficient credit from these private lending programs to cover all of their
educational expenses. Some students are driven toward still more

expensive private borrowing. For example, graduate students in the
United States have an average of seven credit cards, and the average
cumulative balance on these cards is $5800.2 Credit card interest rates
are often 16% to 18% per year.
In 1995-96, approximately one-quarter of all students at private law

schools had private loans on top of their Stafford loans." This percentage
was bound to keep rising, at least until 2003, because while law school

costs kept going up, the $18,500 annual limit on Stafford loans set by
Congress in 1992 was not changed in the congressional review of the

Higher Education Act in 1997, and is not scheduled for further
legislative review until 2002-03.-4 When the annual Stafford limits are
eventually increased, the amount of private lending may fall, but the

amount of total borrowing will continue to increase.
50. See id. §§ 1077a(k)(1), 1078-8(e)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
51. See Jane Bryant Quinn, New Schools of Thought on College Loans, WASH. POST, Nov.
14, 1999, at H2.
52. See Michael A. Olivas, Diane L. Saunders & Mel R. Stiller, The Challengeof Payingfor
a Graduateor ProfessionalDegree: Trends in Student Borrowing and the Ability to Repay Debt, In
SYMPOSIUM ON HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING: CRITICAL CHALLENGES INFINANCING GRADUATE
AND
PROFESSIONAL
DEGREES
47,
57,
Access
Group,
available
at
http://www.accessgroup.org/symposiumlacrobat/chapt3.pdf (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter SYMPOSIUM]
(providing the comments of Diane Saunders, Vice President of Communications & Public Affairs at
Nellie Mae). Nine percent of graduate students have credit card balances exceeding $15,000. See
id.; see also Susan Carpenter, Bankrupt at 24: For More and More Young Adults, Credit Cards,
Student Loans and Unwise Spending Add Up to Ovenvhelming Debt-And Some Are Using a LastResort Measure First,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at El.
53. See Kipp, supranote 37, at 22 tbl.4.
54. The percentage of law students borrowing from private sources fell (from 36%) after
1992, because in that year, Congress raised the loan limit to $18,500 and made eligibility criteria
much more generous. See Default Rate Dips Againfor Student Loans, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 12, 1997,
at 10A. "[M]ore than 60 percent of the increase in cumulative federal borrowing ... was actually
the result of substituting lower-cost federal loans for private loans." Kipp,, supra note 37, at 21.
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The federal indebtedness and the total indebtedness of graduating
law students have increased steadily. Table 1 displays this increase.
TABLE 1:

CUMULATIVE DEBT OF GRADUATING LAW STUDENTS"

Public law schools

Year

Average
federal loan

Average total
debt

Private law schools
Average
federal loan

Average total
debt

debt

debt

$28,000

1987-88

(estimate)

1992-93

$22,278

$28,945

$30,887

$41,776

1995-96

$39,337

$39,987

$49,043

$53,036

1999

$44,366

$41,828

$52,083

$56,324

(conservative
estimate) -"

From 1988 to 1996, the cost of living increased by 32.6%, so

indebtedness of $28,000 in 1988 would amount (in 1996) to $37,128 in
1988 dollars. The 1995-96 $53,036 average total debt of private law

school students therefore represents a considerable increase in terms of
real dollars. Similarly, the 1992-93 average total private law school debt
of $41,776 should equate in 1996 to $45,368, not $53,036, if there had
been no real increase. " From 1987 to 1999, the cost of living went up by
less than 50%,"8 but the average debt of students graduating from private
law schools doubled.

55. The data from 1992-93 and 1995-96 were derived by Samuel M. Kipp, III from thz
National Center for Education Statistics' National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 1992-93 and
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 1995-96 databases. See KIpp. supra note 37, at 21. They
understate total indebtedness because they exclude credit card debt. See id. Good statistics are
apparently unavailable before 1992-93. The 1938 estimate is based on an analysis of the cumulative
debt ($22,000) of students graduating from Tulane Law School that year who had borro%%ed from
Law Access, plus an estimated $6000 of undergraduate debt with v,hich they arrived in law school.
See Kramer, supranote 21, at 672-73.
56. This estimate was derived only by adjusting for 1996-99 inflation, and assuming no real
increase in borrowing, even though borrowing has historically outpaced inflation. United States
government statistics show that average indebtedness for all 1997 first-professional (not only lav.)
graduates was $66,200. See SUSAN P. CHOY & C. DENNIS CARROLL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuC., DEBT
BURDEN FOUR YEARS AFrER CO.LEGE 56 (NCES 2000-188 2000).

57. Unless othenvise stated, inflation adjustments in this Article were computed using a
particularized inflation calculator. See Consmner Price Index (CPI) Inflation Calculator.Johnson
Space Center, at httpJ/www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2inflateCPLhtml (last visited Feb. 13.2001).
58. The increase over these years vms 46.7%. See id.
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The $56,324 estimate of average debt (for students graduating from

private law schools in 1999) is based on projections from data selfreported by students in a Department survey, and it may significantly
understate the amount of debt. Two recent studies suggest that the debt
is actually higher. The National Association of Student Financial Aid

Administrators' survey of financial aid administrators found that for law
student borrowers graduating in 1998, average cumulative debt

(including undergraduate debt) was $45,536 at public schools and
$63,078 at private schools. 9 The Access Group, which probably extends

the majority of loans to law students," studied the average indebtedness
of 1998 law graduates who had exhausted their three $18,500 Stafford
loans and borrowed at least once from the Access Group.6 It found that
the average indebtedness of these graduates was $79,851.55, not
including accrued undergraduate debt.62

Averages can be misleading. Many schools have higher-thanaverage tuition or are located in regions in which the cost of living is

particularly high. Also, within high-cost schools, students incur a range
of debt, in part because some bring with them more family resources
than others, and some earn more during summers. It is therefore worth

noting that among law students graduating in 1995 from the 10% of law
schools with the highest average indebtedness, the average debt was

$68,690.

Some law schools with high average indebtedness of

graduating students in 1998 included California Western School of Law

($78,350), Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
("Catholic") ($78,500), Georgetown University Law Center
("Georgetown") ($82,600), George Washington University Law School
($80,050), Stetson University College of Law ($91,897), Tulane Law

59. See Kenneth E. Redd, Policies, Practices, and Procedures in Graduate Student Aid: A
Report on the 1998 NASFAA SOGAPPP Survey, NASFAA's STUDENT AID TRANscRIr, Spring
2000, at 10, 18 fig.4.
60. Telephone Interview with Jeff Hanson, Access Group Analyst (June 29, 2000). Law
students probably know this lender by the term "Law Access," its division for law school lending.
61. See The Price of Law School: An Access Group Analysis, Access Group, Access Update,
at http:lwww.accessgroup.orgupdatel3.-2000/5.htm (last modified Mar. 2000) (providing a
summary of the analysis).
62. See id. The components of the indebtedness were: Subsidized Stafford loan borrowed,
$25,500; principal amount of unsubsidized Stafford loan, $30,000; accrued interest on unsubsidized
Stafford loan (at 8.25% per annum), $5259; principal amount of private loan, $14,000; accrued
interest on private loan (at 8.76% per annum), $2911; guarantee fee (covers defaults on private
loans) due at repayment, $2181. See Memorandum from Jeff Hanson, Access Group, to interested
parties on Average Debt at Repayment, Law School Class of 1998-Revised 2-3 (Jan. 26,2000) (on
file with author).
63. See Kipp, supra note 37, at 29.
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School ($96,596), and Whittier Law School ($82,868)64 The average
law school debt (that is, excluding college debt) of new George
Washington students had increased from $30,000 to $71,000 in just
eight years.s
Many law schools' average debt is lower than these very high
figures, but even at schools with lower average debt, some students owe
much more. Journalistic accounts report some students graduating from
law schools owing $90,000,05 $100,000, 67 and $120,000."
From one perspective, increasing law school costs and the

concomitant debt that students incur are unproblematic, because the
market will presumably respond appropriately. 9 Consumers of legal
work may pay more for it, making student loan repayment at least as
easy in the future as it has been in the past. Alternatively, if consumers

believe that legal work is overpriced (in part because legal education is

64. These figures were derived from reports of average 1998 graduating debt supplied by law
schools to U.S. News & World Report and compiled on its Web site. See Compare Lim, Schools,
U.S. News & World Rep. Online, at http://vwv.unews.conitusnewadtdukaeyondgmdfgradlaw.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2001). The numbers for the schools mentioned in the text above are calculated
using this Web site and one additional site. See U.S. News & Vorld Rep. Online, at
http://www.usnews.com/servletsdWorkSheet (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). The figures reported here
are $9500 higher than those listed on the Web sites, because the magazine requested from law
schools only the average debt resulting from law school loans; the data thus excludes outstanding
college debt. See E-mail from Ruth Lammert-Reeves, Assistant Dean for Financial Aid,
Georgetown University School of Law, to the Author (June 12, 2000) (on file with author). The
excluded outstanding educational debt from undergraduate studies was S9546. See Lawepoly
Clarification, Nat'l Jurist Online, at http://www.natjurist.comfmeath.shtm (last visited Mar. 2,
1999). The NationalJurist data was based on Department statistics. See id. For the class of 1999,
the average cumulative debt at Georgetown had grown by an additional $5920. so for that class it
was approximately $88,520 (after a $9500 upward adjustment for college debt). See E-mail from
Ruth Lammert-Reeves to the Author, supra.
65. See Ginny Edwards, Loan Forgiveness: Making Public Interest Law.,
Interesting, PUB.
LAW., Winter 1999, at 6; Kate Ackley, TilDebt Do Us Part: Some Schools Help Reps, Student
Loans for Grads 1Wo Take Public Interest Jobs, LEoAL TLmES, Sept. 6. 1999, at $31. It is not
suggested that the average distribution of student indebtedness among institutions deviates from the
usual bell curve, but only that policy makers should be concerned, perhaps especially concerned,
about those at the high end as well as other parts of the curve.
66. See Ackley, supra note 65.
67. For example, Leonard Adler, a Georgetowm graduate of 1994, graduated vith such debt.
See FinancialAid, Nat'l Jurist Online, Apr.-May 1998, at htip'J:/w-w.natjurist.conffinancia.html
(last visited June 10, 1998).
68. See Tom Stabile, Lawopoly: Borrowed Time, NAT'L JURIST, Apr. 1999, at 14. 14 pt. 2.
Bennett Miller, chair of the ABA student division in 1999, knew of one couple %%ho had graduated
from Northwestern University Law School owing a combined $250,00. See Mark Haren, And
Debt'sAll Folks: To New Lmyers Paying Off Student Loans 'Budget' Is Not a Bad Word, A.B.A.
J., June 1999, at 24,24.
69. See, e.g., Trish Crawford. Unequal Justice,ToRoNro STAi, Feb. 6. 1994. at BI ("'Legal
services are based on [the] ...market."') (quoting Osgoode Hall Law School Associate Dani.
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too expensive), they will not pay more. 0 Then some students will see
that they cannot afford to become lawyers, and they will pursue other
lines of education and employment. Society will have fewer lawyers,
and some law schools might close, but those would be desirable
consequences of market-based decisions to spend less on legal service.
Indeed, there is evidence that the market has been responding in the
first of these ways, by paying lawyers more. Between 1993 and 1999,
starting salaries in most sectors of the legal profession rose apace.
TABLE

2:

STARTING SALARIES FOR LAWYERS
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 7

Private

1993
median
starting

1999
Percent
median increase
starting

salary

salary

48

70

46%

61

27%

practice

1999 median
starting salary
in 1993 dollars

Percent
increase in
constant
dollars

I

Business

40

54

35%

47

17%

Government

31.6

38

20%

33

4.4%

Public

27

32

18.5%

27.7

2.6%

interest

Thus, while the average cumulative debt at the nation's private law
schools increased from $41,776 to $56,324 (35% in current dollars, and
15% in constant dollars), starting salaries for lawyers in private practice
and business surpassed the increase in accumulated debt. These two
2
categories account for 69% of all new lawyers.
The 27% real increase for lawyers in private practice may
significantly understate the trend for this group, because a wave of major
salary hikes in 1999-2000 apparently produced a further 20% increase,
at least for lawyers starting at large corporate firms, just after these

70. See Curtis J. Sitomer, Burger Urges Lawyers to Polish Ethics, Help Unclog Courts,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1984, at 3.
71. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, STARTING SALARIES: WHAT NEw LAW
GRADUATES EARN, CLASS OF 1998, at 6 (1999). The data for the Class of 1999 were derived from
NAT'L Ass'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.'S: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW
GRADUATES, CLASS OF 1999, at 18 (2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES 1999].
72. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.'s: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF
NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 1998, at 13 (1999) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES
1998].
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statistics were reported.' Among recent graduates who join private law

firms, approximately 25% enter firms of more than one-hundred
lawyers.'
Within these categories, some new lawyers at the turn of the

twenty-first century were being paid at a rate far surpassing the median.
Some7 5new lawyers in the year 2000 started at salaries of $160,000 or
more.
The table also shows, however, that government lawyers (12.2% of

beginning attorneys) and public interest lawyers (2.6% of such
attorneys) 76 were falling behind the curve. Their real income increases of
4.4% and 2.6% did not keep up with the 15% real average indebtedness
increase over the same period of time.' For them, the problem of debt is

becoming more severe for each graduating class. It is not simply that the
absolute amounts of debt are larger each year; that would not be a
problem if salaries were keeping pace. For these graduates, debts are
mounting more rapidly than starting salaries.
C. The Pressureon PublicInterestLawyers

How much pressure does this mounting debt actually put on new
lawyers who seek public service jobs? An analysis of this problem must
first take note of the prevalent idea that student loans should be paid

within ten years after graduation. This concept is a psychological

73. See Jessica Guynn, ForBay Area Attomeys, Salariesin Stratosphere: Competitionfrom
Internet Start-Ups Prompts Some Big Firms to Pay Their Beginners S125,00 or More, CO'TRA
COSTA Tinrs, Feb. 19, 2000, at A01 (noting that the average large-firm starting salaries increased
to $125,000, with some firms offering $165,000); David Leonhardt, Law Firms' Pay Soarsto Stem
Dot-Com Defections, N.Y. TINES, Feb. 2, 2000, at Al (noting top New York firms raising their
starting pay to $160,000, and firms around the country were expected to follow with significant
raises); Jeffrey McCracken, Boom Fuels Lmyer Pay Surge: Local Law Firms Follow Honigiman
Miller's Lead,CRAm's DET. Bus., Apr. 10, 2000, at 3 (describing Detroit firms raising starting pay
by $20,000 or more in 2000, compared to $3500 in 1999); David Phelps, Not Just Poecet Change,
STAR-TRiB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 23, 2000, at D1.
74. See EmPLOYMENT AND SALARIES 1998, supranote 72, at 28.
75. See Leonhardt,supra note 73.
76. See EmPLOYMENT AND SAtARIES 1998, supranote 72, at 13.
77. A Department official who read an earlier draft of this Article, including the statistics
reported in the table of starting salaries, vote to the Author that the numbers reported by the
National Association for Law Placement for starting and mid-career salaries of govenment officials
"seem[s] erroneously high, particularly based on all the letters my office received from low-pad
public defenders and prosecutors earlier this year." E-mail from Daniel L Pollard. D.partnt of
Education official, to the Author (Aug. 1,2000, 10:33 EST) (on file with author).
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assumption on the part of most students. It is also very nearly a
convention in the literature on debt repayment.79
As all law student borrowers know, Stafford loans taken out
through FFELP must be repaid within ten years, unless the borrower
elects an alternative repayment plan." This maximum ten-year period is,
according to the federal statute, the "standard repayment" period." When
the federal government lends money to students through the federal
direct loan program, it offers other repayment options, but the direct
federal lending program also calls ten-year repayment "standard
repayment."82 Students have become used to thinking of ten years as the
"right" time within which to pay off student loans, even though, because
of the existence of alternative repayment plans and subsequent
consolidation opportunities, no student is required to do so."' Authorities
on debt repayment also tend to treat ten-year repayment as standard,
often not mentioning alternatives. 4 The popular press read by law
students reinforces the holiness of a ten-year schedule. For example, in
1999, a dramatic cover story in The National Jurist, a magazine
distributed free at law schools, concluded that average debt was so high
at twenty-three law schools that graduates entering public practice would
actually have a below-zero disposable income after making their loan

78. See, e.g., Kramer, supranote 14, at 264.
79. See, e.g., id.; see also sources cited infra note 84.
80. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1999). Students receive this information in
written form from their financial aid offices, from the lenders who handle their loan, or from Web
sites. See, e.g., FederalStafford Loan, Access Group, at http://www.accessgroup.org (last visited
Feb. 21, 2001) (following hyperlinks to Federal Stafford Loan terms stating "[u]p to ten years to
repay" and "[filexible repayment options and federal loan consolidation also available").
81. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A)(i).
82. See id. § 1087e(a)(1), (d)(1)(A) (1994).
83. See id. § 1078(b)(9)(A) (Supp. IV 1999) (containing other repayment plans); id.
§ 1087e(d), (g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (explaining that students may consolidate governmentguaranteed loans such as Stafford loans into a federal direct loan with a longer repayment term).
Private loans typically offer repayment terms longer than ten years. See, e.g., Law Access Loan,
Access Group, at http://www.accessgroup.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (following hyperlinks to
Law Access Loan terms).
84. For example, Olivas uses a ten-year repayment table to compute the "[mlonthly payment"
for various types of graduate students who owe average debts, without identifying that he is doing
so. See Olivas, supra note 30, at 338 tbl.2. In his discussion of law graduate debt repayment, Kipp
also treats only ten-year repayment, stating: "If they had medium or high debt levels, those on the
lowest end of the salary scale would require 26 percent or more of their gross monthly earnings to
repay their student loans within ten years." Kipp, supra note 37, at 30. Kipp does not explore longer
repayment options. Kornhauser and Revesz analyze debt burdens by reference to both ten-year and
fifteen-year repayment schedules, but they do not consider longer repayment terms. See Lewis A.
Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of
Race, Gender, and EducationalDebt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 890 (1995).
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payments.'5 The magazine assumed that students would pay 1.3% of
their debt per month, based on the empirical average paid by graduate
students, not the lowest amount that students could lawfully pay." The
ten-year term, more than any other factor, makes making ends meet on a
low income so difficult.
Experts have offered certain benchmarks as measures of the
dividing line between acceptable and excessive debt repayment.
Reviewing the literature on debt manageability a decade ago, David
Chambers noted: "The principal writers ...hover within a fairly narrow
range in their recommendations."" Daniere, a leading authority, advised
students not to incur indebtedness requiring them to pay more than 7.5%
of net (after-tax) income, while Horch, another expert, suggested 9% for
higher-income professionals.? John Kramer recommended 8%.? The
Department believes that "[tihe median Federal [student] debt burden
(yearly scheduled payments as a percentage of annual income) of
borrowers in their first full year of repayment [should] be less than 10
percent," because "[a]s a general rule, it is believed that an educational
debt burden of 10 percent or greater will negatively affect a [student's]
ability to repay his or her student loan and to obtain other credit such as
a home mortgag
Over the years, however, single-digit percentages have been
exceeded routinely by law graduates. Rather than lending less money or
calling for subsidies, banking industry representatives have made everhigher estimates of how much debt repayment is tolerable. In the early
1990s, they raised the level to about 15%, and later in the decade, to
20%,"' though as recently as 2000 some industry officials still

recommended an 8% limit on gross income," which works out, for a
person earning $32,000, to about 9.4% of net income. But The National
85. See Jack Crittenden et al., Lawopoly: Pass Go,Borrow Money. Pay Tuition. Repeat Cycle.
Welcome to the Game of Lav School Debt-Where the Money Is Real and the Stakes Are High,
NAT'LJURisT, Feb. 1999, at 14, 17-18 pt.l.

86. Seeid.at 18.
87. Chambers, supranote 24,at 717.

88. See id.
89. See Kramer, supranote 14,at 263-64.
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POLICY, at K-6 Indicator
1.4, availableat http:/Iwv,w%.ed.gov/pubsIAnnualPlan200O069-red.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,2001).

supra note 85, at 15 (quoting Diane Saunders, Vice Prsid2nt of
91. See Crittenden et al.,
Communications and Public Affairs at Nellie Mae, a major lender).
92. See PATICIA M. ScHERSCHEL, USA GROUP FOUND. NEW AGENDA SERIES. STUDENr
DEBT LEVELS CONTRIN TO RISE: STAFFORD INDEBTEDNESS: 1999 UPDATE, at 7 (2000) ("Lenders

frequently recommend that borrowers limit their monthly student loan payments to no more than 8
percent of their pre-tax monthly incomes. Although arbitrary, this guideline helps ensure that
monthly installments remain a manageable share of household budgets.").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:733

Jurist'scalculations (which understated the magnitude of the problem by

erroneously excluding undergraduate debt)93 showed that by 1998,
seventy-one law schools' new graduates entering the public sector had
debt-to-income ratios exceeding 20%.' Using the lower indebtedness
figures from 1995, Kipp concluded that graduates with average debts
and jobs paying the lowest decile of starting salaries would have to
spend at least 26% of their already low incomes for ten-year debt
repayment. 95 Similar students with high debts would have to spend 36%
of their incomes to pay back their student loans.96 Kornhauser and
Revesz concluded: "[A]n individual in these circumstances would accept
a not-for-profit job only if she were independently wealthy, benefited
from generous [debt relief] assistance [from her law school], or could

not secure more lucrative employment.' '
These payment-to-salary ratios all assume ten-year repayment. But,
as noted above, a law graduate could consolidate her loan and pay a
lower amount each month. This procedure will, of course, stretch out the
number of years during which she will have to pay. Furthermore,

deferring payment of much of the debt will significantly increase the
amount that has to be paid, because interest will accrue, and compound,

for a longer period of time. The amount of additional payment will
depend on the interest rate(s) applicable to the loan and the period of
repayment. Table 3 assumes that a graduate is repaying $75,500,
approximately the largest amount that he or she is likely to borrow
through FFELP.9' It assumes that the interest rate on the loan is 8.25%,
93. See Lawopoly Clarification, Nat'l Jurist Online, at http://www.natjurist.conmeath.shtml
(last visited Mar. 2, 1999).
94. See Crittenden et al., supra note 85, at 15.
95. See KIpp, supra note 37, at 30 tbl.9.
96. See id.
97. Komhauser & Revesz, supra note 84, at 890. Law school debt repayment plans arc
discussed later in the Article. See infra Part V.F. Komhauser and Revesz erroneously believed that
they "are now becoming commonplace and quite generous." Komhauser & Revesz, supra note 84,
at 890. However, by 1999, only forty-seven law schools (of the 182 law schools accredited by the
ABA) had such plans, and they varied considerably in the generosity of their benefits. See Law
Schools with LRAP or Public Interest Scholarship Programs, Nat'l Ass'n for Pub. Interest Law,
Financing the Future, at http://www.napil.org/SUB-SO/Report2000/REPORTLIST-FM.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2001). In fact, just six law schools disbursed 70% of all of the benefits offered by
the forty-seven loan repayment programs. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, FINANCING
THE FUTURE: NAPIL's 2000 REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL LOAN REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE AND
PUBLIC INTEREST SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS 10 (2000) [hereinafter FINANCING THE FUTURE].
98. This assumes approximately $55,500 in law student Stafford loans, $5000 in accrued
interest and $15,000 in undergraduate debt. In 1996, the average undergraduate debt for law
students was between $9000 and $10,000, though the average undergraduate debt for graduates of
four-year private colleges was $14,290. See KIPP, supra note 37, at 25, 35. The average
undergraduate debt for law students had been falling slightly, perhaps because those with already
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the maximum that may be charged on Stafford loans.

'

It shows the

relationship between the duration of the loan term, the monthly payment,
and the amount of actual dollars that the graduate vAil eventually have to

pay. It also includes a column showing the value in current dollars of the
total repayment, an amount much smaller than the actual dollar cost of
repayment because a dollar that must be paid to a creditor after twenty

years of inflation is much less valuable than a dollar that is paid
immediately. The table discounts the value of money by 5.8% per

annum, the rate of interest as of September 14, 2000, on thirty year
United States treasury bonds.""
TABLE 3:

COST OF REPAYING A $75,500 LOAN AT 8.25% INTEREST,

OVER VARIOUS PERIODS

Monthly
payments

Annual
payment

Total of actual
payments, rounded
to nearest thousand

Present value of all
payments, rounded
to nearest thousand

10 years

926

11,112

111,000

83,000

15 years

732

8789

132,000

87,000

20 years

643

7720

154,000

90,000

25 years

595

7143

179,000

92,000

30 years

567

6806

204,000

95,000

The table shows that stretching out a debt from ten years to a much
longer period of repayment does reduce the monthly repayment
high debt levels were less likely to continue on to law school. See id. at 40. This Article uses many
illustrations that assume an accumulated undergraduate debt of S15,000, in part to adjust the 1996
figures for inflation and in part because of the concern not only with the average student but alro
with students (such as graduates from four-year private colleges) %hose debts are greater than
average (and whose incomes are significantly below average).
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(I)-(3) (1994).
100. Because a dollar repaid in the future is less valuable than a dollar that is repaid at once,
discounting the stream of future loan repayments to present value (that is, to constant dollars) is
important. But selecting the appropriate discount rate for future loan repayments is not simple. The
thirty-year treasury bond rate seems a conservative choice, and the tables in this Article use a
discount rate of 5.8%, the thirty-year bond rate in September 2000. An appendi to this Article
discusses the issue of discounting and the reasons for choosing the thirty-year bond rate. The
income-contingent repayment calculator, infra note 268, uses the thirty-year bond rate as its default
value but allows the user to select any other rate.
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significantly, and that, of course, the total amount that must be repaid
increases greatly. It also shows that measured in terms of the present
value of future payments, the increase in the cost of repayment is not
nearly as dramatic as the straight dollar comparison suggests. The fact
that they are paying in dollars worth less than in yesteryear may seem
cold comfort to students who are actually repaying $200,000 for a
$75,000 loan, but as John Kramer noted long ago, "the total amount of
dollars exacted by the penalty [of paying over a longer period] may
overstate the actual burden on the graduate."'0 '
As noted above, students at some major private law schools
graduate with debts considerably higher than $75,500. Because they are
unable to borrow more than $18,500 in government-guaranteed loans,
they must borrow the additional funds commercially. Table 4 shows the
additional cost of repaying $30,000 in commercial loans. The interest
rate on such loans is not capped at 8.25%. In June 2000, students
fortunate enough to obtain a relatively good rate would pay
approximately 8.64%, and that is the rate used in this table.'te
TABLE

4: COST OF REPAYING $30,000 BORROWED COMMERCIALLY
Monthly
payments

Annual
payment

10 years

374

4488

15 years

298

20 years

Total of actual
payments, rounded

Present value of all
payments, rounded to

to nearest thousand

nearest thousand

45,000

34,000

3572

54,000

36,000

263

3154

63,000

37,000

25 years

244

2930

73,000

38,000

30 years

233

2801

84,000

39,000

A lawyer who graduates owing $105,500 would combine those
shown by Tables 3 and 4, as indicated in Table 5.
101. Kramer, supranote 14, at 267.
102. The rates vary slightly by offeror and school of attendance. This is the Law Access Loan
offered by the Access Group to Georgetown Law Students. This company offers a rate of 2.75%
above the ninety-one day treasury bill rate, which was 5.885% for the second quarter of calendar
year 2000. The rate is actually understated, because Law Access also requires a one-time payment
of at least an additional 6.9% of the amount borrowed as a "guarantee fee," to be paid just before the
last payment is made. See, e.g., Law Access Loan, Access Group, at http://www.accessgroup.org
(ast visited Feb. 21, 2001) (following hyperlinks to Law Access Loan terms). Significantly higher
rates are imposed on students at other schools. See infra note 429.
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TABLE 5:

REPAYMENTS REQUIRED OF A TYPICAL GRADUATE

WHO OWES $105,500
Monthly

Annual

payments

Total of actual

Present value of all

payments, rounded
to nearest thousand
117,000

10 years

1300

payment payments, rounded
to nearest thousand
15,600
156,000

15 years

1030

12,361

186,000

123,000

20 years

906

10,874

217,000

127,000

25 years

839

10,073

252,000

130,000

30 years

800

9607

288,000

134,000

A graduate who owes about $105,000 could therefore reduce her
annual payment from about $15,600 to about $9600 (a 38.5% reduction)
by stretching out the payments over thirty years, and by agreeing to
repay a total of $288,000 rather than $156,000 (an 84.6% increase
measured in current dollars, though only about 15% more in constant
dollars if a 5.8% discount rate is used). But even stretched out loans that
lower current payments by 38.5% are not affordable for public interest
lawyers. Recall that the median 1999 starting salary for public interest
lawyers is $32,000. Federal tax on that amount for a single filer was
$3784; 'o- taking into account state and local tax, the graduate's after tax
income would be about $27,000. Even the most stretched out repayment
of $9607 annually would require the graduate to pay 36% of her aftertax income toward her student debt, far in excess even of the highest
figure (20%) recommended by a banking official. And that stretched out
repayment would require the graduate, over thirty years, to write checks
for $288,000 to repay her $105,500 student loan.
D. The Casefor a Subsidy
If stretching out loans is not sufficient to enable law graduates to
become public interest lawyers, perhaps public or private subsidies
should be encouraged. But before considering the effect of the subsidies
103. This calculation assumes that the taxpayer would take the standard deduction of S4150
and have a personal exemption of $2650. The tax here is based on the 1999 federal tax tables. See
2000
Tax
Tables,
Digital
Daily,
Feb.
13,
2001,
at
http:/w.irs.gov/prodrmc.infoltax_tablesdta035k.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2001) (providing
the 2000 federal tax tables).
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that are built into the income-contingent repayment option, it is worth
taking a moment to return to the idea that if there is a problem here, the
market will solve it. The market for corporate legal services already
appears to be adjusting to the high cost of education." ° If salaries for

public interest lawyers are too low to enable them to repay their
educational debts, perhaps the market is signaling that we have an
oversupply of government and public interest lawyers. In this view, the

trend in which debt is rising faster than income for public interest
lawyers is at worst a temporary problem that will eventually vanish as

new lawyers simply reject the less remunerative nonprofit specialties
and join the ranks of the corporate world.

From a different perspective, however, governmental or public
interest legal services might be regarded as a public good deserving of a
subsidy because the market does not value them highly enough." The

nation provides many kinds of subsidized services, including some legal
services, to its least fortunate residents. Furthermore, a nation that in the

short run would rather have more corporate and fewer public interest
lawyers may want to pay a modest sum to preserve for another day the
strain of idealism and the culture of public service embodied by public
interest lawyers and the students who become such lawyers.
A glimpse at what would happen if students who want to become

public interest lawyers were not sufficiently subsidized may clarify the
cost of treating the market-driven status quo as good enough. We may
perceive several effects that some, including the Author, regard as
unfortunate.

104. See supra text accompanying note 73.
105. In recent years, programs of law school subsidies for students who want to become public
interest lawyers have grown dramatically. See FINANCING THE FTURE, supra note 97, at 17
(showing the subsidy growth from 3 million dollars in 1993-94 to 7.5 million dollars, given out
through forty-seven law school programs, in 1998-99). This development suggests that within the
community of legal educators, there is broad agreement that such subsidies are desirable. Not
everyone agrees with this view, however, either within or without the law school community. But
even a very strong free market advocate who disapproves of subsidies for public interest lawyers,
particularly those serving ideological communities because "there is no guarantee that gains In
utility will exceed losses in utility and result in an overall increase in societal welfare," recognizes:
[T]here appears to be a consensus ... that there is substantial unmet need for civil
poverty lawyers and that criminal representation is barely adequate [so a] ... law school
may conclude that both the immediate donees and the public at large would benefit if the
law school were to make a charitable contribution that increased legal services for the
poor.
Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 451, 513-16
(1991).
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E. Effects on Nonprofit PublicSenice Institutionsand
Their Clients

It is well known that the civil legal needs of the nation's poor are
not being met. Attorney General Janet Reno reminded the nation in 1994
"that eighty to ninety percent of the poor and the working poor in

America do not have access to legal services.""" Her conclusion is
supported by several academic studies.

7

Legal aid organizations

obviously need more public support, either directly through larger
federal grants or indirectly through loan repayment subsidies that enable
them to spread their scarce payroll dollars among more lawyers." As
lawyers' debt burdens rise, fewer graduates will be able to afford to
serve in poorly paid public interest jobs that serve the poor and near-

poor. In the short run, public interest organizations, such as legal service
offices, public defender organizations, and local governments may still
be able to fill vacancies, though expansion will be limited. At present,
many law students are idealistic and would like to engage in public
service,' °' and most nonprofit organizations currently have little trouble

attracting applicants for the few jobs that become available."' However,
106. The Honorable Janet Reno, Address Delivered at the Celebration of the Seventy.Fifth
Anniversary of Women at Fordham Lav School, 63 FORDHAM L REV. 5, 12 (1994).
107. See, e.g., FAMILY LAW SECTION, COMM. ON THE PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT. MASS.
BAR ASS'N, CHANGING THE CULTURE OF THE PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT 26 (1997) (noting that

in probate and family court, at least one party is unrepresented in approximately 80% of cases);
JANE C. MURPHY & BARBARA A. BABB, ADVISORY CouNciL ON FAMILY LEGAL NEEDS OF Low
INCOME PERSONS, INCREASING AccEss TO JUSTICE FOR MARYLAND'S FAMILIES 50 (1992) (noting

that only 11% of Maryland's poor who have domestic problems receive legal assistance); Jane C.
Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law. 8 BYU J. PUB. L 123. 124-27
(1993) (containing a summary of several surveys); William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal
Needs of the Poorin Louisiana, 19 S.U. L. REV. 273,273 (1992) (noting that "85% [to) 92% of the
low income people in Louisiana who had civil legal needs in 1991 were" unrepresented).
108. See, e.g., More Legal Aid, KAN. CrrY STAR, May 1, 2000. at B4 (discussing the urgent

need for more funding in legal aid programs).
109. In 1998, in a survey of 548 entering frst-year law students conducted by Georgetown,
20% of the respondents said that "public interest" work best described their current plans for using
their law degrees; another 16% selected "government practice." GEORGETOwN UNIERSITY LW
CENTER, 1998 SURVEY OF ENTERING STUDENTS (Sept. 17, 1998). These p.ercentages are slightly
overstated as students were allowed to select more than one career option, and the total of the
percentages selected by all students was therefore 108% rather than 100%. See id.
110. Even now, this generalization is not universally true. In 1993, a survey by the Legal
Services Corporation found that 57% of Legal Services Corporation field program directors h2a
difficulty recruiting attorneys, and 55% reported educational debt as a constraint on the numter of
applications. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. INTEREST LAw, COMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS,
CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVIcE GRANT PROGRamiS AND SUFORT FoR

INVESTiENT AcdnvmIES 3 (1994). Some other public interest organizations also experiene
recruiting difficulty. The ABA operates ProBar, a highly reputed office serving the needs of aliens
who need legal representation at the border in Harlingen, Texas. See, e.g., James Pinkerton. Judge
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to the extent that students at high-cost law schools are unable to consider
such employment because the low salaries are insufficient to enable
them to repay their loans, these organizations cannot participate in a

truly national labor market. In time, their recruiting will be limited to the
small proportion of lawyers who are independently wealthy, lawyers
who went to state law schools where their educations were subsidized by

state taxpayers, and graduates of the minority of law schools (possibly as
few as six such schools) that pay generous subsidies through their own
loan repayment programs to graduates who perform public service.'"
Furthermore, the world does not have a static number of public
service jobs. The number and variety of such positions expand in part
because law students and young lawyers who want to work in such
organizations create new positions. Some win "seed money" foundation

grants to establish new organizations through which they will be
employed."'

Others volunteer with organizations and become so

indispensable that the organizations intensify fund-raising efforts to
retain them. As debt closes off the opportunity to establish new low-

income positions, this pie-expanding phenomenon will be curtailed.
To the extent that increasing indebtedness precludes lawyers from
accepting full-time public service employment, the gap might in

principle be filled by an increased commitment from law firms to
encourage pro bono work by their lawyers."3 Unfortunately, the world
seems to be moving in the opposite direction. As salaries for lawyers
have skyrocketed in recent years (reducing partners' profits), the subtle

pressure on many firms' associates not to contribute pro bono time has
Grants Orphan-Twins Asylum After Hearing About Abuse by Family, HotUs. CHRON., Feb. 8, 2000,
at A15. The ABA began advertising in October 1999 for a lawyer with two years immigration
experience to serve in the ProBar office, and the position was still unfilled in June 2000. See E-mail
from Carol wolchok, American Bar Association staff member, to the Author (June 12, 2000) (on
file with author).
111. See supra note 97.
112. For example, the Vanguard Public Foundation (which contributed $5000) and the echoing
green Foundation (which provided $25,000) made it possible for Van Jones to start the Ella Baker
Center for Human Rights in San Francisco. See Rinat Fried, Civil Rights Lawyer Fights Police
Misconduct, RECORDER, Sept. 11, 1995, at 2. Three years later, Mr. Jones had succeeded in forcing
the dismissal from the police force of an officer who had killed two suspects, and won the Reebok
International Human Rights Award. See Susan Gray, Lawyer's Fight Against Rogue Cop Becomes
Crusadefor Human Rights, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 14, 1999, at 12. The echoing green
Foundation also provided a small grant to enable Eric Rosenthal to start Mental Disability Rights
International, now a well-respected human rights organization. See Stacy Weiner, Speaking Up for
the Mentally Disabled: Eric Rosenthal Brings Their Plight to the World, WAsH. POST, Jan. 18,
2000, at Cl.
113. See, e.g., Jeff Blumenthal, Pro Bono Work Benefits Client, Associate: New Wolf Block
Program Combines Pro Bono and Professional Training, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 18, 2000,
at 5.
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intensified."' Lawyers at the one hundred top American law firms are

now expected to bill for 2200 hours per year compared to 1700 a few
years ago, and in 1999, even before major salary increases that took

effect in 2000, they spent only thirty-six hours per year doing pro bono
work, compared to fifty-six hours in 1992." 5
F. Effects on Individual and Family Consumersof
Legal Senices

As costs and debts rise, not only the very poor (who are often
served through nonprofit organizations) but also ordinary families and
workers are relegated to an ever-constricting legal market. Like the poor,
they will be unable to obtain legal representation, " ' or will have to
choose among a limited pool of lawyers who, for personal reasons, are

not forced by their debts to work for wealthy corporations. Some law
students would like to spend their careers representing ordinary

Americans with routine legal problems; they seek a practice in which
they will serve neither large corporations and their wealthy executives

nor the very poor. But the solo practitioners and small firms who have
long been the nation's family lawyers are able to pay far less than the
large corporate firms. For 1999 graduates, the median starting salary in
firms with two to ten lawyers was $40,000, compared with $97,000 for
firms with more than 500 lawyers and $92,000 in firms with 251-500
114. Some firms remain strongly committed to a pro bono tradition and count pro bona time
toward an associate's billable hours, and in a few cases do not even distinguish the purpose of the
hours spent in reports that go to the partners. But such firms appear to be a minority. See. e.g.,
Daphne Eviatar, Uncormmon Causes,AM. LAW., Dec. 2000, at 88, 115.
115. See Greg Winter, Legal Finns Cuttig Back on Free Serricesfor Por N.Y. TImES, Aug.
17, 2000, at Al.
116. It could be argued that society should expect a family with modest resources to chvoae to
spend even a high proportion of those resources on expensive legal services, if it needs a law)er,
and to forego alternative spending. But that analysis treats legal services as just another
consumption choice, like buying a car or taking a vacation. Frank Michelman has argued effectisely
that the right to counsel, particularly for purposes of litigation, involhes considerations not
applicable to ordinary consumer goods and services. See Frank L Michelman, The Supreme Ceurt
and LitigationAccess Fees: The Right to ProtectOne's Rights-Part , 1973 DLKE LJ. 1153, 117277. These include concerns about individual dignity when judicial redress is needed, the citizen's
political or governmental participation that is implicit in litigation, the ways in which indiidual
litigation affects the rights of others in society-for example, by deterring civil wrongding-and
protecting individual rights secured by society. See id. The Supreme Court seems to have
concluded, at least for the current era, that these interests do not constituticnallyrequire states or the
United States to provide their impoverished residents with free legal assistance in civil cases. See
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-61 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434. 449-50
(1973). But these considerations may persuade legislatures of the desirability of making such
provision. I am grateful to Professor David Luban for referring me to Professor Michelman's
analysis.
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lawyers." 7 If public interest lawyers are driven out of the labor market by
rising costs, small firm lawyers may not be far behind.
G. Effects on Law School and Legal Culture

Already, lawyers are perceived as wealthy and greedy, an image
reflected in thousands of jokes but mitigated in part by frequent news
stories of public service lawyers who selflessly serve poor people, death
penalty defendants, rejected minorities, and unpopular causes."' The
profession, the community of law students headed for business careers,
and the nation would experience a loss if this segment of lawyers and
law students were to disappear in favor of more mercenary recruits.
H. Effects on Law Students

The extinction of law students who want to become public servants
would not occur in one or two years. As the gap between debt and
income continues to grow, law students contemplating careers in public
service would continue to struggle to live up to their ideals. But life
would become increasingly unpleasant for them. Already, some new
graduates who chose the nonprofit sector are finding the struggle to
repay student loans exceedingly difficult. For example, Stacey Klein, a
1998 Stetson University College of Law graduate earning $25,000 as a
legal services lawyer in Tampa had to take a part-time job as a waitress
to make ends meet."9 Marie Tatro, earning $34,000 at Brooklyn Legal
Services, owned no skirts and one pair of black pants for court
appearances, and counted on birthday gifts for clothing." 0 Leonard
Adler, $100,000 in debt and living on $30,000 that had to cover both his
personal expenses and those of his new National Anti-Poverty
Organization, lived in an attic with no heating and spent only $100 a
month on food.' More generally, students responding to a 1997 survey
were much more likely than those responding to the same survey in
1991 to report that student debts had interfered with major life choices

117. See EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES 1999, supra note 71, at 30.
118. See, e.g., Susan Vaughn, Making It: Lawyer Verges on Saintly in Defense of Los Angeles'
Neediest, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 24,2000, at W1.
119. See Hansen, supra note 68, at 24.
120. See
Financial Aid,
Nat'l
Jurist
Online,
Apr.-May
1998,
at
hup://www.natjurisLcom/financial.html (last visited June 10, 1998).
121. See id.
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such as having children,"' though even in 1997 it appeared that students
as a whole (as opposed to the much smaller group of high-debt, lowincome law graduates)2D had not changed their lifestyle because of debt
as much as they believed they had. Borrowers in that survey whose
payments exceeded 10% of their incomes (only 18% of whom were law
graduates, and whose median total debt was only $32,500) reported the
greatest impact of their debt on their lifestyles. For example, 57% of
them reported that their debts had delayed home purchasing (compared
with 38% with lower payment to income ratios), 28% reported that debts
had delayed moving out of their parents' homes (compared with 12,%),
and 33% reported that debts had delayed having children (compared
with 19%).'"
Furthermore, many idealistic students do not realize before
choosing law as a career that they may have to borrow more than
$100,000 or that starting salaries for public interest lawyers are so low
that they will have trouble repaying sums at this level.'' Law schools
and faculty members are understandably reluctant to advise new students
to abandon their goals or their career aspirations.'" Accordingly, when
students realize part-way through lawv school the extent of the financial
pressure on them to join corporate law firms,2' they often become
resentful or embittered. This phenomenon will increase unless law
schools become more forceful in advertising themselves only as trade
schools for business lawyers (except, of course, for those students who
are so wealthy that they do not need to borrow).

122.

See SANDY BAUm & DIANE SAUNDERS, NELIE MAE FOUND., LIFE AFTER DEBT:

RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL STUDENT LOAN SURVEY 28 (1998). In 1997, 22% of respondents (as
opposed to 12% in 1991) believed that debt had delayed them in having children. See id.
123. Debtors with doctoral and professional degrees comprised only 7q of the survey
population; those with a college degree or less (and therefore presumably much less indebted)
constituted 75%. See id. at 43 thl.2Th.

124. See id. at 29.
125. See SANDY BAUM, NELLIE MAE FOUND., GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL Bo.IROWr;G:
ARE EARNINGS HIGH ENOUGH TO SUPPORT DEBT LEVELS? 15 tbl7 (1999).

126. See Claudia MacLachlan, Doing Well vs. Doing Good: Students IncreasinglyTempted to
Forgo Public Service for Lav Firm Salaries,LEGAL TMES, Sept. 4. 2000. at 50; see also Ann
Davis, Graduate Debt Burden Grows, NAT'L L.J., May 22, 1995, at Al (stating that law students
could borrow up to $150,000 in certain cases).

127. See MacLachlan, supranote 126 (quoting the director of the office of legal career servicas
at Catholic University's Columbus School of Law ("Catholic".) as stating that students consider

more than just salaries when selecting their jobs).
128.

"[S]tudents often aren't aware of the full extent of that debt-and its impact on their

lifestyles--until they start thinking about looking for their first jobs. 'For most students, the light
dawns some time in their second year,' said Mary Birmingham. placement director at the University

of Arizona... :'Crittenden et al., supra note 85, at 17.
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Finally, to the extent that students insist on sticking to their career
plans, the default rate is certain to increase." 9 Defaults will affect the
credit histories of the law graduates. In addition, more defaults will
increase the cost to the taxpayers who guarantee student loans and cause
rate increases or loan denials for future students.13' Already, the default
rate is at least 15% on the commercial loans that law students take when
they exhaust the $18,500
per year of government-guaranteed loans that
3
are available to them.' '

This description of the costs of allowing the rate at which
indebtedness rises to exceed the rate at which income rises may not
convince everyone that public interest lawyers, or low-income
practitioners who serve individuals and families rather than businesses,
should be subsidized. Appreciation of market inefficiencies 32 may help

to justify government intervention, but the key difference between those
who might support a subsidy and those who are less likely to do so is a

difference of values. Supporters of subsidies are likely to agree that
taxpayers should take more responsibility to assist the less fortunate in a
nation in which the gap between the rich and the poor is very great and
continues to become larger each decade,'33 and that those who cannot
129. See Davis, supranote 126.
130. Already, at least one major law student lender has tightened credit criteria for law student
borrowers. See Stabile, supranote 68, at 17.
131. See Jeffrey E. Hanson, The Challenge to Schools to Reduce Defaults and to Maintain
Access, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 52, at 100, 100, Access Group, available at
http:llwww.accessgroup.org/symposium/acrobat/chapt6.pdf (Sept. 1997). In 1996, thirty-six law
schools had default rates exceeding 15% and faced restrictions on student borrowing. See Mary
Geraghty, Deep in Debt, More Law-School Graduates Are Defaulting on Their Student Loans,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 1996, at A27.
132. Such inefficiencies may include, for example, entering students' lack of knowledge about
cost and debt, and the possible tendency of some voters to subordinate their long-term desire to
promote greater public service to their short-term interest in reducing taxes by paying fewer
subsidies.
133. Another way to put the point is that, as every first-year economics student learns, even
when markets are efficient, they may not produce "just" results because of an initial or continuing
maldistribution of wealth or income. The United States has a huge gap between the wealth of its
wealthy citizens and those of its poorest citizens. In 1983, the wealthiest one-half of 1% of the
United States population was estimated to own 27% of the nation's wealth, up from 14% in 1976.
See KEvIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: VEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
INTHE REAGAN AFrERMATH app. B at 241 (1990). In 1988, families in the lowest quintile of the
population (under $15,102 annual income) had 4.6% of the income, while the highest quintile had
44%, a gap that was increasing with time. See id. at 13. By 1999, the lowest fifth was down to 4%
of the after-tax income, while the highest fifth had more than 50%, and the richest 1% (household
after-tax income in excess of $516,000) had as much after-tax income as all of the people in the
bottom 38%. See Isaac Shapiro & Robert Greenstein, The Widening Income Gulf, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, at http://www.cbpp.org/9-4-99tax-rep.htm (Sept. 5, 1999) (last visited Feb. 14,
2001). Wealth continued to be even more concentrated than income. By 1995, the concentration of
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pay their own way in their effort to secure justice should be served by
public interest lawyers."" The Author is among those who believe that at

least for the present time, some degree of subsidy is warranted. But the
Author's personal opinion is not particularly important. The nation as a

whole has already addressed the basic question of subsidization for highdebt, low-income graduates, particularly those who desire public service.
On this very point, Congress has acted.' 5

wealth (39% of the nation's wealth) in the richest 1%of the population %as greater than at any tim=
since the Great Depression. See id.
134. For a dated but still excellent account of the realm of public interest law. see Robert
Borosage et al., Comment, The New Public Interest Lamyers, 79 YALE U. 1069 11970); see also
Edgar S. Calm & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-7TlwPublicInterest
in Public Interest Lnv, 79 YALE U. 1005, 1003. 1016, 1024-25 (1970) (discussing the rise
of
public interest law and the concomitant changes needed within the legal system).
135. The following discussion pertains to the legislation providing for subsidies for lowincome graduates through the income-contingent loan repayment option of the direct lending
program, but it should be noted that the much older laws establishing student loan programs such as
the Stafford loan programs also include subsidies. Stafford loans have three subsidies: III the
government pays interest on up to $8500 (subject to a very generous "need" test) of each year's loan
while the student borrower is in school, see 20 U.S.C. § 1078(bl)(tA)(v) ISupp. IV 19991; 12) the
next $10,000 is loaned at an advantageous low rate because the government guarantees the debt. see
id. § 1078-8(d)(2)(C); and (3) loans are subject to a rate ceiling of 8.25% even if the market rate of
interest is higher. See id. § 1077a(f)(1), (k)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Stafford loans arguably
include two additional subsidies, though the point can be debated. The interest paid by Stafford
borrowers wshile they are in school (or in a grace or deferment period) is 0.6% lower than the rate
paid during ordinary repayment periods. See id. § 1077a(k(2) (Supp. IV 1999). This lo%er rate may
reflect lower processing costs attributable to this period, but "[t]here was in fact a budgetary basis
for this statutory change ...[which] disproportionateply] ...accrues to borrowers, such as la%
students, who have the largest loans and stay in school for the longest period of time." E-mail from
Daniel L. Pollard to the Author, supra note 77. Also, all Stafford loans are extended at the same
interest rate, disproportionately benefiting students at schools where banks would otherwise charge
higher rates because of higher default rates by alumni. When they make commercial loans b=cuse
students have reached the ceiling on government-guaranteed loans, banks do in fact vary the rate by
school. See, e.g., Law Access Loan, Access Group, at httpd/iw-w.accessgroup.org (last visited Feb.
21, 2001) (following hyperlinks to Law Access Loan terms in providing the rates the Access Group
offers on Law Access loans to students at different law schools). The 1993 legislation added further
subsidies for high-debt, low-income borrowers, as described in Part IV. In addition to thee two
features, which may or may not be subsidies for all Stafford borrowers, two other features have
lower rates for borrowers who obtain funds directly from the federal government rather than
through the Federal Family Education Loan Program (CFFELP"). Direct borrowers receive an
immediate interest rebate of 1.5% of the loan, though to keep it, they must make their first tclve
payments on time. See Press Release, Making College More Affordable and Accessible for
America's Families
(Aug.
10, 2000) (on
file with author),
inailable at
http.//linton4.nara.gov/textonly/WHWorkThursday-August_10.2000.html (last visited Feb. 14.
2001). This rebate is the equivalent of less than 1%over the life of a ten-year loan. See id.Second,
students who consolidate their loans from FFELP into direct federal loans receive a new interest rate
of 0.8 of 1%lower than their current payment: again, they must make the first twelve payments on
time to keep the lower rate. See id.
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III. CONGRESS TO THE RESCUE

A.

The 1993 Legislation

In 1993, after a considerable legislative struggle, Congress created
a new federal program that would compete with the banks offering
FFELP loans. 3 6 Through the new federal direct lending program, the
Department would offer its own loans to students. 3 7 Direct loans would
eliminate the "middle-man" banking entities that earn substantial federal
fees on FFELP loans while taking few risks, since the federal
government guarantees the FFELP loans.
Ironically, the policy of making it easier for heavily indebted
graduates to engage in public service was a major driving force behind
the new law,'38 though so far there is little indication that the 1993 law is
yet serving this purpose. As we shall see, even heavily indebted, socially
conscious law graduates, the group that might be most likely to benefit
from the novel "income-contingent repayment option" that Congress
required for federal direct loans, do not know much about, or want to
use, the plan.
The history of the law's enactment is told in Steven Waldman's
book, The Bill: How the Adventures of Clinton's National Service Bill
Reveal What Is Corrupt, Comic, Cynical-and Noble-About
Washington,'39 and summarized for student borrowers in Anne
Stockwell's popular handbook, The Guerrilla Guide to Mastering
Student Loan Debt.'4 Three factors coalesced during the Bush
Administration to start direct lending on a path to congressional
enactment. First, the Credit Reform Act of 1990 changed the way that
the government accounted for student loans, so that the expense of
making good on expected FFELP defaults had to be counted as
governmental expenditures in the year that loans were made.'4' This law
ended a practice under which FFELP loans seemed costless to the
government, and it made any future direct loans seem at least

136. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1077a, 1078(b), 1078-8 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
137. See id.
138. See WALDMAN, supranote 11, at 66.
139. See STEVEN VALDMAN, THE BILL: How THE ADVENTURES OF CLINTON'S NATIONAL
SERVICE BILL REVEAL WHAT Is CORRUPT, CoMic, CYNICAL-AND NOBLE-ABoUT NVASHINGTON

66(1995).
140. See ANNE STOCKWELL, THE GUERRILLA GUIDE TO MASTERING STUDENT LOAN DEBT
(1997).
141. See id. at 86.
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competitive, and perhaps more profitable than FFELP loans." Second,
Republican Representative Tom Petri, who over the years had become
an expert on student loans and a critic of FFELP, began to advocate
more vigorously within the Bush Administration for the creation of a
direct lending program. 3 Among Petri's ideas was a concept originally
advocated by the conservative economist Milton Friedman,'" allowing
the annual amount of a student loan repayment to depend on the
student's income, treating the loan as the lender's investment in the
student's future success, on which dividends should be returned if there
is enough income to pay them.' But Petri believed that incomecontingent repayment could only be managed through direct lending, not
through FFELP.' He believed that the administration of a repayment
program linked to income could only be managed by the Internal
Revenue Service, to which all income was reported.4 Third, in the Bush
White House, Republican economist Charles Kolb devised the
mechanics of a direct loan program under which "the [FFELP] banks
would be eliminated [because] Uncle Sam could raise the same money
more cheaply ....The... existing program would be replaced by a
streamlined system that maximized efficiency and minimized cost."''
During the Bush Administration, Congress even passed a law through
which the federal government would create a federal direct loan
demonstration project, in which students at a small number of schools
would be able to obtain loans with income-contingent repayment.'
Just as the ideas of direct lending and income-contingent repayment
were gaining currency in Washington, Bill Clinton was on the campaign
trail advocating creation of a national public service program (which was
eventually enacted and became the AmenCorps)." ' Late in the
campaign, he coupled income-contingent repayments with the idea of
national service, reasoning that students resisted public service in part
142. See id. at 86-87.
143. See id.
144. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITAuSM AND FREEDOM 10007 (19621 (describing a plan

whereby money for educational purposes would constitute an investment in human capitall.
145. See STOCKVELL, supra note 38. at 84-85. In his Presidential campaign in 193S,
Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis had also advocated creation of a federal incomecontingent loan repayment plan. See Barbara Vobejda, Dukakis Student Loan Plan Gets Mired
Reviews in Theory Practice,WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1988, at A23.
146. See WALD.MAN, supranote 11, at 203-04.
147. See id.at 144.

148. STOcKWELL, supranote 38, at 87.
149. See Federal Direct Loan Demonstration Program, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Slat. 569-576
(1992) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087a-j (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
150. See WALDMAN, supra note 11, at 11-14,239.
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because they incurred so much debt. 5 ' Clinton suggested that reducing
loan repayments would "remove extra weight from the shoulders of

someone who is inclined toward a public service career," and he thought
that addressing this problem would particularly benefit graduate
students. 2 He deeply believed that "'people are not really free' if they
[could] not take advantage of their God-given potential," and that by
reducing debt, the government could enable young Americans to serve

others.'53 At a White House meeting during the first month of his
administration, his advisors briefed him on the concept of direct federal

lending."l He responded by lecturing the advisors, saying what was
important to him was income-contingent repayment, rather than direct
lending.'55 "'The direct loan is a good thing,"' Clinton argued.5 6 "'[B]ut
that's not the core of my proposal'.... 'Everywhere we went [in the
campaign,] people responded to this"' idea for facilitating public
service.'57 Senators who would eventually become leaders in the effort to
gain legislative approval of the program agreed with him.'
Originally, the President wanted a single bill to create a national

service corps and an income-contingent repayment plan, but loan reform
had to have its own bill because it had to go through a congressional

process quite different from the process of setting up a new agency."'
The loan bill was introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy on May 5,
1993; the bill stated that one of its purposes was to "provide borrowers
with a variety of repayment plans, including an income-contingent
repayment plan, so that borrowers['] ...obligations do not foreclose
community service-oriented career choices. ' ' "WIn his introductory

151. Seeid. at6.
152. Id. at 31.
153. Id.at 32.
154. See id. at 47.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. In 1992, Senator Paul Simon had said that income-contingency "helps to ensure that debt
does not drive students into particular professions just so that they'll be able to pay off their loans."
138 CONG. REC. S4676 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1992) (statement of Sen. Simon). When the 103d
Congress opened, Senator David Durenberger urged the President's nominee for Secretary of
Education to make an income-contingent loan program a high priority. See 139 CONG. REC. S121
(daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
159. The direct lending bill had to go into the budget reconciliation bill because it saved money
that could be used to offset other budget expenditures. See WALDMAN, supra note 11, at 126, 275
n.126. The national service bill could not go into the reconciliation bill because, under Senate rules,
new programs could not be created through a budget reconciliation bill. See id.
160. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 103D CONG., RECONCILIATION SUBMISSIONS
OF THE INSTRUCTED COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET
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remarks, Senator Kennedy stated that income contingency would make it

possible for students "to pursue careers and to take lower paying jobs
they prefer, including careers in public service and community

service. ' 16' During its progress through Congress, the bill was the subject
of heavy attacks from the banking industry, which was intent on
preserving the FFELP,'62 but it picked up many supporters who were

particularly attracted by the possibility that it could encourage greater
public service. 63

The public service aspect of income-contingent repayment was also
highlighted at the hearings of the Senate Committee on Labor and

Human Resources ("Senate Committee"). Senator Kennedy called it "a
companion feature of the direct lending" and said that "[n]o college
student should be forced to become a lawyer or investment banker who
would rather be a teacher."' ' Senator Claiborne Pell said that the
repayment plan "could also help encourage students to enter public

service occupations which often, and unfortunately, do not carry high
salaries."' 65 Deputy Secretary of Education Madeleine Kunin noted that
the option "will allow students to enter lower paying community service
jobs."' 65R. Marshall Witten, speaking for the National Commission on
Responsibilities for Financing Postsecondary Education, "strongly
endorse[d] income-contingent repayment" because it would offer
borrowers "loan forgiveness for public and community service."'" Claire

Roemer, testifying for the National Association of Student Financial Aid
Administrators, opposed new direct lending legislation but recognized
the value of income-contingent repayment because it would enable
"borrowers to consider lower-paying community service jobs.' '

3

(H. CON. REs. 64) 453 (Comm. Print 1993) (reprinting report by Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources to accompany Title X of the Budget Reconciliation Act).
161. 139 CONG. REc. S5585 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
162. See generally WVALDAN, supra note 11, at 131.40, 159-69.
163. See 139 CONG. REc. S5639 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (noting that
income contingency "will allow many of today's graduates to consider lower-paying. communityoriented jobs, or career paths that will provide the kind of personal satisfaction that so many seek
without necessarily providing the kind of financial success of other more lucrative careers"); id. at
is naive of us to think that we can attract energetic and
S5641 (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (m[l]t
bright individuals into community and social service %hen they have living expenses and education
costs to think about."); id. at S5642 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("Quite often, if you have a huge
loan, you are not going to have the opportunity to do ... a lot of the kind of waork that needs to bo
done in this country but could not pay much by way of wages").
164. Student Loan Reform: Hearing on S. 920 Before the Senate Con. on Laborand Human
Resources, 103d Cong. 2 (1993) (opening statement of Sen. Kennedy).
165. Id. at 5 (opening statement of Sen. Pell).
166. Id. at 34 (prepared statement of Deputy Secretary of Educ. Kunin).
167. Id. at 76 (statement of Corm'rNvitten).
168. Id. at 80 (statement of Ms. Roemer).
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The Senate Committee recommended passage of the bill, noting
that "[i]ncome-contingent repayment will allow students to take lower
paying community and public service jobs without the fear of being
overburdened with loan debt." '69 The option "is intended to
accommodate borrowers whose income after graduation ... is low, and
thus would be attractive to borrowers who plan to enter lower-paying
community service jobs.' 70
Similarly, the report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, incorporated in the report of the House Budget Committee, stated
that one of the purposes of the legislation was to provide "an income
contingent repayment plan ...so that borrowers['] ... obligations do
not foreclose community service-oriented career choices for them.''
The report added that "any student wanting to take a lower-paying job
that serves his or her community would be encouraged to do so through
flexible and affordable repayment terms for education loans.' 7' The
income-contingent option would "permit students to pursue public
service either for a few years after completing their education or as a
career since their loan burden need never be disproportionate to their
income."' '
A conference committee reconciled the Senate and House versions
of the bill. 74 The real battle between the versions was fought over
whether direct lending would entirely supplant FFELP.'" By contrast,
the details of direct lending, such as income-contingent repayment, were
uncontroversial.7 6 As approved by the conference committee and soon
thereafter by both houses of Congress, the legislation created the federal
direct lending program, leaving many of the details to be established by
regulation.' 7 It required the Secretary of Education to offer borrowers
169. STAFFOF SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 103D CONG., RECONCILIATION SUBMISSIONS
OF THE INSTRUCTED COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON TIlE BUDGET
(H. CON. RES. 64) 447 (Comm. Print 1993) (reprinting report by Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources to accompany Title XII of the Budget Reconciliation Act).
170. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 121 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 489.
171. Id. at 112, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 480.
172. Id. at 106, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 474.
173. Id. at 107, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at475.
174. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 399 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088,
1088 (reconciling both houses' versions of H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. (1999) (enacted)).
175. See WALDMAN, supra note 11, at 203-04.
176. The House bill would have replaced the FFELP with direct federal lending immediately.
The Senate bill would have allowed 50% of lending to be direct lending. The compromise that
emerged allowed a phase-in of direct lending, leading to federal extension of more than 60% of
student loans by the fifth year of the five-year legislative authorization. See id. at 204, 222, 230,
235.
177. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-3(d)(4) (1994).
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four repayment plans: (1) standard ten-year repayment; (2) "extended
repayment" over a longer period of time; (3) "graduated repayment," in
which the amount to be repaid would increase as the loan aged; and (4)
income-contingent repayment." The income-contingent provision
provided that annual repayment amounts would be based on the income
of the borrower, giving the Secretary wide latitude to establish
repayment schedules." 9 It also specified that the period of repayment
was "not to exceed 25 years," implicitly authorizing the Secretary to
cancel or forgive outstanding balances at the end of that period, since
Congress did not authorize continuing collection of the debt after
twenty-five years.'S
Imposing some limit after which student loans would not be
collected was necessary because without it, the amount due on a student
loan paid through an income-contingent plan could forever rise, as
payments deferred by the income-related cap continued to be added to
the remaining principal. Without some time limit, the former student
could pay for his or her entire life, and the student's estate could be
liable after that. However, Congress did not give much thought to the
length of time after which debts would be forgiven. The bill that the
Department had drafted for congressional consideration did not specify
this or any other detail, because in early 1993 "the department [as
opposed to the President] still didn't fully buy into the importance of
flexible repayment; it viewed direct lending as a major reform, and
[income-contingent repayment] as a minor convenience."' 8' The House
bill did not specify a period. But on this issue, staff members to two
Republican senators made an important contribution to the legislation.
When the Senate bill was being edited, aides to Senators James Jeffords
and Nancy Kassebaum
suggested that no student should have to pay off a loan for more than

twenty years. [Senator Simon's aide] and the other staffers agreed.
Although the discussion took about ten minutes ...these Senate

Republican staffers had made the reform dramatically more
progressive, establishing a much stronger incentive for public service
than Clinton's own Department of Education.'6
The conference committee resolved the difference between the House
and Senate provisions on income-contingent repayment with the "not
178. See id. § 1078(b)(9)(A) (Supp. IV 1999).
179. See WALDMAN, supra note 11, at 14243.
180. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A)Civ).
181. WVALDMNAN,
supra note 11, at 157.
182. Id.at 157-58.
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[to] exceed 25 years" formula.1 3 To ensure that any borrower could use
income-contingent repayment, even if the borrower had originally
borrowed through FFELP rather than through a federal direct loan,

Congress also provided that the government had to offer a consolidation
loan, repayable through the income-contingent plan, to any FFELP
borrower)&
The debate on final passage added no further relevant legislative

history. Senator Simon noted simply that "[ait the heart of the new
program is President Clinton's promise to allow students to pay off their
loans as a percentage of income, so that no one is prevented from

serving the country as a teacher, rural health worker, or other valuable
yet lower-paying profession. ''
B.

The Income-Contingent Repayment Formula

Shortly after Congress passed the law, the Department began a

process of fleshing out its details through regulations. They have been
amended from time to time, but they have remained substantially
similar, and they offer two new subsidies that are not available to
Stafford loan borrowers who elect other repayment methods. A borrower

may consolidate all government-guaranteed loans (even a single loan)
into a federal direct loan and may elect to pay under the incomecontingent repayment option.'86 As in the case of all consolidated federal

loans, the interest rate is fixed,'

and it is determined on the date of

consolidation by computing the weighted average of the underlying

loans. 8 (Until consolidation, the rate on those underlying loans is
183. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 447 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088,
1136.
184. Congress did this by providing that a federal consolidation loan should be offered to any
borrower who "is unable to obtain a consolidation loan with income-sensitive repayment terms
acceptable to the borrower from such a lender." 20 U.S.C. § 1078-3(b)(5) (1994). Since banks do
not offer loan cancellation after twenty-five years, any borrower may obtain federal consolidation
by regarding a bank loan without a forgiveness clause as unacceptable. The Department made a
decision not to require consolidating borrowers to document their inability to obtain a loan with
acceptable terms from a private source. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.216(d)(1)(i)(B) (2001) (requiring only
that borrowers "assert" that they meet the program's eligibility requirements). The legislation also
provided that federal consolidation "loan[s] shall, as requested by the borrower, be repaid either
pursuant to income contingent repayment ... or pursuant to any other repayment provision" of the
new law, thus specifying that consolidated FFELP loans, as well as loans that began as federal
direct loans, were eligible for repayment through the income-contingent option. 20 U.S.C. § 10783(b)(5).
185. 139 CONG. REc. S10,729 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simon).
186. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.216(a).
187. See 20 U.S.C. § 1077a(a).
188. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.202(a)(3)(i)(E); id. § 685.216(g).
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variable and is the ninety-one day treasury bill rate for the last auction
during the preceding May, plus 1.7% or 2.3%, subject to the statutory

cap of 8.25%).' The borrower repays the debt over a twenty-five year
period, unless it is paid off earlier than that.'

But in each and every

year, the amount payable is limited to a specified part of the borrower's
income for the previous year. The borrower is required to pay only the

amount produced by whichever of two formulas produces a lower
number. 9' One of the two formulas, the "discretionary income"

method, 92 produces most of the calculations that are important for highdebt, low-income law graduates. 9
This method defines the graduate's discretionary income as the

borrower's adjusted gross income,' minus the federal poverty level for
a family of the borrower's family size. The borrower need repay only

20% of discretionary income.' The federal poverty level is adjusted
annually; in 2000, it was $8350 for a single person, and $11,250 for a
couple. 9 ' Thus for an individual with adjusted gross income of
189. See id. § 6S5.202(a)(l)(iii)(A)-(B). Students who consolidate during an -in.school" or
"grace" period are able to lock in the lower rate (1.7% above the last auction rate) for the life of the
consolidated loan. See DearPartner,ColleagueLetters, U.S. Dep't of Educ.. GEN-99-17, (June 18.
1999), at http'.lfap.ed.gov/deve.-csbfnewlhome (last visited Feb. 14. 2001) (following hyperlinks to
Dear Partner, Colleague Letters).
190. The regulations provide that the "maximum" period for income-contingent repaymnt is
twenty-five years, implying that a borrower might elect a shorter period, or that the Secretary of
Education could agree to a shorter one. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209c)(4Jti). But at present only a
twenty-five year loan is eligible for forgiveness of the balance remaining at the end of the
repayment period. See id.§ 685.209(c)(4)(iv).
191. See id. § 685.209(a)(2)()-(ii).
192. Id. § 685.209(a)(2)(ii).
193. The alternative formula caps annual repayment at the amount the borrower would repay
annually through twelve-year amortization, multiplied by an "income percentage factor" publisltd
annually in a Federal Register table that links this factor to the level of the borrower's income. See
iS. § 685.209(a)(2)(i). This alternative formula is lower than the formula discussed in the text only
for certain borrowers with relatively low debts. It has some impact on high-debt, lov-.ineomc
borrowers, however, bemause toward the end of their periods of repayment, their balances may
become low enough that the alternative formula produces a lower repayment amount. The incomecontingent repayment calculator described in this Article computes monthly, annual, and total
payments based on whichever formula produces lower monthly payments.
194. Adjusted gross income is defined in federal tax law. For most practical purposes, it is the
same as gross (pre-tax) income. However, payments of a portion of student loan interest. moving
expenses, and alimony payments, as vell as a few less frequently encountered ex'pnditures,. are
deducted from gross income before arriving at adjusted gross income. See LR.S., YOGR FEnDEAL
INco.m TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS 116 (Pub. 17, 2000) (listing available deductions). available at

http-//fip.fedworld.gov/publirs-pdf/pl7.pdf (providing the 2000 rules) (last visited Feb. 14.2001 .
195. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(2)(ii). The borrower must consent to allow the Internal
Revenue Service to disclose the borrower's adjusted gross income. See id. § 685.209(ect7).
196. See 2000 HHS Poverty Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. 7555,7555 (Feb. 15, 2000). availableat
http:llaspe.hhs.gov/povertyl00poverty.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001). For each dependent, S2900 is
added and the numbers are higher in Alaska and Hawaii. See id.
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$28,350,"'7 the repayment obligation would be 20% of $20,000, or $4000
per year ($333 per month). For a person with $55,000 of consolidated

debt, the $333 per month repayment obligation is much lower than the
"standard" repayment of $674. Of course, if the borrower's income rises,

the annual repayment will rise, but it will never be more than 20% of
discretionary income."'

The $333 monthly payment in this example is also lower than the
$434 that would be owing under a simple twenty-five year amortization

of the $55,000. Under income-contingent repayment, the $101 that is not
paid each month because of the income-related cap is added to the
principal balance owing. However, once the principal balance increases

to an amount that is 10% higher than the borrower's original balance, the
government stops adding the unpaid interest to the balance." Once the
principal has reached this 110% level, the interest that is unpaid as a
result of the income-related cap is merely accumulated in a dummy

account and is not again added to principal. Even after the borrower later
works the principal balance down to less than 110% of the original

principal, new unpaid interest is placed only in this new dummy account.
The borrower owes the federal government the balance in the dummy
account, as well as the balance in the regular account, but the dummy

account funds are not subject to compounding. If and when the borrower
is able to pay more than the amount due for the current month within the

limits of his or her monthly income-contingent cap, he or she will begin
to work down the balance in the dummy account as well 2 ° The non197. This number was chosen to make the example simple, but it is not an impossibly low
salary for a person beginning a public interest job. In the year 2000, 35% of starting salaries in legal
services offices were $29,000 or less. See infra text accompanying note 285-88.
198. Because "discretionary income" is defined by the formula and is not the same as after-tax
income, payments as a percentage of after-tax income can be slightly higher than 20%. However, as
the tables in this Article show, payment obligations higher than 20% are rare, and occur mainly for
borrowers with very high incomes, not for high-debt, low-income taxpayers. High-income taxpayers
could lower their payments by electing different income repayment plans.
199. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(5).
200. This unpaid interest will be added to the principal only if the borrower re-consolidates the
debt (or in the case of a loan that was a direct federal loan from the beginning, consolidates it), or
defaults. See Telephone Interview with an anonymous Department of Education official (July 5,
2000). The anonymous official was familiar with the Department's algorithm for computing the
balance due on income-contingent loans, but did not want to be identified by name. See id. Neither
the combination of two debtors' income-contingent debts as a result of marriage, nor election of a
different repayment schedule, is considered a consolidation. See id. However, if the borrower
changes repayment plans, the accrued interest in the dummy account must be scheduled for
payment See id. Thus, if the borrower moves out of income-contingent repayment and elects tenyear amortization of his or her remaining debt, he or she must pay one-one hundred and twentieth of
the balance in the dummy account each month, but the part of the dummy account that is not paid
during the first month remains in a special account and still is not capitalized, so it does not
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compounding of unpaid interest after the borrower first increases the
principal balance by 10% is the first of two additional subsidies"'
provided to high-debt, low-income borrowers who use the incomecontingent plan.
Payments that must be remitted because they are within the
income-contingent repayment formula (that is, less than 20% of the

difference between the borrower's adjusted gross income and the
poverty level) must be paid monthly.' 2 Because the repayment period is
so long, and interest continues to accrue even though it may not be
added to principal, the amount of money that will eventually have to be
paid is much larger, even taldng the subsidy into account, than under

standard repayment.
The borrower may switch out of income-contingent repayment,
electing standard repayment or a different repayment plan, at any time."3
If the borrower remains in the income-contingent plan and experiences
favorable income increases, the principal balance might be paid off in
less than twenty-five years. However, if the borrower is not so fortunate
as to pay off the loan within that time, the federal government will
forgive the entire remaining balance, including principal and accrued
interest, at the end of the twenty-fifth year. " This is the second

additional subsidy built into the income-contingent repayment option,
potentially offering significant benefits to graduates who plan entire
careers in low-paying jobs.

accumulate additional interest. See id.Similarly, if a borrower wins the lottery and decides to
prepay the debt all at once, the accumulated additional interest must ba paid at that time. See id.
201. See supra note 135 (providing a description of the three subsidies available generally to
Stafford borrowers).
202. These payments would be those that would ba due under a twenty-five year extended
repayment plan, subject to the income-contingent cap. Within the limit established by the cap, the
borrower first pays the interest and principal that would be due under the twenty-five-year extended
repayment formula, and if within that limit, any money can ba paid from the dummy account
created because the borrower's principal had at some point climbzd by 10. that money is due as
well
203. The regulations purport to permit switching from income-contingent to standard
repayment only during the first ten years of income-contingent repayment. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 685.210(b)(2)(i). However, "[a] borrower may prepay all or part of a loan at any ti=t without
penalty." Id.§ 685.211(a)(2). So a borrower who wants to elect ten-year repayment after pa~ing
under income-contingency for, say, eleven years, could use any WVeb-based ten-year repaymcnt
calculator to compute the monthly payments for the remaining principal balance paid omer ten years
(rather than the remaining fourteen years), and then make those payments for ten years until the debt
was fully repaid. The borrower could make his or her own graduated repayment plan in the same
manner.
204. See id. § 685.209(c)(4)(iv).
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Married borrowers may pool their debts for purposes of incomecontingent repayment. 5 However, even borrowers who do not elect to
pool their debts, and even borrowers who are married but separated, are
deemed to pool their income for purposes of determining the monthly
repayment obligation.' Thus the plan includes a significant "marriage
penalty" for married two-income, one-debt couples, compared to the
repayment obligations of similar couples who do not marry, about which
more will be said later in this Article.
Because the income-contingent repayment option offers two
subsidies for low-income borrowers, including a potentially very large
subsidy after twenty-five years, one might think that law students
contemplating low-paying public interest careers would be keenly aware
of and interested in this repayment method, which was enacted with
people like them in mind. However, nothing could be further from the
truth.
IV.

WHAT IS REALLY (NOT) HAPPENING OUT THERE
A.

Law Students

During the spring of 1999, I surveyed law students at Georgetown
and Catholic to ascertain what they knew about the income-continent
repayment option, and (whether or not they knew about it before my
survey explained it to them) their views about using it to pay off their
own debts. Both schools are located in Washington, D.C. Both are
private schools affiliated with the Catholic Church. Both have high
tuition in an area of the country with a relatively high cost of living. The
two schools differ, however, in that Georgetown has a LRAP 0 7 through
which it repays some of the debt of low-income graduates who work in
public interest jobs, while Catholic does not.0 3
Georgetown is one of the nation's largest law schools. In 1998-99,
1553 full-time students were enrolled.' 9 The Law Center charged

205. See id. § 685.209(b)(2).
206. See id. § 685.209(b)(1).
207. See Ackley, supra note 65. Georgetown's program is described in detail on its Web site,
See Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, Georgetown University Law Center, at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/finaid/lrap.html (last modified Aug. 18, 2000).
208. See Ackley, supranote 65.
209. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, OFFICIAL AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 182 (Rick L. Morgan & Kurt Synder eds., 2000) [hereinafter ABA
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS] (reporting 1998-99 data).
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$24,530 annual tuition, and it estimated living expenses at S14,720. t
Average debt at graduation was $82,600 (including an estimated $9500

of undergraduate debt). 2t1 Sixty-six percent of its most recent graduates
were employed in law firms, 5% in business, 14% in government (other
than as judicial clerks), 8%as clerks, and 3%in public interest law. 2'
At the time of the survey, Catholic had 902 students!" Its tuition
Average
was $23,898, and living expenses were estimated at $13,390.""
debt was $78,500 (including the average college debt).2 Forty-seven

percent of its recent graduates worked in law firms, 19% in business,
18% in government, 10% in clerkships, and 3%in public interest law.'
At each school, the Author's surveys and a follow-up reminder
were placed in each student's individual mailbox, and responses were

returned to a central location."1 7 The questionnaires did not include space
for the respondent's name or other identifying information, and they
were returned anonymously to a central location. At Georgetown, 390
students (25%) responded; at Catholic, 131 students (14%) responded.
Table 6 summarizes certain relevant characteristics of the students
who responded. It recapitulates their class in law school; membership in
Georgetown's Equal Justice Foundation ("EJF') or Catholic's Students

for Public Interest Law ("SPIL"), which promote interest in public
interest law;2" and intention to go into a government or public interest

job immediately after graduation.

210. See id. at 183.
211. See Compare Law Schools, U.S. News & Wvorld Rep. Online, at
http'/wvAv.usnews.comusnews/edufbeyond/gldfgradlaw.htm (last visited Feb. 14,20011.
212. See ABA APPROVED LAw ScHoOLs, supra note 209, at 182.
213. See id.at 128.
214. See id.at 129.
215. See Compare Law Schools, U.S. News & world Rep. Online, at
http-/www.usnews.comLusnewsedufbeyondlgradfgradlaw.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
216. See ABA APPROVED LAw ScHoOLs, supra note 209, at 129. There are some slight
discrepancies in the data reported to the ABA and the data reported to US. News & IWorld Report,
which could result from somewhat different methods of measurement. According to the U.. Nea-s
& World Report data, the tuition and fees at Georgetown war: $25,705 and at Catholic, S25,692.
Online,
at
See
Compare
Law
ScIwols,
U.S.
News
&
World
Rep.
http'/www.usnews.comlusnewsledulbeyondlgrdfgradlawn.htm (last visited Feb. 14. 2001). U.S.
News & World Report lists Georgetown's percentage of graduates in law firms at 72q. in business
at 6%, in government at 8%, in clerkships at 10%, and in public interest jobs at 3,%. See id. It lists
Catholic's equivalent percentages as 38%, 14%, 23%, 18%., and 2%. See id.
217. A covering letter from a faculty member (myself at Georgetown. Professor Lisa Lerman
at Catholic) explained that the survey would be used in connection with research about the federal
income-contingent repayment option.
218. Both of these student organizations raise money for summer stipends for students who
take summer jobs in public interest organizations.
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6: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS
Georgetown (N=390)

Catholic (N=131)

1st: 29%
2nd: 32%
3rd: 35%
4th: 4%19_
22%

lst: 46%
2nd: 32%
3rd: 22%

Students intending to take a public interest job
immediately after graduation (or after a clerkship)",
Average government-guaranteed debt of public-interest
oriented students?"

23%

43%

$63,095

$58,064

Average total debt of such students-

$95,495

$94,615

Percentage of respondents who were in each class of law
school
Percentage who were members of ElF or SPIL

Percentage of these students whose debt will fall into
each range

Low: 15%
High: 32%
1 Very high: 53%

19%

Low: 8%
High: 18%
Very high: 74%

For those students (about two-thirds of all respondents) who
indicated a desire (if debt were not a factor) to spend at least one-third of
their careers doing public service, the table also reports average
219. This includes evening students and students in a four-year joint degree program.
220. The numbers reported in this row are higher (and in the case of Catholic, substantially
higher) than the actual numbers reported for government and public interest employment to the
ABA. See ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 209, at 129, 183. However, the ABA
statistics report judicial clerkships as a separate category of employment, and some of the clerks go
on to government or public interest jobs. Also, students while in school may have intentions to do
public interest work in the short term that are not ultimately fulfilled. Finally, the sample of students
responding to this survey (particularly at Catholic) may have overrepresented students who planned
to do public interest work immediately after graduation or a clerkship. If so, this is not a significant
problem for the survey research, because the principal goal of the survey was to learn about the
knowledge and attitudes of these very students (as opposed to all students) regarding the incomecontingent loan repayment program, and most of the questions were directed only to that subgroup.
221. This data was only for respondents who reported a desire, were it not for debt, to spend at
least one-third of their careers in public interest work. Those desiring to spend less than this
percentage were not asked about debt.
222. This data was only for respondents who reported a desire, were it not for debt, to spend at
least one-third of their careers in public interest work. Those desiring to spend less than this
percentage were not asked about debt. The comparison of these numbers with those reported by
schools to U.S. News & World Report suggests that the debts of these respondents may have been
somewhat higher than average, perhaps because these respondents are the ones most interested in
public service, and they may have earned less money than others in summer jobs during law school,
Two other possible factors could account for the differences. First, the U.S. News & World Report
data for debt reported on the class that graduated in 1998. See Compare Law Schools, U.S. News &
World Rep. Online, at http:llwww.usnews.com/usnews/edulbeyondlgradlgradlaw.htm (last visited
Feb. 14, 2001). Some of the students in my survey would not graduate until 2001, and expenses
(and debts) were continuing to rise. Second, students with the highest debts may have been
underrepresented in the responses to schools that were reported to the media, rather than
overrepresented in my survey.
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anticipated government-guaranteed debt (including college debt);
average anticipated total debt; and the percentage of respondents whose
anticipated total debt (rounded to the nearest $10,000) was, in the
categorization used for purposes of analyzing survey responses, "low"
(zero through $60,000 after rounding), high ($70,000 through $90,000),
or very high ($100,000 or more). A few aspects of Table 6 are worth
noting. First, the Author was concerned that the sample would be
unrepresentative because only the students who most cared about public
interest law would respond to the questionnaire, but as measured by
affiliation with the public interest student organization, at neither school
was the group of respondents top-heavy with students who were
members of the relevant core group. Second, among those asked to
report debt at both schools, the average anticipated governmentguaranteed debt exceeded three times the annual Stafford ceiling on law
school loans, reflecting students' borrowing up to the limit of Stafford
loans, accruing some interest on them, and also owing governmentguaranteed loans from college. Finally, the total anticipated debt levels
were very high, with half of the Georgetown students and three-fourths
of the Catholic students expecting to graduate owing at least $100,000.1
Nine percent of each survey's students expected to graduate owing at
least $130,000.
The Author first sought the respondents' career choices, because he
was interested primarily in learning the views about loan repayment held
by students planning careers in public interest law. "Public interest"
work was defined as full-time legal work for a nonprofit organization or
government agency, and respondents were reminded that these
organizations generally had starting salaries in the range of $25,000 to
$37,000.22 Respondents were asked: "If the burden of your student loans
were not a consideration, what part of your legal career would you like
to spend doing full time public interest work?" The results are displayed
in Table 7.

223. The tuition and living expenses at the two schools are similar, but Georgetown -tudants
may be contributing a bit more to their expenses from family members, savings, or law firm

summer jobs. Many Georgetown students (though relatively fewer of those %%ith public interest
aspirations) earn more than $15,000 by working for ten weeks after their second summer for one of
the major law firms.
224. Se4 e.g., Martha Neil, Noble Ambitions Drive Law Students: Staye., Cll. DAILY L

BULL, OcL 21, 1998, at 1.
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TABLE 7:

[Vol. 29:733

PORTION OF CAREER IDEALLY SPENT ON

PUBLIC INTEREST WORK (%)22'
Georgetown (N=387)

Catholic (N=131)

Less than 1/3

33%

24%

1/3 to 2/3

33%

38%

More than 2/3

34%

37%

As might be expected, interest in life-long public interest work
(more than two-thirds) was higher among EJF members (41%) and SPIL
members (72%) than among respondents as a whole. But there was also
a correlation between the size of the anticipated debt (even though
students were told to disregard debt repayment) and desire to do such
work. At Georgetown, 37% of those with low debt, and only 28% with
very high debt, wanted to spend at least two-thirds of their lives in
public service (compared to 34% of all respondents). At Catholic, 63%
of those with low debt but only 28% with very high debt wanted to
perform this work, compared with 37% of all respondents. It is possible
that to some extent, anticipated debt load had so pervaded the
respondents' self-image and sense of values that they were not able fully
to disregard this factor in response to the question.
The correspondence between anticipated debt load and expected
first post-law-school employment was considerably more dramatic.
Table 8 shows a significant fall-off, as debt rises, in the expectation of
doing public service work in the short term.

225. The responses did not vary substantially by class in law school. At Georgetown, for
example, the proportion who wanted to spend more than two-thirds of their careers fell only slightly
from 39% of the first-year respondents to 32% of the third-year respondents.
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TABLE 8: PERCENTAGE AND NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO EXPECTED
TO TAKE A PUBLIC INTEREST JOB IMMIEDIATELY AFrER GRADUATION
OR A CLERKSHIP, BY SIZE OF ANTICIPATED DEBT

Low debt
($60,000 or less)
High debt
($70,000 through $90,000)
Very high debt
($100,000 or more)

Georgetown

Catholic

77%
(13 out of 17)
29%
(19 out of 66)
18%
(51 out of 281)

90%
(9 out of 10)
77%
(17 out of 22)
30%
(28 out of 95)

The students who did not want to do public interest work,
regardless of debt, were not the principal focus of this research, but the
survey was also intended to contribute marginally to the literature on
non-debt influences on law students' decisions not to pursue public
interest careers.2 7 Therefore, respondents who indicated a desire,
regardless of debt level, to spend less than one-third of their careers on
public interest work were asked: what accounted for their choice. Were
they motivated primarily by a desire for the greater remuneration offered
by the private sector, or by non-economic factors-for example, interest
in business, greater anticipated intellectual stimulation in a law firm,
etc.? Table 9 summarizes the quite similar responses of students at the
two schools, nearly half of whom reported that they were primarily
affected by the huge income differential (even before the large salary
jump of 2000) between the private and public sectors. As one student
commented:
These [public interest] salaries are simply too low to expect attorneys
to want these jobs.... Anyone who had a career before [attending] law
school ... probably made the same or more money before starting...
legal education.... [so] the price you are asked to pay is simply too
high compared to private sector employment. 223

226. As noted above, this data pertains only to respondents %%horeported a desire, were itnot
for debt, to spend at least one-third of their careers in public interest work.
227. See Chambers, supra note 3, at 226-27; Komhauser & Revesz, supra note 84. at 957-58.
See generally ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING rr AND BRE.XING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTZIEST
Co

riTmT DURING LAW SCHOOL (Howard S. Erlanger ed.. 1989) (discussing how law school

instruction and professional socialization contribute to the decrease in preference among la%%
students for public interest jobs).
228. This was a response on one Georgetown questionnaire.
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TABLE 9: PRIMARY REASON FOR GREATER INTEREST
IN PRIVATE SECTOR WORK AMONG THOSE WHO DID NOT WANT
PUBLIC INTEREST CAREERS

Georgetown (N=128)

Catholic (N=32)

43%

41%

Non-financial reasons

51%

53%

Other

6%

6%

"Need or expect more money
than public interest jobs pay"

The approximately two-thirds of the respondents who expressed a
desire, but for debt, to spend at least one-third of their careers on public

interest work were asked many other questions. (All of the remaining
tables report responses only from those students who, if debt
considerations were disregarded, wanted to spend at least one-third of
their careers doing public interest work). First, the counter-factual

hypothetical was eliminated so that the focus could be on the impact of
debt. Students were asked: "Taking the reality of student loans, along

with other financial realities and all other concerns into account, do you
actually expect to spend at least one-third of your legal career doing fulltime public interest work?" Table 10 shows that when financial realities
are factored in, public service falls off by about 50%, though the dropoff rate is less for EJF and SPIL members. The gap between aspirations

and expectations is also considerably smaller among those with the
lowest debt than among those with the highest debt, providing some
evidence challenging the findings of those who have suggested "that,

contrary to commonly held beliefs, law school debt does not have a
significant effect on attorneys' first job choice," and that the more

significant influences on public interest career choice are race, preexisting career plans, law school grades, and relative wages in various
sectors of the profession. 9

229. Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 84, at 957; see also Chambers, supra note 3, at 199.
Kornhauser and Revesz's conclusions were based on data collected from 1987 through 1990, (and
Chambers' data dated from 1989), when debt was much lower. See Komhauser & Revesz, supra
note 84, at 892. But even they concede that "debt affects an individual's decisionmaking calculus as
a constraint: an individual otherwise inclined to take a not-for-profit job will be deterred from doing
so if her disposable income after taxes and debt-service payments is not greater, by some amount,
than her living expenses as a student." Id. at 890. Furthermore, they note that their
conclusions ought to be reexamined in the coming years ... [because] debt burdens are
continuing to rise in real terms, and the effect of debt at one level may not be the same as
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TABLE 10: OF THOSE WHO WANT TO SPEND AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF
THEIR TIME IN PUBLIC SERVICE WORK, PERCENTAGE WHO

EXPECT TO DO So
Georgetown

Catholic

All respondents

48% (124 of 261)

47% (45 of 96)

Respondents who were
members of EJF or SPIL
Respondents anticipating low

59% (43 of 73)

68% (17 of 25)

68% (13 of 19)

73% (8 of 11)

42% (32 of 76)

61% (14 of 23)

48% (79 of 166)

37% (23 of 62)

debt
Respondents anticipating
high debt
Respondents anticipating
very high debt

The half of the respondents who desired to work as public interest
lawyers but did not expect to do so were asked why they lacked that
expectation. Specifically, they were asked to identify the factors
accounting for at least 25% of their expectation not to do the public
service work that they wanted to do. The choices were these:
o3 I can't afford to take a public interest salary and still repay my
student loans. [coded in the table below as "Debt"]
E3 Even aside from the burden of student loan repayments, I want the
higher pay or other tangible or intangible benefits that I think I
could get in the private sector. [coded as "Benefits"]

oa I can't get or don't expect to be able to get a public interest job that
would interest me. [coded as "Qualifications"]
Table 11 shows the spread of reasons, which exceed 100% because
students could give more than one reason.

that at a much higher level ... [and] debt might have a larger effect on career choice
than it now has.
Id. at 958.
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TABLE 11:

STATED SIGNIFICANT REASONS FOR FOREGOING
PUBLIC INTEREST WORK
Georgetown (N=137)

Catholic (N=51)

Debt

90%

92%

Benefits
Qualifications

53%
6%

49%
4%

Other

10%

16%

This result tends to confirm that debt is by far the most important factor
causing law students to abandon public service aspirations. Of course,
the data is self-reported, and although students responding to an

anonymous questionnaire could gain no benefit by reporting debt rather
than salary differentials as the most frequent reason for changing their
career plans, they might be deceiving themselves because they feel that
wanting more money (rather than rapid debt retirement) is shameful.

However, it provides one additional piece of evidentiary support for
President Clinton's view that accumulated debt significantly interferes
with public service choices.'

Before turning to questions about income-contingent repayment,
students who desired to spend at least one-third of their careers in public
interest law were asked one additional question, but a different question
was asked at each school because only Georgetown has a school-

financed LRAP for those who take public interest jobs. Georgetown has
two such programs. LRAP-I is an entitlement program which can pay off
all government-guaranteed debts within a few years for students earning
less than a specified ceiling in "a non-profit entity which has as one of
its primary purposes the rendering of legal services to or on behalf of

persons or organizations which could not otherwise obtain like

230. Pay becomes a relatively more significant factor relative to debt as students move through
law school. For the first-year Georgetown students, anticipated debt was a significant factor for
94%, and benefits were significant for 42%, but by the third year, these numbers were 84% and
56%. The Catholic students showed a similar trend. For first-year students, the numbers were debt
at 91%, benefits at 57%, but for third-year students, they were debt at 78% and benefits at 68%.
Students may have become more aware, as they moved through law school, of the huge gap
between private-sector and public-sector pay, but debt remained the most commonly cited factor for
not following a public interest career. For the Georgetown students, the frequency of mentioning
debt did not vary appreciably according to whether the respondent was an Equal Justice Foundation
("EJF') member, with 88% of EJF members and 91% of non-members mentioning debt, and 60%
of members and 51% of non-members mentioning pay. For Catholic, the raw numbers were too low
to make this comparison.
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services."' ' LRAP-II covers students who work at low pay for a
government, but it is not an entitlement program; students share, pro
rata, in an annual appropriation.2 At Georgetown, to measure
knowledge of a loan repayment plan that was extremely close to home,
students were asked whether they were planning to use this program.
Five percent planned to apply for LRAP-I, and 3% for LRAP-II. Thus,
93% of students interested in significant public interest law work did not
plan to use their own law school's repayment plan. This 93% (327
students) who responded negatively were asked their reasons, and Table
12 explains them.
TABLE 12:

REASONS STUDENTS AT GEORGETOvN GAVE

FOR NOT USING LRAP DESPITE WANTING TO Do
PUBLIC INTEREST WORK (N=300)
Reason

Number giving this reason

(respondents could give
more than one reason)

I do not know about those programs

90 (30%)

The work I want to do would not qualify

75 (25%)

The programs would not provide enough money
toward meeting my loan repayment needs

47 (16%)

I want to earn a high salary and pay off my
student debt before considering public interest

115 (38%)

work

Other

22 (7%)

The fact that planned usage of the Lav Center's LRAP is so low
may be good news for administrators with limited budgets, but the
reasons articulated by those who plan to pass it by must give some pause
to those designing loan-repayment programs. It may be that even a welldesigned and reasonably generous program (at least when compared to
the federal income-contingent repayment option) will reach only the
"hard-core" public interest practitioners because large numbers of other
would-be public interest lawyers will not find out about the program, or
want or need a still more generous program to enable them to follow
their dreams. On the other hand, as we shall see, 7% planned usage is
University Law Center, at
231. Loan Repayment Assistance Programs. Georgetom
http.//vwww.law.georgetowm.edulfinaidlrap.html (last modified Aug. 18.2000).
232. See id.
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probably a much higher level than law student usage of the incomecontingent repayment option, so perhaps Georgetown's LRAP offers a
benchmark for a federal program that is aimed at encouraging public
service by high-debt students.
Catholic students were asked a different but related question:
"Which of these statements best reflects the planning that you have done
for paying back your student loans?" The choices were:
o3 When I graduate, I will not have incurred substantial student debt.
o Before starting law school, I computed the amount of debt that I
would graduate with and planned how I would repay it and still
have the kind of career I want to have.
o While in law school, I have figured out a good way to repay my
loans and still have the kind of career I want to have.
o I have not yet figured out a good way to repay my loans and still
have the kind of career I want to have.
Table 13 shows that the vast majority had not yet found a way to
reconcile their debts with their career aspirations.
TABLE 13: FINANCIAL PLANNING BY CATHOLIC
LAW STUDENTS WHO WANTED SUBSTANTIAL
PUBLIC INTEREST WORK (N=98)
No substantial debt

6%

Analyzed debt and made plan before starting school

13%

Analyzed debt and made plan during school

12%

Have not yet figured out a plan

68%

Turning to the income-contingent repayment option, a two-sentence
description of the federal program without providing any details about
its rules was first given, and respondents at both schools were asked
whether they had heard of it before receiving the questionnaire. 33 Table

233. The question read as follows:
The United States Department of Education has a program (called the income-contingent
repayment option) through which a graduating student can consolidate his or her
government-guaranteed student loans into a single loan from the federal government and
pay that consolidated loan back over a long period of time, with limited annual
repayments. The repayments are tied by a formula to the income that the graduate
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14 shows that only 9% of the respondents had known about the plan
even generally, and only an additional 24% to 30% had ever heard

mention of it. At each school, more than 60% of these respondents-the
target group for a plan to help those with the largest debts and lowest

incomes-had never heard of the income-contingent repayment option.
TABLE

14: KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCOME-CONTINGENT
REPAYMENT OPTION

Georgetown

Catholic

(N=255)

(N--98)

No, never heard of it

62%

67%

Yes, but only vaguely and did not

30%

24%

know of its provisions even in

general terms_________________
Yes, and knew of provisions at
least generally

9%
I

9%
I

_I

The low awareness could have been accounted for, in part, by
students attending to debt repayment only in their third year of school,
when debt repayment loomed. But the survey showed no significantly
increasing awareness as the date for repayment neared.- Table 15 shows
the percentage of respondents who were unaware of the option, by year
of law school.

received during the previous year. Before receiving this questionnaire, had you heard
about this program?
234. At Catholic, the percentage of those unaware had dropped to 471 by the third year. but
there vere only seventeen third-year respondents at Catholic, eight of %%hom had not heard of the
option. The apparent increase in awareness could be anomalous. Undergraduates are even less
aware of the existence of the income-contingent repayment option. In a recent sun ey of students at
fifty-five colleges, 86% of respondents were unfamiliar with the option. See Tracey King & Ivan
Frishberg, Big Loans Bigger Problems: A Report on the Sticker Shock of Student Loans, igher
Education Project, U.S. PIRG Higher Education Project, at http:'J,,v.pirg.orglstudzntdzbil Ilast
vistied Apr. 13, 2001).
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PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS UNAWARE OF THE
OPTION BY YEAR OF LAW SCHOOL
Georgetown

Catholic

First year

60%

67%

Second year

61%

77%

Third year

64%

47%

The degree of unawareness may, however, be somewhat related to the
amount of debt, with the least indebted students least aware of the
option, as shown by Table 16.
TABLE

16:

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS UNAWARE OF THE
OPTION BY SIZE OF ANTICIPATED DEBT

Georgetown

Catholic

Low debt

79%

82%

High debt

56%

65%

Very high debt

62%

66%

About one-third of students who expected at least $100,000 of debt
had heard of the option. However, the percentage of these high-debt
students who knew at least generally about its terms was only 8% at
Georgetown and 9% at Catholic, no better than the percentage among all
respondents at these schools.
The minority of students who had at least heard of the option were
asked how they had heard of it and were allowed to respond with as
many sources as were applicable. Table 17 shows that most of the
information about the option had been received through word of mouth
rather than from the government (either through printed literature or its
Web site) or from other more channeled sources of information.2"

235. The number of respondents at Georgetown was large enough to investigate the degree of
knowledge of the option from the most frequently relied on sources. Among the forty-nine students
who had learned of the program through word of mouth, only eight thought that they knew its terms,
but among the ten who had learned of it from the United States Government, seven thought that
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TABLE 17: SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE
INCOME-CONTINGENT OPTION
Georgetown

Catholic

(N=98)

(N=32)

Law School Career Services OfficeF

10%

13%

Newspaper or Magazine

8%

3%

United States Government Literature

10%

6%

Word of Mouth

50%

56%

Internet

4%

9%

Other

17%

13%

'

The one-third of respondents who had heard of the program were
asked whether they were planning to consolidate their loans and repay
them through this plan.27 Table 18 shows that fewer than one-quarter of
this one-third of respondents were planning to use it, and that a majority
did not know enough about it to make such a plan.

they knew its terms. Thus, it may be that if the government did a better job of publicizing incomzcontingent repayment, students might learn more details of the program than they do from friend.
236. In designing the questionnaire, the financial aid office should have been included as a
possible response to this question, since students trying to figure out how to balance their debts
against their career decisions could receive advice from either law school office. However, cen if
all of the students who listed "other" in response to this option had received their information from
the financial aid office, a majority would still have learned of it from word of mouth rather than
from their law schools. In addition, it should be noted that the data in this table refer only to the'
approximately one-third of students who had heard of the option at all.
237. Neither Georgetown nor Catholic provided students vith the option of borrow~ing their
law student loans directly from the government, through direct lending, so consolidation would be
needed to take advantage of income-contingent repayment through the direct lending program.
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TABLE 18: PLANS TO USE INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT,
AMONG STUDENTS WHO HAD HEARD OF IT BEFORE
RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Georgetown
(N=97)

Catholic
(N=32)

24%

13%

No, because I did not know enough about it

60%

66%

Yes

17%

22%

No, because I knew how it worked but

decided not to use it

The small number of students who knew how the option worked
but nevertheless had decided not to use it were asked the reasons for
their decision. They were permitted to rank their reasons. Only the
Georgetown database was large enough to produce a meaningful
tabulation to this question. 8
TABLE 19: ToP-RANKED AND THREE TOP REASONS OF STUDENTS
WHO HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION BUT HAD DECIDED NOT
TO USE INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT

I have not wanted to agree to long-term indebtedness

Georgetown
(N=21), top
choice
43%

31%

14%

28%

Georgetown, top
three choices

I do not know what jobs or income I will have over a long
period of time, so it has been difficult to decide what
repayment plan would be best for me in the long run
I would use this plan if it covered all my loans, but I need a
high income because I have large loans that cannot be
consolidated into the plan because they are not governmentguaranteed
The total payments would be too high, even if some of the
money were eventually forgiven
I have been putting off until a later year my planning of
how I will repay my loans
I have not heard of anyone using this program, so I have
been suspicious of it
LRAP is sufficient to help me pay off my loans

19%

11%

5%

13%

14%

11%

5%

4%

0%

0%

Other

0%

2%

238. Only four Catholic students had made a deliberate decision not to use income-contingent
repayment.
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Table 19 considers the first-ranked reasons and the top three
reasons. It shows that the most important reasons, by far, are students'
unwillingness to commit to a long repayment plan, the difficulty of longterm planning under conditions of uncertainty, and the fact that they had
high private9 debts that would not be covered by income-contingent
repayment.
Because the number of students who had enough information to
decide about income-contingent repayment was so low, further questions
were addressed to respondents who already claimed to know about how
income-contingency worked and had decided not to use it,2" and to the
larger group of respondents who did not have enough information about
" ' They were provided with a description of the program,
it.24
comprising
approximately one single-spaced page with the information about the
regulations summarized earlier in this Article.:2 After they read a
description of the program, they were asked whether they would
probably want to use this option. For the most part, this better informed
group still did not want to use income-contingent repayment, although
the percentage who were interested at Catholic (which has no LRAP)
was twice as high as at Georgetown and is the most significant
difference in the data supplied by students at the two schools.
TABLE 20: PROBABLE USE OF INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT BY
STUDENTS DESIRING TO WORK IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW AND
INFORMED ABOUT THE TERMS OF THE OPTION
Will you probably use this option?
Yes

Georgetown
(N=238)
20%

Catholic
(N--91)
39%

No

80%

61%

239. This conclusion equally applies to the subgroup of those with very high debt. Their top
three reasons (aggregating their three top-ranked reasons) for not wanting to use incomecontingency were avoiding long-term debt (30%), lack of information about their futures (27%1 and
lack of coverage of commercial loans (15%).
240. Students who thought that they knew about the program might have been misinformed
about it, particularly since most of them knew about it through word of mouth. Therefore, the
summary of the program was directed to these students as well as to those who admitted not
knowing enough about it.
241. Thus, the only respondents not asked the remaining questions were the small number %%ho
had already decided to use income-contingent repayment.
242. See discussion supraPartIILB.
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This negative opinion of income-contingent repayment did not vary
greatly among subgroups with larger debts. Among the Georgetown
respondents, 17% of those with low and high debt said that they would
use the option, while 21% of those with very high debt said that they
would do so.
The students who had just been informed about the parameters of
the program and had decided not to use it were then asked their reasons,
just as those who had already known about the program had been asked
earlier. The possible responses were similar to those offered in
connection with the earlier question, but because these students had just
been given detailed information about the option, more specific
explanatory wording for the reasons was provided. The choices were:
[] I don't want to be indebted for 25 years, even if the annual
payments could be low and I might eventually get some
forgiveness.
o I don't know what jobs or income I will have over a long period of
time, so it is difficult to decide what repayment plan would be best
for me in the long run.
o3 I'd use this plan if it covered all my loans, but I need a high income
because I have large loans that can't be consolidated into the plan
(they are not government-guaranteed).
o3 The total payments would be too high because I expect my income
to rise, and as my income rises, my payments will also rise, so
little if any of my debt would be forgiven after 25 years.
ol The total payments would be too high, even if some of the money
were forgiven after 25 years.
o I would be worried about having to pay income tax on the amount
forgiven in the 25th year.
ol I am putting off until a later year my planning of how I will repay
my loans.
o I haven't heard of anyone using this program, so I am suspicious of
it.
o] LRAP is sufficient to help me pay off my loans (Georgetown
questionnaire only).
o Other.
Table 21 reveals that the main reasons for reasonably wellinformed public-interest-oriented students' avoidance of the option are
the same as those given by students who had not been so recently
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss3/2
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educated: the twenty-five year commitment before forgiveness
occurred;..3 the difficulty of deciding in favor of the option without
knowing more about the student's future employment or income; and the
plan's exclusion of commercial debt.
TABLE 21:

ToP-RANKED AND THREE TOP REASONS OF STUDENTS

WHO HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED ABOUT INCOME-CONTINGENT
REPAYMENT BUT DECIDED NOT TO USE THIS OPTION

Do not want twenty-five
year indebtedness even
with low payments and

Georgetownm
(N=188), top
choice
50%

Georgetown.
top three
choices
30%

Catholic
(N=56). top
choice
45%

Catholic,
top three
choices
31%

17%

27%

9%

21%

19%

16%

20%

17%

5%

10%

13%

12%

2%

5%

5%

5%

-

3%

possible forgiveness

Difficult to plan long in
advance
Plan does not cover
commercial debt
Expect income to rise
Total payments would be
too high, even with
forgiveness
Concerned about tax in

1o%

twenty-fifth year

Putting off planning

2%

5%

2%

3%

Have not heard of anyone

1%

2%

-

I%

LRAP is sufficient

2%

1%

(No LRAP)

(No LRAP)

Other

3%

2%

12%

7-%

using this program

Unwillingness to sign up for a twenty-five year repayment plan
was, by far, the most important negative factor attributed to the incomecontingent repayment plan. It should be noted, however, that as debt
rose, the aversion to twenty-five year repayment gave way, a bit, to non-

coverage of commercial debt as a major factor against using incomecontingent repayment. This result tends to suggest that as the percentage

of students with very significant commercial debt rises (as it vill each
year that the annual ceiling on Stafford loans remains $18,500 despite
243. The questionnaire made clear that the repayment plan could be switched to a different
option, so that respondents would not necessarily lock themselves into twentyfive years of
repayment. But they were also made aware of the fact that forgiveness was not m-1d available
unless one remained in the plan for twenty-five years.
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increases in tuition and the cost of living), non-coverage of commercial
debt will become a more important reason why students avoid the
income-contingent repayment option. The Georgetown numbers are
shown in Table 22.2'
TABLE 22: TWENTY-FIVE YEAR REPAYMENT AND NON-COVERAGE OF
COMMERCIAL DEBT AS FACTORS IN GEORGETOWN RESPONDENTS'
DECISIONS NOT TO USE INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENTe 43

Debt level

Percent who listed

Percent who listed

All respondents

twenty-five year term
as first factor
50%

commercial debt
as first factor
19%

Low (N=13)

61%

8%

High (N=62)

52%

18%

Very high (N=113)

48%

20%

Finally, because it was acknowledged while designing the
questionnaire that aversion to twenty-five year repayment would loom
large as a reason for not considering an income-contingent plan, 46 those
students who had objected for this reason were asked to clarify their
objection. 7 Did they dislike twenty-five year repayment because the
term was simply too long in some absolute sense, or because the norm
was ten-year repayment?"4 At both schools, a strong majority was averse

simply because they could not bring themselves to sign up for a twentyfive-year term, but a significant minority (17% at Georgetown, 19% at
244. The number of Catholic respondents was too low to be meaningful.
245. Respondents who listed other than these are not counted, causing the total of percentages
to be lower than 100%.
246. During the preparation stage of this Article, the income-contingent repayment plan was
explained to perhaps a dozen students, not all of whom were at Catholic or Georgetown. They were
visibly interested, until it was made known that the repayment term was twenty-five years. At that
point their eyes almost always became distant and their interest became academic rather than
personal. Several said that people in their mid-twenties could not be expected to sign any agreement
that would affect their lives until they were in their fifties (as if their choices of law school, first
jobs, and spouses did not do so).
247. This question was directed to students who listed objection to a twenty-five-year term as
one of their reasons, regardless of ranking.
248. The choices were: "Iwouldn't want to repay my student loans over such a long period
even if 25-year repayment becomes the norm for all law graduates, those going into the private and
public sectors," or "I could accept repaying my student loans over such a long period if that were
the norm for everyone, especially if that saved me some money. But I don't want to be making
payments on my loans for fifteen years after most people I know have finished paying for school."
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Catholic) objected primarily because they did not want to deviate from
the norm.
B. FinancialAid Advisors
These surveys of students tend to show that there is relatively little
interest in the income-contingent repayment option among students with
high debts and low salary prospects, whether or not they are well-

informed about its details. But what about the professionals who advise
these students about their financial obligations and opportunities? To

learn something about their views on income-contingent repayment, the
Author surveyed the law school financial aid advisors, sending a

questionnaire via e-mail to all 153 law school financial aid advisors who
listed an e-mail address either in their professional directory"" or on their
law school's Web site.?0 The advisors were able to complete the

questionnaire without revealing their identities or law schools, and to
those who did reveal their school names were promised anonymity.

Officials at ninety-eight law schools responded. 5 '
According to the survey results, fifty-seven of the responding

schools are private law schools. Twenty-five of those (as well as eight
public law schools) have LRAPs. Thirty of the schools (including seven
of the fifty-seven private schools) participate in direct lending, making it
possible for graduates to elect income-contingent repayment without
first consolidating -'2 (and presumably making information about this
option more readily available to them than at schools like Georgetown
and Catholic). At about one-half of the responding law schools (52%), a

majority of graduating students take their first jobs in large law firms

249. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONCOUNCIL, DiRECrORY 1998-99 (1999).
250. The ABA accredits 181 law schools, see ABA APPROVED LW. SCHOOLS. supra nota 209.
at 8, but not all have financial aid advisors, and not all financial aid officers list e.mail addresses.
Some of those who do list addresses and were included in my survey are not technically law f'hool
advisors and do not actually have offices in their law school. These officials work in a central
university administration office and are the primary persons designated to answer questions from
law students, but they do not see law students on a daily basis as the financial aid advisors situated
in law schools inevitably do. In a few instances, the officials who received the inquiries did not
respond, and a follow up was conducted by asking Georgetown's financial aid advisor to gise them
additional copies of the questionnaire at their annual convention.
251. This absolute number of responses is, of course, small. but the data might be fairly
representative because it represents more than half of all United States law schools.
252. Unfortunately, some columnists who inform students about repayment options do not
mention that FFELP borrowers may consolidate their student loans into a direct federal loan _o that
they can elect income-contingent repayment. See Tony Munroz,/ f You Can't Pay, Talk to Lean
Arranger, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 27, 1998, at 35.
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(with more than 250 lawyers). At one-third of the law schools, at least
10% of graduates start at salaries of $33,000 or less.
The actual cost of attending two-thirds of the responding schools
exceeds the $18,500 annual Stafford loan limit; these schools are
referred to as "high tuition" schools for purposes of analyzing the
questionnaire responses. Of the sixty-six schools in that category,
twenty-nine have LRAPs. Thirty-one percent of the schools reported that
the average debt of their graduating students was $55,500 (three Stafford
loans) or less; 59% between $55,500 and $75,000; and 10% more than
$75,000. These categories are referred to for purposes of analysis as low
debt, high debt, and very high debt schools. Among the private schools,
however, only 4% were low debt schools; 78% were high debt, and 18%
were very high debt schools.
First, financial aid advisors were asked how much they knew about
the federal income-contingent repayment option. Three percent had
never heard of it. Twenty percent had heard of it but were not familiar
with it. Sixty-two percent said that they understood "the basic outline of
the option but [were] not familiar with it in detail." Advisors who
checked this option might know enough about it to refer high debt, lowincome students to the government's Web site for further information.
Only 14% said that they were familiar with its details. 3 To elect this
option, they had to say that they understood "its repayment formulas, its
limitation on capitalization of unpaid interest, the opportunities for entry
into and exit from the option, and the forgiveness feature." In other
words, they had to know enough about it (in the opinion of the Author)
to be able to offer expert advice to law students, including those who
inquired about the option and those who might benefit from the option
but had not previously heard about it.

253. This percentage rose to 19% among financial aid advisors at private law schools, the
schools whose students have more substantial debt. But it was only 15% among financial aid
advisors at schools at which more than 10% of the graduates start at salaries of $33,000 or less. It
fell to 10% among advisors at the twenty-nine schools where the average debt of graduates was less
than $55,500.
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TABLE 23: FINANCIAL AnD ADVISORS' KNOWLEDGE
OF THE OPTION (N=98)
Understood the option well

14%

Understood basic outline but not familiar with details

62%

Had heard of it

20%

Had never heard of it

3%

Additional questions were not asked of the twenty-three financial
aid advisors who had never heard of the income-contingent repayment
option or who had heard of it but were not familiar with it. All of the
remaining data was collected from the seventy-five advisors who at least
understood the basic outlines of income-contingent repayment.
To find out what advice these advisors proffered, they were asked
what information about the income-contingent repayment option they or
others in their offices gave to students who expected to have low-income
jobs but would graduate with high debt. Respondents had three choices:
Eo We do the income-contingent arithmetic with them (or at least with
those who request us to do that), to help them decide whether this
option would be helpful for them, either as a short-term option or
over a 25-year period.
o3 We tell them about the federal income-contingent option and give
them printed information that is specifically about incomecontingent repayment (or instructions about how to get specific
information about this repayment plan), but we do not do the
arithmetic with them as part of our counseling.
o3 We give them general information about loan repayment options
(such as printed information about loan repayment choices, or the
Access Advisor diskette), but we do not usually discuss this
specific option.
Consistent with the low degree of familiarity with the program's
formulas, very few advisors or their offices assisted students with the
quite complex arithmetic that is necessary to understand the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of this repayment option. Table 24
displays the advice dispensed by all financial aid advisors who knew at
least the basic outline of the program, and by the fourteen who reported
that they understood the option well.
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TABLE 24:

TYPES OF ADVICE GIVEN BY THE FINANCIAL AID

ADVISORS MOST FAMILIAR WITH INCOME-CONTINGENT
REPAYMENT

All of these
advisors
(N=75)

Those who
understood the
basic outline
(N=61)

Help with arithmetic, at least
by request
Provide printed information or

Those
who knew
the details
N=14

4%

0%

21%

51%

49%

57%

45%

51%

21%

explain how to get it

Do not discuss incomecontingent repayment

Thus, nearly one-half of the advisors who knew at least the outlines
of the income-contingent program do not inform students about it, and
only 4% of them (all at private law schools) help with the math
necessary to compare this method with other methods of repayment.
Cross-tabulations were performed in an attempt to identify factors
that might make it more likely that these advisors would discuss incomecontingent repayment with law students. Because so few of them do the
arithmetic with students, the advisors were divided into only two groups.
Those in the first group either do the arithmetic, provide information, or
inform students about how to get information. Members of the second
group do not discuss income-contingent repayment at all.

254. It could reasonably be assumed that the financial aid advisors who did not know even the
general outlines of the program did not help students with the complex arithmetic. Therefore, of the
ninety-eight advisors who responded to the survey, only three helped students to do the comparative
computations.
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TABLE 25:

INFLUENCE OF POSSIBLE FACTORS ON DEGREE OF
INFORMATION OFFERED BY THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE

LAW SCHOOL FINANCIAL AID ADVISORS
Help with arithmetic,

Do not discuss income-

provide printed data,
or advise how to get

contingent repayment

information

All knowledgeable

55%

45%

66%

34%

45%

55%

Private school (N=46)

61%

39%

Public school (N=29)

45%

55%

More than 10% of
students take low-paying
jobs ($33,000 or less)
(N=23)

56%

44%

Less than 10% take low-

54%

46%

54%

46%

55%

45%

61%

39%

42%

58%

advisors

Advisors who believe that
at least 5% of their
graduates could benefit in
the short or long-term
from the option (N=35)
Advisors who believe that
less than 5% could benefit
(N=33)

paying jobs (N=52)
School participates in
federal direct lending
(N=26)
School does not
participate in federal
direct lending (N=49)

High-cost schoolr 5
(N=51)
Low-cost school (N=24)

The results suggest that neither a school's participation in direct
lending nor the percentage of students who take very low-paying jobs
has much influence on how much advice financial aid advisors provide

255. The cost of attendance exceeds the annual Stafford limit.
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about income-contingent repayment, 6 but that the likelihood of
providing at least minimal advice was increased if the advisor believed
that a more substantial number of graduates could benefit from the
program, the school was a private school, or the school was a high-cost
school.
To learn these advisors' opinions of the utility of incomecontingent repayment, they were asked to state their view of its use by
their high-debt graduates "who want to work, at least for several years,
in jobs that do not have high compensation-for example, public
interest, local government jobs, and very small firms." They were given
three options for response:
o Many of these graduates might benefit by using it as a long-term
repayment plan, and many others might benefit by using it for a
few years and then switching to a more conventional repayment
option.
o It would not be helpful as a long-term repayment plan for many of
them, but a considerable number of them might benefit by using it
for a few years and then switching to a more conventional
repayment option.
o Very few, if any, of our graduates would benefit from either longterm or short-term use of this plan.
The overall responses are displayed in Table 26. They show that
despite the advisors' lack of familiarity with the details of the program
or their disinclination to help students to compute whether it would be
advantageous, the vast majority believe that the option would be useful
for this segment of law graduates.
TABLE 26: OPINIONS OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE FINANCIAL AID
ADVISORS ABOUT THE UTILITY OF THE INCOME-CONTINGENT OPTION
FOR HIGH-DEBT, Low INCOME GRADUATES (N=75)

Many might benefit as a long-term plan and many 39%
for a few years
Benefit for a few years only
52%
Few if any would benefit

9%

256. It should be noted, however, that these results are displayed only for advisors who knew at
least the basic outlines of income-contingent repayment, and that direct lending participants were
somewhat more likely (87% compared to 72%) to fall into that category.
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Interestingly, the better the advisors knew the program, the less useful
they thought it was, as indicated in Table 27.
TABLE 27:

OPINIONS ABOUT UTILITY AS A FUNCTION OF GREATER
FAMILIARITY WITH IT
Percent of those who
understood details
very well (N=14)

Percent of those
who understood the
basic outline

14%

44%

Benefit for a few years only

64%

49%

Few if any would benefit

21%

7%

Many might benefit as a longterm plan and many for a few

(N=61)

years

Table 28 examines factors about their law schools that might influence
the opinions
repayment.

of financial

TABLE 28:

aid advisors

about

income-contingent

CROSS-TABULATION OF ADVISORS' OPINIONS AND
LAW SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS
Percent who think it
could help high-debt,
low-income graduates
both as a long-term
and as a short-term

Percent who
think it is useful
only as a shortterm plan

Percent who
think few if
any would
benefit

plan

All respondents

39%

52%

91%

School has LRAP

29%

61%

11 %

45%

47%

9%

52%

39%

9%

32%

58%

10%,

41%

49 %

10%

Low-cost school (N=24) 33%

58%

81%

(N=33)

School does not have
LRAP (N=42)

More than 10% of
graduates start at
$33,000 or less (N=23)

Fewer than 10% of
graduates start at
$33,000 or less (N=52)

High-cost school
(N=51)

I
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Not surprisingly, advisors were more likely to think income-contingent
repayment useful (especially for both long-term or short-term users) if
their schools lacked an LRAP, had more low-income graduates, and cost
more to attend.
The eight advisors who did not think that income-contingent
repayment would be useful either for long-term or short-term use were
asked to explain their reasoning. One did not respond. Table 29
summarizes the thinking of the other seven, though it should be noted
that the number of respondents here is very low because so few thought
the program useless.
TABLE 29:

REASONS OF THE SEVEN MOST SKEPTICAL ADVISORS

ABOUT WHY INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT WOULD NOT BE

USEFUL EVEN IN THE SHORT TERM
Top ranked reason

All reasons

43% (3 of 7)

33%

14% (1 of 7)

28%

School's LRAP is sufficient

29% (2 of 7)

17%

Students are better off working for
law firms or corporations to reduce

-

11%

-

6%

14% (1 of 7)

6%

Other, less complex repayment plans
would be better for those who cannot
afford ten-year repayment

Short-term users do not remain in the
program long enough to qualify for
forgiveness and will end up paying
more than on ten-year plan

debt before taking low-paying jobs

Department of Education
administration is unreliable

Other

A much larger group of forty respondents (including the eight who
thought it not useful in either time frame) thought that incomecontingent repayment would not help as a long-term repayment method.
They were asked the reasons for their views about lack of long term
utility. They were offered eight possible explanations, as well as the
opportunity to list an "other" reason. The eight options were as follows:
o It only

covers governmentally
guaranteed debt.

extended and government-

o It requires 25-year amortization to qualify for forgiveness, and such
a long repayment period is too long for our graduates, even if the
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss3/2
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forgiveness)

were

o Few graduates will remain in the program long enough to qualify
for forgiveness, and they will end up paying more money than if
they elected a more traditional repayment plan.
o The program is useful only to those high-debt students who can
predict what their career paths will be and know that they will
have low incomes for a long time, but few if any of our graduates
will fit that profile.
o3 The forgiveness eventually offered by the program is taxable as
income.
o3 I have not yet heard of law graduates benefiting by using this
program.
13 This school has a Loan Repayment Assistance Program, and it is
sufficient to meet the needs of most of our high-debt, low-income
graduates.
o3 Administration by the Department of Education, either of direct
lending generally or of this option, is unreliable.

As Table 30 shows, a plurality of them believed that few graduates
would remain in the program long enough to qualify for forgiveness and
would end up paying too much money.
TABLE 30: REASONS WHY INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT
WOULD NOT BE A USEFUL LONG-TERM (TWENTY-FIVE YEAR)
OPTION (N=40)
Top ranked reason

All reasons

Does not cover commercial debt

5%

14%

Twenty-five years is too long, even if
forgiveness would be advantageous
Few graduates will remain in the
program long enough to obtain
forgiveness, and they will pay too much
compared to standard repayment
Long-term career paths are too
unpredictable
Forgiveness is taxable

13%

14%

40%

26%

15%

16%

7%

8%

7%

9%

I have not heard of others using it
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LRAP is sufficient

10%

9%

Department of Education administration

0%

3%

3%

1%

is unreliable

Other

Finally, the financial aid advisors who had been familiar with incomecontingent repayment were asked to estimate the percentage of their
students who would benefit by using it, and the percentage who actually
did use it. Apparently, schools do not usually ask their graduates to
report back to them on the repayment method they elect; 80% of the
advisors stated that they would have no way of making even a rough
estimate of the percentage who actually used the option. 7 But Table 31
shows that an overwhelming majority of the advisors (86%) believe that
at least 1% of their schools' graduates would benefit, and a majority
(52%) believes that the percentage is more than 5%. Contrast these
percentages with the mere 4% of advisors who help their students, even
when requested, with the arithmetic needed to evaluate the utility of
income-contingent repayment.
TABLE 31: ESTIMATES, BY FINANCIAL AID ADVISORS FAMILIAR WITH
INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT, OF THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR

SCHOOLS' GRADUATES WHO WOULD BENEFIT (N=68)
Percent Who Would Benefit

Estimate

More than 10%

25%

5% to 10%

27%

1% to 4.9%

34%

Some but fewer than 1%

11%

None

3%

Not surprisingly, the percentage of advisors who thought that at least 5%
of students would benefit was higher at private schools (60%) than at
public schools (37%); at schools lacking an LRAP (55%) than at those
that had such programs (46%); at schools where at least 10% of
graduates took low-paying jobs (70%) than at those where fewer took
257. Of the fifteen who were able to estimate, two said none; four said fewer than 1%; seven
said I to 4%; one said 5 to 10%; and one said more than 10%.
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such jobs (43%); and at high-cost schools (54%) than at low-cost
schools (45%). But the data also showed that the advisors who reported
understanding the details of the income-contingent plan were less likely
to believe that at least 5% would benefit (36%), compared to those
advisors who only knew its general outlines (55%). This finding seems
consistent, however, with the earlier conclusion that the advisors who
best understood the plan were less likely to think that it was beneficial to
students."
V. IS INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT GOOD FOR YOU?
Part III of this Article reported the high hopes of Congress and
President Clinton that income-contingent repayment would help to
enable idealistic students, including law students, to enter public service.
But the survey data in Part IV suggest a dismal image of the utility of
income-contingent repayment for idealistic law graduates. One-half of
the students who want to spend at least one-third of their careers in
public service do not expect to do so,"' and 90% of those students cite
their student debt as a significant reason for foregoing the opportunity. : '
Approximately two-thirds of these students have never heard of the
income-contingent repayment option,:6' and only 9% even know
generally what it provides. 62 Among the very few who know about it,
63 When informed about the details of
only about one-fifth plan to use it.
the option, only one-fifth to two-fifths of the students wanted to use it. "
Professional financial aid advisors are slightly better informed but at
least as skeptical. Only 14% of them understand the option well." Onehalf of the advisors who know of the program at least generally think
that it would benefit at least 5% of their students, and one-quarter think
that it would help more than 10% of their students. ""But only 4% of the
advisors go over the complex arithmetic with the students whom it could
help, even on request, and nearly one-half do not discuss it with students
at all .

258. See supratbl.27.
10.
259. See supratbl.
260. See supratbl.11.
261. See supra tbl.14.
262. See supratbl.14.
263. See supratbl.18.
264. See supra tbl.19.
265. See supratbl.23.
266. See supratbl.31.
267. See supra tbl.24.
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This skepticism and lack of knowledge on the part of both students
and advisors would be justified or at least harmless if the incomecontingent repayment option is so poor that in fact, only an infinitesimal
fraction of high-debt, low-income students would be advantaged by
using it. To evaluate its utility generally, and to enable law students to
compare how their own debts would fare under income-contingent
repayment and other repayment plans, the Author and his research
assistant, Tai-yeu Hsia, constructed an interactive income-contingent
loan repayment calculator. FinAid, a public interest Web site for
information on student loans, has made the calculator available without
charge in HTML form.2"
A person using this Web site calculator enters, in specified fields,
his or her government-guaranteed debts that are eligible for
consolidation in the direct lending program,269 the applicable interest rate
or rates, his or her starting income (including any spousal income), and
his or her anticipated rate of income growth.*' Guessing future income
growth is one of the more difficult aspects of using the calculator, but
one can ask prospective employers about their historical rate of salary
increases, and one can also make alternative assumptions about future
income growth and test them. The user of the calculator may also
assume a sudden increase in his or her future income level-for
example, a change from public interest to law firm employment. Finally,
the user may enter the current thirty-year government bond rate (or a
different discount rate, if preferred) to reflect the financial advantage of
repaying money later rather than sooner.2"
The calculator will then provide the user with the monthly payment
for the first month and every month until the debt is paid off or forgiven;
the time at which the debt will be paid off or forgiven; the total of
payments that the student will pay over time; the amount of the debt that
the government will forgive as a result of the subsidies built into the
option; and the projected principal balance at the end of every month
(which will help the user to decide whether to prepay the debt or switch,
268. To use the FinAid income-contingent repayment calculator, access Mark Kantrowitz,
Income Contingent Repayment Calculator,FinAid: The SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid, at
http://www.fmaid.org/calculators/icr.phtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
269. If her debts were direct federal loans to begin with, rather than FFELP loans,
consolidation is not necessary.
270. The user also enters whether he or she lives in Alaska or Hawaii, since the federal poverty
level is set higher in those states, and the size of the user's family. The latter entry is necessary
because the poverty level varies with the number of dependents.
271. For an explanation of why the thirty-year bond rate is recommended, see the Appendix to
this Article.
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at any given point, to ten-year or some other form of repayment).' The
calculator will also show the present value of the stream of future
repayments, and of any amount of subsidy that the government aill

eventually provide. Because the value of a dollar paid twenty-five years
from now is less than the value of a dollar paid ten years from now, only
present value calculations can enable a borrower to compare the cost of
repayment using two or more repayment plans with different terms.'
The FinAid Web site also allows a borrower to compare incomecontingent repayment with ten-year repayment, thirty-year "extended"
repayment, or repayment over any other term of years.24 Similar
calculators are available on other sites, but this one uniquely computes
present value so that the cost of a loan paid under one of these methods

can more accurately
be compared to the cost of income-contingent
5
repayment.2

272. No calculator, including the one utilized in this Article, can predict precisely a borrowers
actual schedule of repayments under the income-contingent repayment option, becaucz a borrower
cannot predict in advance certain relevant events that will occur in the future, such as the rate of
change in the federal poverty level (an aspect of the repayment formula) or the precise year-to-year
income fluctuations of the borrower. Even if the borrower had an entirely fiat rate of income
increases, calculators (which assume even increases) will be imperfect predictors of the pa)mnt
bills that the government's computer will send out in future years, because increases in the
consumer price index and the poverty level are not the same from year to year. Even the
Department's o'n Web site calculator, posted to the public so that would-be borrowers can
determine how much they would pay under various repayment plans, bears the following legend in
bold, red, capital letters: "Calculations are estimates. Values may not reflect the actual amount
computed by the direct loan servicing center." Income Contingent Repayment Data Entry, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., at httpi.//ww.ed.gov/officesOSFAPDirectLoanlRcpayCalcldlentry2html (last
visited February 15, 2001) (capitalization omitted). The tables in this Article are subject to the same
caveat. We were able to check our calculator against the government's Web site calculator only for
hypothetical borrowers whose income increased by 5% per annum, because that assumption is
rigidly built into the government's Web site calculator. In that range, our calculator produces
payment totals (over tventy-five years) which, measured in current dollars, are generally within
one-tenth of 1% of the amounts reported on the government's Web site calculator.
273. See the Appendix to this Article. The government's calculator, Income Contingent
Repayment
Data
Entr,
U.S.
Dep't
of
Edue.,
at
http'// wv.ed.gov/offices/OSFAPDirectLoanRepayCalcldlentry2.html (last visited February 15,
2001), does not calculate present values.
274. See Mark Kantrowitz, Income Contingent Repayment Calculator, FnAid: The
SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid, at http'/wwv.finaid.orgcalculatorlicr.phtml (last visited
Feb. 13, 2001). A steady repayment calculator also appears on the FnAid Web site. See Mark
Kantrowitz, Loan Payment Calculator, FmAid: The SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid, at
http:/lwv.finaid.orglcalculatorsloanpayments.phtml (lastvisited Feb. 13, 2001).
275. Compare Mark Kantrowitz, Income Contingent Repayment Calculator, FinAid: The
SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid, at httpJ/www.finaid.orgealculatorcier.phtml (last %isited
Feb. 13, 2001) with Income Contingent Repayment Data Entr, U.S. Dzp't of Educ., at
httpI:/wwv.ed~gov/offiesOSFAPDiretLoan/RepaCaleldlentry2.html (last visited Febmar 15,
2001).
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A. Larry and Lisa Lifer, Public Interest Careerists
With the calculator in hand, consider the situation of Larry Lifer, a
law student graduating in June 2000,2'6 with $15,000 in governmentguaranteed undergraduate debt, $55,500 in additional debt as a result of
law school Stafford loans, and $5000 in accrued interest from the law
school loans.277 If he consolidates his loans into a federal direct loan
now, the loan will bear an annual interest rate of 8.25%.7 8 Mr. Lifer has
been offered a position as a staff attorney in a neighborhood legal
services office in the continental United States at the typical starting
salary of $32,000. He plans to spend his entire career in legal services
work. He is not married. Because legal services' budgets depend on an
annual funding process and his office does not have a fixed or unionized
salary scale, he and his future employer are a little uncertain about the
rate of salary increase that he can expect. It might be 2%, 3%, or 4%. Let
us say that the thirty-year bond rate is currently 5.8%.
Table 32 shows the important characteristics of repayment for the
three assumptions about the rate of salary increase. It shows that in all of
these cases, payments in the first year and the sixth year are much lower
than the $926 required by ten-year repayment. Thus, the main goal of
income-contingent repayment, keeping payments affordable, is met. In
addition, the government provides additional loan subsidies for
borrowers at all of these levels of increasing income, but the degree of
subsidy is highly sensitive to the rate of increase. If Mr. Lifer's income
increases at 2% per year, the government will write off about 24% of the
total debt repayment (measured in terms of present value). But if his
income increases by 4% annually, the government will write off only
about 7% of the debt.

276. The tables in this Article display costs of repayment based on consolidation in late
Summer 2000. The FinAid Web site is updated annually to include in its calculations the most
recently released federal poverty level values and other adjustments required by federal law. Using
the FinAid calculator in 2001 will produce slightly different results than those reported here, but
that calculator permits historical research by allowing the user to assume that he or she was
consolidating in an earlier year. Thus, these results can be replicated by selecting "2000" as the
"table year" on the FinAid calculator. See id.
277. This is approximately the amount that would accrue during three years of law school and
a six-month grace period. See Memorandum from Jeff Hanson, Access Group, Average Debt at
Repayment, Law School Class of 1998-Revised, to Interested Parties 2 (Jan. 26, 2000) (on file

with author).
218. For 2000-01, the Stafford loan repayment rate is the ninety-one-day treasury bill rate in
May 2000 (5.89%) plus 2.3%, or 8.19%. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.202(a)(1)(iii)(B) (2001). This is
rounded up in a federal consolidation loan to the next higher one-eighth of a percentage point, or
8.25%. See id. § 685.202(a)(3)(i)(E).
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CHARACTERISTICS OF INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYiENT
FOR LARRY LIFER: $75,500 DEBT,
$32,000 STARTING SALARY

Monthly payments, year one" '

Income
increases
at 2%
$394

Income
increases
at 3%
$394

Income
increases at
4%
$394

Monthly payments, year six

$428

S457

S488

Total of payments, current dollars

$144,107

$171,440

$194,477

Present value of total of future

$73,677

$84,444

$94,272

payments

Amount the government forgives,

I

I

Present value of government

$24,633

forgiveness

_

S29,543

$71,427

$100,845

current dollars

$17,447

$7216

Income-contingent repayment could be attractive to Larry Lifer at
all three of these rates of salary increases, because it is a way to keep
payments low in relation to income. Indeed, recalling the very highest
percentage of income (20%, twice as high as the government's own
recommendation) that professionals have recommended as a ceiling for
student debt, income-contingent repayment is the only way to make
repayment affordable, particularly in the early years. Table 33 shows
that among repayment plans that reduce payments (compared to standard
ten-year repayment), it may even be a good way to keep down the total
amount paid, because it most greatly reduces payment right away, while
keeping total payments over the life of the loan comparable to other
payment-reduction plans. But as noted, Mr. Lifer's federal subsidy is not
very great if he will experience income increases as large as 4%
annually.

279. Because the income-contingent repayment option only permits consolidation of
government-guaranteed debt, repayment of any commercial debt must be added to the monthly
figures.
280. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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TABLE

33: COMPARISON OF REPAYMENT PLANS FOR LARRY LIFER
wITH 4% INCREASESs '
Standard
repayment

Monthly
$926
payments year
(41%)
one, and
percentage of
after-tax
income m
Monthly
$926
payments, year
(34%)
six, and
percentage of
after-tax income,
based on gross
income of
$40,500'3
Total of
$111,123
payments,
current dollars
Present value of
$84,738
total of future
payments
Amount the
0
govemment
forgives,
current dollars
Present value of
0
government
forgiveness
I

Graduated repayment,
debt repaid in thirty
years

I

Extended
thirty-year
repayment

$519
(23%)

$567
(25%)

$595 (26%)

Incomecontingent
repayment
with 4%
income
increases
$394 (17%)

$540
(20%)

$567
(21%)

$595 (22%)

$488 (22%)

$216,364

$204,195

$178,584

$194,477

$98,175

$94,605

$94,170

$94,272

0

0

0

$29,543

0

0

0

$7216

I

Extended
twentyfive-year
repayment

I

281. Under the federal government's graduated repayment plan, the period within which the
debt is scheduled for repayment increases as the amount of the debt goes up. For a $75,500 debt, the
period is up to thirty years. Unlike thirty-year extended payment, however, the amount of monthly
repayment is not steady. It starts at a smaller level in the early years, and increases over the period
of repayment, on the assumption that the borrower's income will rise. A borrower can choose a
period of repayment shorter than the maximum. Although a comparison between twenty-five-year
graduated repayment and twenty-five year income-contingent repayment was preferred, neither the
government's Web site calculator nor, apparently, any other online calculator permit the user to
assume a repayment period shorter than the maximum. The data on graduated repayment in this
chart were calculated on the government's Web site. See Income ContingentRepayment Data Entry,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., at httpl/www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoanRepayCalc/dlentiy2.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2001). The present value calculation for the graduated repayment data was
performed on a spreadsheet created by Lewis Walton on the basis of an algorithm supplied by the
Department.
282. This assumes a personal exemption of $4300, a standard deduction of $2750, federal
income tax of $3746, and state and local income taxes of $1124 (30% of federal tax). The personal
exemptions, standard deductions, and tax rates in this Article are based on 1999 rules. See I.R.S.,
supra note 194, availableat http:llftp.fedworld.gov/pub/irs-pdflpl7.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2001)
(providing the 2000 rules).
283. This assumes $6026 in federal tax and $1807 in state and local tax.
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What if Mr. Lifer is unduly pessimistic, and actually achieves 5%
or 7% salary increases after electing the income-contingent repayment
option? He will obtain no subsidy, because he will pay off his loan
before he gets to the twenty-five-year mark. But that does not
necessarily spell disaster. He can switch to ten-year repayment when he
can afford it. Or he can keep paying through the income-contingent plan,
taking note of the comparisons in Table 34. Note that even under the
most expensive version of income-contingent repayment (5% income
increases), Mr. Lifer will pay only about $16,000 more, in terms of
present value, than his fellow graduate who pays down the loan over ten
years.
TABLE 34:

COMPARISON OF SIX REPAYMENT PLANS, INCLUDING

THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INCOME INCREASES UNDER AN INCOMECONTINGENT REPAYMENT PLAN
Incom.contingent
repaymznt.
7%
inzr,-Lin.
debt paid
in 19.4

Standard
repayment

Graduated
repayment,
debt paid
in thirt
years

Extended
thirty-year
repayment

Incomecontingent
repayment,
3.%
increases

Incomecontingent
repayment,
5%
increases.
debt paid in
24.4 ears

S926

S519

S567

S394

S394

S394

$926

$540

S567

$457

S519

S56

$111,123

$216,364

$204,195

S171,440

$200.439

S170,711

$84,738

$98,175

S94.605

$84,444

S99,109

S95.4Z9

0

0

0

$71.427

0

0

0

0

0

S17,477

0

0

year
Monthly
payments.
year one

Monthly
payments.
year six
Total of
payments,
current dollars
Present value
of total of
future
payments
Amount the
government
forgives,
current
dollars

-

Present value
of government
forgiveness

Of course, as he is electing how to pay his debts, Mr. Lifer will be
very eager to know what his rate of income increase is likely to be,
because although he will on the whole be better off if it is higher, he will
be more heavily subsidized if the rate is lower. It may not be easy for
284. See supra note 281.
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him to get this information, but he could start by asking his future
employer for projections or at least historical figures on the rate of
increase. For a very rough estimate, he could consult Table 35, the
results of an unscientific survey of civil legal aid offices.
Table 35 was constructed because although all law school career
services offices know the starting salaries at a large range of legal aid
and other public interest employers, there seems to be no published
compilation of the rates of projected or historical salary increase at such
institutions. For purposes of assessing the utility to law graduates of
income-contingent repayment, the national average or median for such
programs is not necessary, but the range of possibilities is worth
knowing. Therefore, a true random sample was unnecessary, and was in
any event beyond the means of this project. The data was collected by
asking Don Saunders, an official of the National Legal Aid and
Defenders Association, to suggest individual legal aid office directors
who would be most likely respond to a survey regarding their salary
practices. Questionnaires were sent to the ninety-five individuals he
suggested and fifty-one replies were received.
The first question asked for the organization's starting salary. The
responses indicate that although $32,000 may be the national average
starting salary for these jobs,"5 many legal services offices start at a
lower level, some of them as low as $25,000 to $25,500 (reported by six
offices). Table 35 reflects this range.
TABLE

35:

STARTING SALARIES AT CIVIL LEGAL AID OFFICES

(N=5 1)

Starting salary

Percentage and number of programs

$25,000 to $27,000

25% (13)

$27,001 to $29,000

10% (5)

$29,001 to $31,000

33% (17)

$31,001 to $33,000

10% (5)

More than $33,000

22% (11)

These directors were also asked to provide historical or estimated
data on the rate of salary increases for the first ten years of an attorney's
285. The mean salary for 1999 graduates starting in full-time legal services jobs was $31,795.
See EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES 1999, supra note 71, at 41.
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career with the office, and for the following ten years. Some of them
wrote letters to the Author about the difficulty of providing this data:
The percentage of salary increase was difficult to estimate because of
our continuing uncertainty regarding federal funding. Our Board, for
several years, was simply6 giving end of the year bonuses to deal with
the funding uncertainty. 2
Since our salary figures vary each year, and in some years when
funding has been particularly tight, our staff have not received salary
increases at all, it is difficult to estimate the increases in a % fashion.
Normally our attorney staff receive less than a thousand dollars in
salary increase each year .... 287

Where is ... little predictability in our salaries.... When funding
declines, as it often does, we sometimes freeze salaries. Then we may
give a relatively large increase to catch up.... [O]ur increases tend to
be in dollar amounts rather than percentages[;] i.e., attorneys will get a
$1,500 increase rather than a 3% increase. This practice... means that
as a percentage, increases are often less each year. m
The reported rates of increase during the first ten years fell into the
pattern shown in Table 36.
TABLE 36: REPORTED RATES OF ANNUAL SALARY INCREASES FOR
LAWYERS DURING THE FIRST DECADE (N=50)
Rate of increase

Percentage and number of programs

2%

4% (2)

3%

18% (9)

4%

22% (11)

5%

32% (16)

6% or more

24% (12)

286. Letter from Juan A. Gonzalez, Executive Director, Legal Aid Soziety of Albuquerque, to
the Author (June 14, 2000) (on file with author).
287. Letter from an anonymous source to the Author (undated) (on file .ith author).
288. Letter from Bob Sable, Director, Greater Boston Legal Services, to the Author (June 22.
2000) (on file with author).
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Because so many programs had starting salaries substantially below
the national median, the rates of increase during the first ten years for the
group of programs that started lawyers at $27,000 or less were
particularly focused upon. These rates varied from 2% (one program)
through 3% (three programs) 9 up to 10% (one program). A set of
income-contingent repayment calculations was therefore run assuming a
lower-than-average starting salary of $27,000, at various rates of
increase.
TABLE 37:

CHARACTERISTICS OF INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT
FOR LARRY LIFER'S SISTER LISA: $75,500 DEBT,

$27,000 STARTING SALARY
Income
increases at
2%

Income
increases at
4%

Income
increases at
7%, debt
repaid in

$311

$311

$311

Income
increases at
10%, debt
repaid in
19.2 years
$311

$336

$386

$470

$563

$112,076

$161,635

$211,050

$175,525

$57,492

$76,879

$99,333

$96,139

$133,476

$83,908

0

0

$32,603

$20,496

0

0

24.9 years

Monthly payments,
year one

Monthly payments,
year six

Total of payments,
current dollars

Present value of
total of future
payments
Amount the
government
forgives, current
dollars

Present value of
government
forgiveness

As this table indicates, for a person starting at the low end of the salary
scale, even a 4% annual rate of increased income results in a very
substantial federal subsidy, which in terms of present value is almost
20% of the debt repayment. But high rates of salary increase do require
larger total repayment, and a borrower experiencing rapid income
increases might at some point convert to a different repayment plan. For
example, if Ms. Lifer's actual increases were 7%, her debt would have
289. One of these programs gave some attorneys larger increases.
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grown to $86,272, including the accrued but uncapitalized interest that
she owed the government, by the beginning of the sixth year. If she
calculated the consequences of shifting at that point to standard ten-year
repayment, she would discover that such a conversion would require her
to repay only $126,978 (in current dollars) over the remaining loan
period, rather than $167,790 if she remained in income-contingent
repayment. In terms of present value, she would have to expend only
about $97,000, rather than $110,000 through income-contingent
repayment. But her monthly payments in the sixth year would suddenly
increase from $492 (18% based on one-twelfth of her after-tax income
of $32,687)2 to $1058 (37%). This much more rapid payment may
simply not be affordable.
It should be noted that the calculator, and the tables, are premised
on a constant rate of salary increase, set by the borrower to estimate the
value of income-contingent repayment. Similarly, the government's
calculator assumes a constant rate of income increase, though the rate on
that calculator is set inflexibly at 5%. However, as one legal services
director noted in his letter, the rate of increase may actually drop, so the
tables and the calculator may understate the value of income-contingent
repayment. In fact, eighteen of the fifty-one programs reported
decreasing percentages of salary raises, and none reported accelerating
percentages of increases. The programs with the lowest rate of initial
increase (under 5%) reported the smallest drop (to 4% after ten years).
Those with rates of increase of 5% to 7% tended to drop them by 2%,
while those with the largest initial increases, in the range of 8% to 10%,
tended to drop the rate by as much as 5% after a decade, unless the
attorney was promoted to a managerial position.
B. Ralph Reformer, Test Case Litigator
Suppose Larry Lifer's classmate Ralph Reformer undertakes a
career, not in a legal services office starting at $27,000 or $32,000 with
3% increases, but in a public interest law firm devoted to test case
litigation, public policy education, or public interest lobbying. In order
to learn about starting salaries and rates of increases at the much smaller
number of these organizations, a survey was sent out to fifteen of their
directors." Six replies were received, which are displayed in Table 38.

290. This assumes $6026 in federal income tax and S1807 in state and local incom tax.

291. These directors were also identified by NLADA's Don Saunders as representathe and
likely to reply.
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TABLE 38: STARTING SALARIES AND RATES OF SALARY
INCREASE IN PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRMs

Firm
number

Years of
experience
required
of starting

Starting
salary

Rate of
increase,
first ten
years

Rate of
increase,
second ten
years

Number of
lawyers
employed

lawyers

1

0

$31,300

3%

3%

More than 15

2

at least 3

$35,000

6%

4%

6 to 15

3

4

$36,750

8.5%

4%

5 or fewer

4

1

$38,000

4.5%

4%

more than 15

5

4

$41,000

5%

2%

6to 15

6

5

$50,000

at least as
much as

same

6 to 15

inflation

Suppose that Mr. Reformer spends his career at firm number four,
about half way through this list. In that case, his repayment options are
summarized in Table 39.
Table 39 suggests a surprising conclusion. One might think that
income-contingent repayment would have few attractions for someone
starting with income as high as $38,000. Yet the early-year payments on
this plan are far more affordable than those under ten-year repayment,
for even in the sixth year, standard repayment would consume nearly
one-third of after-tax income. And although all non-standard repayment
plans are more costly in the long run than ten-year repayment, the thirtyyear graduated and twenty-five year extended repayment plans will cost
the borrower more over time than will income-contingent repayment.
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TABLE 39:

REPAYMENT OPTIONS FOR RALPH REFORMER:

$75,500

DEBT, AT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM NUMBER FOUR, STARTING
SALARY $38,000, WITH 4.5% INCREASES

Monthly payments, year
one, and payment as a
percentage of taxable
income'
Monthly payments, year
six and payment as a
percentage of taxable
income:
Total of payments,
current dollars
Present value of total of

C.

Standard
repayment

Graduated
repayment, debt
repaid in thirty
years"

ExtenLd
twent)-fiveyear
repayment

$926
(36%)

S519
(20%)

S596
123%)

$628
(20%)

$926
(29%)

S541
(17.)

S596
(19 )

$159,095

$111,123

S216364

S178,584

I

$95.526

$98, 175

$84,738

$93,554
I

future payments

Incomecontingent
repayment, debt
repaid in 18.6
y'ears
$494
(19%)

I

I

_

I

Cinty Civic, Serving the PoorFirstand

Getting Rich Later
Unlike Larry and Lisa Lifer, Cindy Civic does not think of herself
as committed to a life of public interest law. She expects that eventually,
she will follow many of her classmates into a fairly large law firm,
where her income will be well above $100,000 per year. For four or five
years, however, she wants to work in a public interest job, either because
she considers it her public duty to serve people who are less fortunate
than herself, or because she thinks that public service work will be more
fun than law firm work, and she wants to undertake it before she has
children to support.
Ms. Civic therefore plans four years of work with Lisa Lifer in her
legal services office. At the beginning of her fifth year, she imagines that
she will have a dramatic career shift, going to work for a corporate law
firm at a salary of $150,000, not nearly as high as she would be making
if she had started at the firm immediately after law school, but a
conservative estimate, and worth settling for in order to have the
292. See supra note 281.
293. The assumptions as to after-tax income are that this single taxpayer %illpay S5354 in
federal income tax (as provided by the 1999 tax table) and another $1606 in state and loml income
tax.
294. The borrower's gross income will have risen to $49,486. and taxable income to S42.436.
assuming a standard deduction. Federal tax is assumed to be $8532, and state and local tax $2560.
keeping it in the same ratio to federal tax as in the previous calculation.
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privilege of doing for four years the full-time service work that she
always wanted to undertake.
Like Lisa Lifer, Ms. Civic has $75,500 of government-guaranteed
debt and will start her professional life with a salary of $27,000, and she
will obtain raises of 4% annually before she changes jobs. After her

change, her new $150,000 salary will continue to rise by 4% per year.
But how will Ms. Civic manage those first four years? She cannot
elect standard repayment at the outset, because the $926 monthly
payments would amount to 46% of her after-tax income.2 9' Income-

contingent repayment would reduce those payments to $311, only 18%
of her income. But what would happen if she remained in the incomecontingent repayment plan until the debt were repaid? Table 40 provides
the answer.
TABLE

40: REPAYMENT OPTIONS FOR CINDY Civic: DEBT $75,000,

INrIAL SALARY
AFTER

Monthly
payments, year
one, and
percentage of
after-tax income
Monthly
payments, year
six," and
percentage of
after-tax income
Total of
payments, current
dollars
Present value of
total of future
payments

$27,000, RAISES AT 4%, NEw JOB AT $150,000

FOUR YEARS, WITH FURTHER RAISES AT 4%

Standard
repayment (shown
for comparison,
but impossible
because Ms. Civic
cannot afford the
initial payment)

Remain in
incomecontingent
repayment
until debt is
paid (12.5
years in all)

$926 (46%)

Five years of
income-contingent
repayment,
followed by
conversion of the
remaining debt to
ten more years,
standard

Five years of
incomecontingent
repayment,
followed by
level payment of
the remaining
debt in five

$311 (16%)

repayment
$311 (16%)

more years
$311 (16%)

$926 (12%)

$1304 (16%)

$1077 (14%)

$1791 (23%)

$111,123

$138,258

$149,948

$128,161

$84,738

$90,184

295. This assumes federal income tax of $2996 and state and local tax of $899.

296. If Ms. Civic were to remain in income-contingent repayment, she would not make higher
payments on her fifth-year much-increased salary until the beginning of the sixth year.
297. This assumes (somewhat unrealistically) that Ms. Civic is still taking the standard
deduction. She will have gross income of $150,000, federal tax of $42,356, and state and local tax
of $13,068.
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This table shows that if Ms. Civic's primary debt repayment goal is

to keep monthly payments at the lowest possible percentage (14%) of
her monthly after-tax income after she takes her law firm job, her best
strategy would be to convert to standard ten-year repayment shortly after
her career change makes it possible to make higher payments. She would
pay off the debt in a total of fifteen years. However, at her new, high
salary, she may be able to afford paying 16% of her after-tax income
toward her student debt. If so, she would actually be better off remaining

in income-contingent repayment until the debt is paid off in a total of
twelve and one-half years rather than fifteen. On the other hand, she

might prefer to pay off the remaining debt quite rapidly, over a five-year
period, after she changes jobs. If so, she will have to pay 23% of her

after-tax income toward her debt repayment in the sixth year to pay off
the debt in a total of ten years! "
D. Fay Federal,Justice Department Lawyer

Suppose that Fay Federal enters the United States Department of
Justice in its Honors Program, and works at the Department's
headquarters in Washington, D.C. She will enter at the GS-1 1 level,
which in the year 2000 started at $42,724 with 3% annual raises.

"

Her

options are shown in Table 41, and any repayment program other than
standard repayment is plausible.

298. With an annual income of $150,000, his. Civic might well begin investing in stock,
mutual funds, or other investments that historically have had long-run returns well ol er 1051. If so.
her best strategy might be to elect a repayment plan through which she would pay off her student
loans over the longest, not the shortest, period of time, a period of at least twenty-five additional
years. Thus, for a long time she would have the benefit of funds for which she was pa) ing interest
of 8.25% but earning interest of more than 10%. For just this reason, many people %ithmortgages
elect to invest discretionary funds rather than use them to pay off their debt. On the other hand.
unlike mortgage interest, only a small part of student loan interest is deductible from income tax.
IRS,
at
Compare
Frequently
Asked
Tax
Questions
and
Anm ers.
http-.//www.irs.ustreas.gov/prodltax-edu/faqfaq-kw217.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2001 . with IRS,
Interest Erpense: Topic 505, at http://vwwv.irs.ustreas.gov/prodft-Lc-edufteletcaiatc505.html (last
visited Feb. 22,2001). Thus, the relevant figure for purposes of comparison is the after-tax return on
investments, requiring a higher pre-tax return to justify this strategy of profiting on the pread.
299. See 2000 General Schedule Locality Rates of Payfor Washington.Baltimore DC-MD.
VA-WV (including St. Maory's Couni, MD). U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., at
http-/w/,.w.opm.gov/oca/2000tblslGSannualhtml/GSDCB.HTM (last visited Feb. 14. 2001 1. This
table incorporates a locality adjustment, raising the General Schedule level to account for the
higher-than-average cost of living in the Washington, D.C. area. See id.
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TABLE 41: COMPARISON OF REPAYMENT PLANS FOR FAY FEDERAL, A
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT LAWYER: DEBT OF $75,500, STARTING INCOME

OF $42,724, WITH 3% INCREASES
Standard

Graduated

Extended

Income-

repayment

twentyfive-year
repayment

$926
(33%)

repayment,
debt repaid
in thirty
years
$519
(18%)

$595
(22%)

contingent
repayment,
debt repaid
in 17.3 years
$573
(20%)

$926
(29%)

$540
(17%)

$595
(18%)

$664
(21%)

Total of payments,

$111,123

$216,364

$178,584

$148,552

current dollars
Present value of
total of future

$84,738

$98, 175

$88,006

$91,785

Monthly payments,
year one, and
percentage of aftertax income'
Monthly payments,
year six, and
percentage of aftertax income, based
on gross income of
$49,845__

payments

E. Max Merger, CorporateLawyer
Finally, a reader of this Article might be curious about the utility of
income-contingent repayment for graduates with high debts who are
planning to work for corporate law firms with high starting salaries and
rapid rates of advancement. Table 42 shows that Max Merger, a typical
corporate lawyer, starting at $75,000 and expecting 10% raises, would
actually repay a little less using the income-contingent repayment option
than using a standard ten year level repayment schedule. The reason for
this is that the government's income-contingent repayment formula
would require a graduate with such a high income to repay a larger
percentage of that income (as well as a larger amount), and as a result,
the graduate using this plan would pay off the debt in seven and one-half
years, rather than ten. Mr. Merger, on the other hand, might prefer to pay

300. See supranote 281.
301. This assumes federal income tax of $6642 and state and local income tax of $1993.
302. This assumes federal tax of $8630 and state and local tax of $2589.
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off his student loan over a very long term, using his high income for
investments rather than loan repayments.""
TABLE 42: COMIPARISON OF REPAYMENT PLANS FOR MAX MERGER, A
LAw FIRM LAWYER: DEBT OF $75,500, STARTING INCOME OF $75,000,

WITH 10% INCREASES
Standard
repayment

Graduated
repayment,
debt repaid in

Extended
twentyfive-year

Incomecontingent
repayment,

thirty years'

repayment

debt repaid

$595
(13%)

S1040
(25%)

$595
(8%)

$1184
(16%)

T

in 7.7

$926
(22%)

Monthly
payments, year

$519
(12%)

years

one, and

percentage of

after-tax incomed

Monthly
payments, year
six, and
percentage of
after-tax income,
based on gross
income of

5

_

$926
(12%)

$540
(7%)

_

$132,867V4_

Total of payments, $111,123

$216,364

$178,583

$102,732

$98, 175

$95,526

S82,886

current dollars

Present value of
total of future

$84,738

payments

It should be clear from these tables that neither the incomecontingent repayment calculator nor a table comparing incomecontingent repayment with other repayment options can dictate which
system a borrower should use. Each individual must decide, based on the
individual's own circumstances, whether income-contingent repayment
is desirable. For a high-debt, low-income borrower, the incomecontingent repayment plan is a strong tool for lowering debt repayment.
In addition, lawyers who start at very low salaries, or who expect very
low rates of salary increase, and particularly those lawyers who start at a
303. See supranote 298.
304. See supranote 281.

305. This assumes federal income tax of S15,851 and state and local income tax of $4755.
306. This assumes federal tax of $33,783 and state and local tax ofS10.134.
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low rate and expect a low rate of increase, will benefit not only by
lowering their payments, but by obtaining substantial federal subsidies.
In addition, although the current-dollar cost of using income-contingent
repayment appears much higher than the current-dollar cost of ten-year
repayment, the present values of the future streams of payments are
sometimes remarkably similar. High-debt, high-income borrowers might
also consider income-contingent repayment as a method for paying off
their debts even more quickly than through straight repayment, with the
built-in buffer that if they accept low-paying work for a while, their
payments will go down. But for a high-income borrower, a decision to
pay off debts rapidly involves balancing the psychological stress of
being in debt against the value of having more money to invest.
Thus, the financial advisors who responded to the Author's survey
may be correct in thinking that a small but significant fraction of law
graduates might benefit from income-contingent repayment. But the
assessment of whether income-contingent repayment is useful for a
particular borrower requires both careful analysis of the borrower's
plans and circumstances and thoughtful comparisons of the results of
complex mathematical calculations. Income-contingent repayment is not
the best solution for every borrower, but it is of sufficient interest to
warrant sophisticated understanding by more than 4% of the nation's law
school financial aid advisors.
F. The Effects of LRAP
Up to now, we have assumed that our prototypical borrowers are at
schools that have no LRAPs. What happens if they go to a school that
provides its own loan repayment assistance for their legal services work?
Of course the effects will depend on the exact rules of the particular
LRAP. Let us consider what would happen if Larry Lifer were an
alumnus of Georgetown.'
Georgetown expects LRAP beneficiaries to schedule repayment
"using a 15 year or more" schedule."' Thus, a graduate who elected
twenty-five-year income-contingent repayment would qualify, but the
307. Georgetown has two loan repayment assistance programs ("LRAPs"). See Loan
Repayment
Assistance
Programs,
Georgetown
University
Law
Center,
at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/finaid/lrap.html (last modified Aug. 18, 2000) (describing both).
By virtue of working in a legal services office, Larry Lifer would qualify for the more generous
LRAP-I program, which is considered here.
308. Id. If a student does not want to consolidate with at least a fifteen-year repayment
schedule, Georgetown awards benefits based on a calculation that nevertheless assumes a fifteenyear level repayment amount.
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graduate can also qualify by electing straight fifteen-year repayment. If a
recent graduate's gross earnings are below a specified, inflation-adjusted
"standard maintenance allowance" ($32,200 for the year 2000, and
higher if the graduate lives in certain high-cost cities), Georgetown will
not expect the graduate to contribute toward loan repayment, but the
school's subsidy is phased out as income rises.1- The graduate is
expected to contribute to loan repayment 50% of the difference between
salary and the standard maintenance allowance, and the student becomes
ineligible for LRAP benefits when the difference between salary and the
standard maintenance allowance is equal to or more than twice the
annual loan repayment.' 0 Loan payments due on undergraduate debt are
deducted from salary for purposes of determining benefits, but
undergraduate loans are not eligible for LRAP payment or forgiveness,
and commercial loans are only covered to the extent that "funds [are]
available. 31' Georgetown will "lend" the graduate the money necessary
to make the monthly loan payments, and it will forgive these loans
according to a specified schedule, with the total amount forgiven after
five years in qualifying public interest employment"2 After five years,
all further funds are loaned to the graduate for six months at a time, and
then forgiven if the borrower remained in qualifying employment for
that period. 3
It should be noted, for purposes of analyzing the interaction
between LRAPs and income-contingent repayment, that LRAP
forgiveness is not considered "income" for purposes of the income tax
law.1 It therefore does not enter the adjusted gross income calculation
of the income-contingent repayment formula.
So if Larry Lifer attends Georgetown, he has three plausible
choices. When he graduates, he could choose an LRAP and fifteen-year
repayment, sticking with fifteen-year repayment even after the benefits
of the LRAP phase out as his income rises. His second option would be
to choose an LRAP and twenty-five-year income-contingent repayment
at the time of graduation. His third option would be to start with an
LRAP and fifteen-year repayment, but switch to income-contingent
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id. Because commercial debt coverage is not guaranteed, this analysis assumes that it
is not eligible for LRAP subsidy. This assumption also facilitates comparisons between this analysis
and other analyses in this Article, because income-contingent repayment does not cover commrcial
debt, either.
312. See id.
313. See id.

314. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(2)D)(ii) (Supp. IV 1999).
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repayment after about five years, as the benefits of the LRAP phase out.
Under all of these plans, he will pay only a small amount out of his own
pocket for his first five years of legal services work. If he chooses
income-contingent repayment from the beginning, his payments during
the first five years will be smallest, and Georgetown will therefore lend
him less money, and will therefore forgive a smaller amount. Table 43
summarizes the consequences of these choices. A fourth column was
added to Table 43, showing the effects of income-contingent repayment
alone, without an LRAP. This column simulates Mr. Lifer's situation if
he were to graduate from a school with no LRAP, or if his
employment-for example, hanging out a shingle to serve working-class
families-produced the same income but did not qualify for LRAP
benefits.
This table shows that by electing income-contingent repayment
from the beginning, Mr. Lifer will pay less out of his pocket in the early
years. But if Mr. Lifer elects fifteen-year level repayment and makes
somewhat larger out-of-pocket payments, the law school will pay a
greater subsidy over time, and Mr. Lifer's payments will be lower in
later years. Furthermore, he will have less remaining debt at the end of
five years. Thus Mr. Lifer might reasonably elect either type of
repayment, depending on his particular circumstances. Starting with
fifteen-year repayment and converting to income-contingent repayment
is a kind of middle option. It would keep repayment minimal when the
LRAP subsidy is beginning to phase out. But under this plan, Mr. Lifer's
debt repayments will gradually rise to $777 per month just before the
debt is repaid, though at that time repayments will still be a relatively
affordable 18% of his rising after-tax income, which will then be
$53,160.315 Under this hybrid plan, the debt will take a total of twentyone years to repay, rather than fifteen years as in the case of level
fifteen-year repayment or twenty-five years under straight incomecontingent repayment.

315. This assumes gross income in the twenty-first year, based on the 4% annual increases of
$72,920, federal income tax of $15,200, and state and local income tax of $4560.
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TABLE 43:

INCOME-CONTINGENTREPAYMENT OPTION

ELECTING INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT ALONG

WrrH GEORGETOvN LRAP: ELIGIBLE LRAP DEBT IS $60,500, BUT
TOTAL FEDERAL DEBT IS $75,500; STARTING SALARY Is $32,000 wvITH
4% ANNUAL RAISES
LRAP ,.ith
fifteen-year level
repayment for
five years, then
convened to
twventy-five-year
incomecontingent
repayment for

Inconecontingent
repaymnt
alone
(no LRAP)

Straight LRAP
(fifteen-year level
debt repayment)

LRAP with
incomecontingent
repayment
(twenty-five-year
incomecontingent
repayment)

Monthly amount due,
year one

$732 (constant for
fifteen years)

$394 (rising to
$467 by year

$732 iconstant
for fifteen )ears)

LRAP payment,
monthly, during first
year (loaned and later
forgiven by law

S587 (law school
debt repayment
only)

$317 (rises with
income over the
five years)"

S587 (law schcal
debt repaymeznt
only)

0

$145 (6%)

S79 (3%)

$145 (62)

S394 i 162)
Irising to $467
byyearfie)

S35,220

$20,638"'

$35.220

0

$70,432

$82,007

$70.432

SS2A007

$260 (10%)"'

S375

$3901 14)''

$488 119'-I

sixteen ears
five)

S394 riring to
$467 b¢y) ar
fiel

school)

Monthly payments
which borrower has
to pay out-of-pocket,
year one (amount due
less LRAP payment),
and percentage of
after-tax income"'

Total subsidy paid by
LRAP, years one
throueh five

Debt remaining after
five years

Monthly out-ofpocket payments,
year six, and
percentage of aftertax income'

4

316. This option would nominally require up to thirty years of total repayment, since switching
into income-contingent repayment requires starting a new repayment period unless the borroir had
been paying under a plan anticipating more than twelve years of repayment. See 34 C.ER.
§ 685.209(c)(4)(ii) (2001). However, under the facts assumed here, Mr. Lifer's incom2 would rise
rapidly enough for him to repay the debt in full, through income-contingent repayment, in a total of
twenty-one years (five of straight repayment and sixteen of income-contingent repa)m:nt). He
would receive no forgiveness at the end of that period.
317. Because Georgetown does not cover undergraduate debt, it will prorate the portion of
income-contingent repayment attributable to that debt, even though the full payment would be low;er
than payment of law school debt alone under fifteen-year repayment.
318. This assumes federal income tax of $3746 and state and local income tax of S1124.
319. This is an estimate, based on 80% (the fraction of debt attributable to law schol loans) of
the $25,798 in income-contingent repayment to this point.
320. This assumes gross income of $40,500, federal income tax:of S6062. and state and local
tax of $1808. This also assumes that Georgetown's standard maintenance allowance has risen by
2% per year and is $36,000 in the sixth year.
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Borrowers in other circumstances, or who graduate from law
schools with different LRAPs, might find that the balance tips more

heavily for or against a particular repayment strategy. For example, after
graduating from Georgetown, Cindy Civic (who plans to jump to the
world of corporate law after four years in legal services) could well elect

an LRAP with a straight fifteen-year repayment plan, rather than
income-contingent repayment, because after the first four years she
would easily be able to afford the monthly payments of $732 (less than
10% of her after-tax income), and she would face a smaller long-term
debt.
Similarly, let us change the assumption that Mr. Lifer attended
Georgetown. Suppose that he attended Northwestern University Law

School. Northwestern has a LRAP, but because the program has an
income ceiling of $29,000,324 lower than Mr. Lifer's income of $32,000,
Mr. Lifer could not use the LRAP, and income-contingent repayment
would look more attractive than if he had graduated from Georgetown.

Or suppose that he attended American University Law School, which
has

a

Public

Interest

Loan

Repayment

Assistance

Program

("PILRAP").3" PILRAP is in some ways more generous than the LRAP
at Georgetown: it covers undergraduate debt, and it pays subsidies as if
the graduate were paying the debt over ten years, even if the graduate

elects slower repayment. But in other ways, it is less generous; in
particular, graduates receive no subsidy after their income reaches

$35,000,26 while Georgetown's subsidy is phased out pursuant to a
complex formula that could result in some benefits for high-debt
graduates earning up to $60,000. Table 44 shows Mr. Lifer's choices as

an American University graduate.

321.

The calculation is as follows: $40,500 income less undergraduate debt repayment of

$1740 is $38,760, from which the standard maintenance allowance, which by now has become
$36,000, is deducted. This yields $2760, or $230 per month. The graduate is expected to contribute
half of this, or $115 per month, toward law school loan repayment. To this must be added the $145
of undergraduate loan repayment.
322. Because the graduate's earnings now exceed the standard maintenance allowance, the law
school will pay a maximum of $115 per month toward the graduate's loan repayment, which by
now has grown to $490 per month in income-contingent repayment. See supra note 320.
323. This constitutes income-contingent payment of $535 per month in the first year of such
payment, minus a law school subsidy of $145.
324. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 110, at 148.
325. See FINANCING THE FUTURE, supra note 97, at 25.
326. See Office of Career Services: Frequently Asked Questions at OCS, American University
Washington College of Law, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/ocs/faq.html (last visited Feb. 23,
2001).
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TABLE 44: THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTING INCOME-CONTINGENT
REPAYMENT WHEN AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY LAW SCHOOL PILRAP
(LRAP) SUBSIDIES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE; ELIGIBLE PILRAP DEBT IS
75,500;. .27STARTING SALARY IS $32,000 vITH 45 ANNUAL RAISES
Straight
PILRAP (tenyear level
debt
repayment)

PILRAP with
income-contingent
repayment (twentyfive-year incomecontingent
repayment)

S926
(constant for
ten ,ears)
$426

Monthly
payments, year
one (amount due
less PILRAP
payment), and
percentage of net
Total subsidy paid
by PILRAP, years

Monthly amount
due, year one
PILRAP payment,
monthly, during
first year (loaned
and later forgiven

Incoirzcontingent
repayment
alonzino
PILRAP)

S394
(rising to $467
by year five)
S394 z'

PILRAP with tenyear level repayment
for five years. then
convened to tmentyfive.year incomecontingent repayment
for telve ears' 2'
S926
(constant for ten
years)
$426

S500
(22%)

s0
(0%)

5500
(22%)

S394
(16() (rising
to$467 by
year five)

S11,445

S10,775

S394 (rising
to $467 by
,earfivea
0

by law school)

income-

I

1

_

S11,445

0

_

"
one through five
'

327. American University's Public Interest Law Repayment Assistance Program I'PILRAP")
covers repayment of federally guaranteed undergraduate as well as law school debt. See Telephone
Interview with Ingrid Valentine, Assistant Director of Financial Aid, American University Law
School (Sept. 21, 2000).
328. This option would nominally require up to thirty years of total repayment, since sw,0itching
into income-contingent repayment requires starting a new repayment period unless the borroer had
been paying under a plan anticipating more than twelve years of repayment. See 34 CF.R.
§ 685.209(c)(4)(ti) (2001). However, under the facts assumed here, Mr. Lifer's income vould rise
rapidly enough for him to repay the debt in full, through income-contingent repayment, in a total of
seventeen years (five of straight repayment and twelve of income-contingent repayment). He w ould
receive no forgiveness at the end of that period.
329. If a graduate were to elect a payment plan providing for slower repayment than standard
ten-year repayment, American University's PILRAP would nevertheless make the same loan
repayment that it would make based on standard ten-year repayment. See Telephone Interview with
Ingrid Valentine, supra note 327.
330. This assumes federal income tax of $3746 and state and local income tax of S1124.
331. PILRAP subsidies end when the graduate earns more than S35,000. Sce supra te't
accompanying note 326. This graduate will earn more than S35,000 in his fourth year, and P11RAP
subsidies will end at that time unless American University increases the standard maintenance
allowance. In an interview with the Author, American University's financial aid office suggested
that the author should not assume that PILRAP would raise its standard maintenance alloanca
(increasing the salary that the graduate could earn without losing subsidies), as such raise. are not
automatic, are not necessarily reviewed periodically, and had not occurred in more than two years.
See Telephone Interview with Ingrid Valentine. supra note 327. A small raise in the allov anze
would affect the figures in this table only marginally, because the $35,000 is so Io%,
compared to

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

93

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:733

Debt remaining
after five years

$45,402

$82,007

$45,402

$82,007

Monthly out-ofpocket payments,
year six, and
percentage of
after-tax income.3

$926
(35%)

$488
(19%)'"

$453
(18%)

$488
(19%)

J

This table shows that with standard repayment, PILRAP alone will
not meet Mr. Lifer's needs. He will soon become ineligible for PILRAP
subsidies, so in his sixth year of work Mr. Lifer would have to pay more
than one-third of his after-tax income to repay his loans. But Mr. Lifer
has other choices. He could use a combination of income-contingent
repayment and PILRAP subsidies to make no loan payments whatsoever
during the first year of repayment. Indeed, he would pay virtually
nothing for the first three years, during which he will remain eligible for
PILRAP subsidies, and he would pay only $488 per month for his loans
even in the sixth year, after PILRAP subsidies end. However, because he
will owe more at the end of five years than he did when he graduated,
his monthly payments will gradually rise to $925 in the final year of
income-contingent repayment (19% of his net income, which will have
risen to $58,598 annually). Or he could pay off the debt more quickly by
using standard repayment for a few years3" and then converting to
income-contingent repayment. If he converted after five years, he would
pay off the debt in seventeen years, and after converting to incomecontingent repayment, his highest monthly payment would be $498 (in
the final year of repayment).
In any event, for a student planning to use a LRAP, creating a table
modeled on Table 43 or Table 44 seems like a desirable step in financial
planning. Creating tables like these could also help prospective students
who plan low-income careers to choose among law schools. For
example, a comparison between the two tables shows that during the
first five years, Georgetown's subsidy for Mr. Lifer (based on ten-year
standard repayment) would be more than three times greater than

starting salaries of average public interest lawyers like Larry Lifer, that such lawyers salaries soon
exceed this level or one that would be somewhat higher than this level.
332. The calculation is as follows: $40,500 gross income minus federal tax of $6062 and state
and local tax assumed to be $1808 yields an after-tax income of $32,630.
333. Because the graduate earns more than $35,000, he or she is no longer eligible for PILRAP
subsidies. See supra text accompanying note 326.
334. Conversion was assumed after five years in Table 44 so as to facilitate comparison with
Table 43. Mr. Lifer would be more likely to convert after three years, when the school's subsidies
end.
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American's, and Georgetown's subsidies will continue long after the
first five years, whereas American's subsidies will end." 5
One feature of these tables should be of particular interest to law
school deans at schools that lack LRAPs. Such deans might see the
federal government's income-contingent repayment plan as obviating
the need for them to create such programs. However, the last column of
Table 43 shows that in the critical early years, even using incomecontingent repayment, a graduate from a school without such a LRAP
would have to pay, out-of-pocket, about three times as much in loan
payments as a graduate from a school that has a strong LRAP.
G. The Effects of Marriage

Return to the original Larry Lifer, graduating from a school with no
LRAP, and going to work for $32,000 with 3% annual increases. He
recently graduated from law school and began thinking about loan
repayment options. He is single, but he and his girlfriend, Penny Lane,
are thinking about getting married. What are the consequences of
marriage for their loan repayments?
First, let us consider what happens if Mr. Lifer and Ms. Lane are in
roughly the same circumstances. She plans to work in legal services,
with the same income. She also has the same amount of debt. Federal
regulations allow the happy couple to combine their debts into a single
income-contingent loan, and they require them to combine their incomes
for purposes of the repayment calculation, because the government
assumes that the couple's combined income most accurately reflects one
member's ability to repay debt. But doubling both the debt and the
income does not result in the same repayment schedule that the couple
would have had if they had remained single, because the federal poverty
guidelines, which are part of the income-contingency formula, assume
that two can live nearly as cheaply as one." Table 45 shows a
comparison between the couple's situation before and after marriage; a
standard repayment column is included in the table for purposes of
additional comparison, though it would require them to repay an
exceedingly high fraction of their income in the early years.
335. This conclusion is not surprising in view of the relative magnitudes of the tw.o programs.
Georgetown's LRAP currently dispenses approximately S630.000 annually. %'hereas Amzrican
University's PILRAP program has dispensed S356,000 since it began in 1988. See NAT'L Ass'r.
FOR PUB. INTEREST LAw, supra note 110, at 30, 10. Based on the size of the third-year class.
Georgetownm (690) is about twice as large as American (350). See ABA AFFROVED LW SCHOOLS.
supra note 209, at 90, 182.
336. See supra text accompanying note 196.
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45: EFFECT OF MARRIAGE, SIMILARLY SITUATED PARTNERS,
$32,000 INCOMES, 8.25% INTEREST, 3% RAISES, $151,000 COMBINED
TABLE

DEBT SUBJECT TO INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT
Larry Lifer and
Penny Lane,
unmarried
borrowers,
consolidated
numbers

Larry Lifer and
Penny Lane,
married couple

$788
(18%)'"

$879
(21%)3'

$1852
(42%)

Monthly payments, year six,

$914

$1019

$1852

and percentage of after-tax

(18%)

(21%)'

(36%)

$342,879

$384,645

$222,247

$168,886

$188,929

$169,482

$141,854

$52,387

0

$34,894

$12,796

Larry Lifer and
Penny Lane,
married couple,
debt paid in ten
years through tenyear standard
repayment

Monthly payments, year one,
and percentage of after-tax
income (joint return in the case
of the married couple), based
on gross income of $64,000

39

income (joint return in the case
of the married couple), based
on gross income of $76,420

Total of payments, current
dollars
Present value of total of future
payments
Amount the government
forgives, current dollars
Present value of government
forgiveness

By marrying after choosing income-contingent repayment, Mr.
Lifer and Ms. Lane will pay approximately 11% more in each first-year

loan payment than if they had remained single, and they will pay
approximately $20,000 more, over the life of the loan (measured in

terms of present value), than they would if unmarried. This might be a
price that they would happily pay for a combination of connubial bliss
and affordable repayment.
But now consider the possibility that although Ms. Lane is, like
Larry Lifer, a $32,000 legal services lawyer, she is free of debt because
she paid for her legal education out of money she saved before attending
law school. If they marry, the Department will attribute her income to

337.
taxpayer.
338.
income.
339.
340.
income.

This assumes federal income tax of $3746 and state and local tax of $1124 on each
This assumes federal income tax of $8725 and state and local tax of $2632 on the joint
This is based on federal tax of $5382 and state and local tax of $1615 on each taxpayer.
This assumes federal income tax of $12,247 and state and local tax of $3674 on the joint
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the couple, even though she has no debt to combine with his. Compare
their pre-marriage and post-marriage prospects in Table 46.
TABLE 46:

EFFECT OF MARRIAGE, DIFFERENTLY SITUATED

PARTNERS, $32,000 INcOMES, 3% RAISES, A SINGLE $75,500 DEBT
SUBJECT TO INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT
LarryLiferand
Penny Lane, married
couple, debt paid
through incomecontingent repayment
(debt will be paid off
in ten years)
S879

LaryLifercar
Penny Lz.e,
married coup!e,
debt paid in ten
)ears through
ten-s ear starard
rea ment
S926
t21 %

$459
(9%),

S945
(19u )08.)

$926

Larry Lifer and Penny
Lane, unmarried
borrowers, the debtor
using incomecontingent repayment,
consolidated numbers
Monthly payments, year one,
and percentage of after-tax
income (joint return in the case
of the married couple)
Monthly payments, year six,
and percentage of after-tax
income (joint return in the case
of the married couple), based on
joint gross income of $76.420
Total ofpayments, current
dollars

S394
)p20%

$171,439

Sl11,415

S1!1,123

Present value of total of future
payments

S84,443

S84,821

$S4,733

Amount the goverment
forgives, current dollars

$70,927

So

SO

Present value of government
forgiveness

$17,447

So

$0

"

In this situation, the impact of marriage is far more dramatic in the
early years of repayment. Mr. Lifer and Ms. Lane will be tempted to

elect income-contingent loan repayment over standard repayment,
because choosing income-contingent repayment without actually
marrying could lower first-year loan repayments from 21% of their

combined income to 9% of their combined income. However, by
exchanging vows rather than merely cohabiting (or by remaining
married rather than divorcing and living together if they have married
before they notice the consequences for their loan repayments), they will
(in the early years) more than double what they have to pay each month

341. This
taxpayer.
342. This
343. This
taxpayer.
344. This

assumes federal income tax of $3746 and state and local tax of S1124 on each
assumes federal income tax of $8775 and state and local tax of S2632.
is based on federal income tax of $5382 and state and local tx of S1615 on each
assumes federal income tax of $12,247 and state and local tax of $3674.
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toward Mr. Lifer's student loans 45 The "marriage penalty" of the federal
student loan repayment program is thus far more severe in the early
years than the "marriage penalty" imposed by the income tax law. 6 The
clear message from the Department to the happy couple: avoid the
benefit of clergyY7 The Article returns to this marriage penalty issue in
Part VII.
VI.

WHY INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT IS So UNPOPULAR

When income-contingent repayment was a gleam in the eye of
policy makers, they anticipated that this option would be used by 15% to

30% of borrowers." Two years later, the Secretary of Education
projected that between 1996 and 2000, 17% of all direct loans, including
consolidations from FFELP loans, would be repaid under the income-

345. Despite the striking differences in payment schedules in the early years, the present value
of their future payments is about the same for this couple under all three plans. Note that the
increased repayment obligation in the early years would be even greater if Mr. Lifer marries Ms.
Lane whose income is much greater than his-for example, if she worked in a law firm for a salary
of $150,000. If Mr. Lifer had elected income-contingent repayment a year before meeting Ms. Lane,
his options, realistically, would be either to abandon income-contingent repayment and ask his wife
to make large payments on his loans (which she might or might not be willing to do), or to refrain
from marrying so that he could continue to pay a small fraction of the couple's after-tax income
toward his loan obligations.
346. In 1999, the federal income tax on two $32,000 incomes, filed by single taxpayers
(whether or not cohabiting) would have been $7492. If those two taxpayers had married and filed a
joint return, they would have paid a federal income tax of $8725, paying a "marriage penalty" of
about 16% of the tax due from them as single taxpayers. By contrast, the additional student loan
repayment caused by the marriage of Mr. Lifer and Ms. Lane would be $10,584 in the first year of
repayment, an increase of 122% above the $4752 payment required if the couple had remained
unwed. It may be worth noting that if Ms. Lane had not married Mr. Lifer, but had instead lived
with Mr. Lifer's sister Lisa under Vermont's civil union law, the couple would have avoided the
additional payments required of married couples. This seems to be a rare instance in which federal
law advantages homosexual couples compared with people who are married.
347. A Department spokesperson would undoubtedly disavow this message and suggest that
this couple elect standard or graduated repayment over a shorter repayment period, since together
they have $64,000 in gross income and are not impoverished. Nevertheless, the Department's
regulations would permit the couple to obtain significant benefits from income-contingent
repayment, provided that the borrowers remain unmarried. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(b) (2001).
348. See OFFICE OF POST-SECONDARY EDUC., DEP'T OF EDUC., DISCUSSION PAPER ON ISSUES
RELATING TO THE REPAYMENT OF FEDERAL DIRECT STUDENT LOANS app. at 3 (Mar. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter REPAYMENT OF FEDERAL DIRECT STUDENT LOANS] ("[Ilt seems most reasonable to
assume that the probability of choosing income-contingent repayment would increase as the savings
in initial payments from doing so increased but that the probability would not be zero or one for any
group. [On the assumption that the probability of choosing income-contingent repayment would
gradually increase to 75% as the difference in initial monthly payments approached $50] between
15 and 30 percent of borrowers would choose income-contingent repayment.").
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contingent plan.39 In fact, fewer than 1% of new borrowers at schools

that offer direct federal loans chooses income-contingent repayment.9

Rather than being used, as President Clinton hoped, to encourage public
service, income-contingent repayment is used mostly '"as a last resortf'

[option] to the most desperate borrowers" (those who have defaulted or
are close to defaulting)." Indeed, 40% of its users are borrowers who

were placed there involuntarily, by the Department, after they
defaulted." 2 There are no separate statistics on law student use of the

program, and financial aid advisors do not know how many of their
students elect this option."" Law students planning public interest careers
might be the most likely candidates for income-contingent repayment,
because legal education is among the most expensive types of graduate
education and many public interest salaries are so low. But the results of

my surveys suggest that the law students who might have the greatest
interest in income-contingent repayment are wary of it, and there is little

reason to think that any substantial number of them use it, or even know
about it.3'

Why is there such a large gap between expectations and reality?
The first answer must be that the Department should probably not have
thought of the program as one that would attract as many as 15 to 30%
349. See FederalStudent Loan Programs:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigationsof the Comm. on Econ. & Educ. Opportunities,104th Cong. 327 (1995).
350. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNmG OFFICE, DIRECr STUDENr Lo.-s: ANALYSES OF
BoRRowERs' USE OF THE INCOME CON
CIGENT
REPAYmNTr OPION app. II at 30 tbl.lI.2
(GAOIHEHS-97-155, 1997) Forty-five percent of borrowers consolidating their loan also chomincome-contingent repayment, but there were only about 60,000 consolidation loans, as of the time
of the study, compared with 554,000 nonconsolidated loans. See id. app. H at 30 tbls.l.2-3. The
percentage choosing income-contingent repayment reported by the General Accounting Office may
have been understated because the program was relatively new at the time of its study. Howrever, as
of May 31, 2000, only 1.46% of unsubsidized, unconsolidated Stafford loan balances %vere being
repaid through income-contingent repayment. See OFFICE OF ELE ITARY ArD SECONDARY
EDUC., DEP'T OF EDUC., BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2001. at
373 (2001), availableat httplw3.access.gpo.govlusbudgetlfy200llpdf/edu.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2001) [hereinafter BUDGET]. Of all federal direct loans in repayment (including involuntary
consolidations), 6% by volume were loans in which, as a result of the benefits of the incomecontingent repayment option, the borrower was paying less than the interest due on the loan. See
Utilization of Loan Repayment Plans in the FederalDirect Student Loan Program, U.S. Dep't of
Educ., at httplwiv.gao.gov/mmslicsdata.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2000).
351. Stephen Burd, Few Borrowers Repay Student Loans Through 'Income-Contingent'
System, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 25, 1998. at A40 (quoting an advisor).
352. See U.S. GEN. AccouNTmG OFFICE, supranote 350. at 2.
353. See supratext accompanying note 257.
354. Recall that only 9% of the students at Catholic and Georgetown vwho wanted to pend
substantial segments of their careers in public interest law knew much about the plan's provisions,
even generally. This figure may overstate kmowledge, because half of those in the 9% had receiv ed
their information through word of mouth, which may have been inaccurate. See supratbLl4.
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of borrowers; the percentage of high-debt graduates who think that they
will have many years of low-paid work is probably far below those
percentages.355 Furthermore, Congress and the Department designed a
program that is simply too weak to attract even 5% of borrowers. The
existing income-contingent repayment plan certainly succeeds in
keeping loan payments affordable. But the twenty-five-year repayment
schedule frightens off most of the potential customers35 6 and their
counselors.357 It affects borrowers in several ways: by making
forgiveness seem on the other side of a lifetime, by making financial
planning difficult because so many events affecting income and
expenses will intervene over such a long period, by increasing the total
amount that must be paid so greatly, and by setting up so great a
divergence with the norm of "standard" repayment.358
A second part of the answer is that financial aid advisors are the
critical link between the Department and student borrowers, and at least
some of them have concluded that income-contingent repayment is
advantageous for virtually no law students.359 Recall that financial aid
advisors tended to think that very few students would remain in the plan
long enough to obtain partial forgiveness, and that of those who thought
that even short-term use of the plan was not useful, the most common
reason offered was that other, less complex repayment options were
preferable. 360 The Author's survey of these advisors also included an
open-ended question on which they could provide comments on the
income-contingent repayment option. Some commented that they just
did not understand the program very well,361 but a few comments shed
further light on the view that income-contingent repayment is simply a
poor way to deal with student debt:
Q We discourage the use of income-contingent [sic] because negative
amortization is not to anyone's benefit.... [and] if they are still
paying on their own student loan when their children go to college

355. One-third of the Georgetown and Catholic law students said that but for debt, they would
like to spend two-thirds of their careers in full-time public service work. But even before law
schools became so expensive, the proportion of graduates who followed such a career path was
much lower. And aside from those who seek public service careers, it is doubtful that many highdebt borrowers expect to have low-income jobs for a long period of time. See supra tbl.7.
356. See supratext accompanying note 243.
357. As one financial aid advisor put it bluntly on a questionnaire, "25 years is too long into
the future for students to see a benefit."
358. Seesupra tbl.21.
359. See supratbls.26-27.
360. See supratbl.29.
361. See supratbl.23.
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it will reduce their ability to assist the children with college
expenses.
03

Financial aid counselors would encourage use of any other option
since this one might result in negative amortization.

o A 25 or 30 year consolidation lowers the monthly [sic] nearly as
low as an income-contingent repayment, but can save the
borrower significant interest expense as compared to a graduated
or income-contingent plan.
O Most ...will choose the graduated repayment option ...as the

monthly payment is similar for the first few years.
o Our law graduates are [not interested in] long payment periods.
Two other options are the graduated payment plan [with
increasing payments over ten years] or [increasing payments over]
12-15 years.
0 Other options are less costly and more attractive in the long haul. I
have confidence in the FFELP repayment options.
o It is my understanding that by using this program they give up a lot
of deferment and forbearance options that would otherwise be
available to them in time of need or hardship.
o To rely on an income that is going nowhere is like stating you will
never be successful.... [Most law alums want to be successful,
and cannot be, if they make payments contingent on their income.
A few may take advantage of this, but I bet they are doing jobs
under the table and not reporting them.
These survey respondents are wise to encourage consideration of
other options, but their comments may also reflect misunderstandings of
the income-contingent option in relation to its alternatives. Negative
amortization (increasing the principal of a loan) may indeed be to the
benefit of some borrowers, if it is coupled with eventual forgiveness of
the principal; also, the Department's regulations limit negative
amortization, so that capitalization of unpaid interest stops when the
principal balance has grown by 10%, and compounding of interest does
not resume even after the debt is worked down.22 For some borrowers,
simple extended repayment over thirty years may well cost about the
same, over time, as income-contingent repayment. But for high-debt,
low-income borrowers, it will not lower the first several years' payments
as much as income-contingent repayment, and for some of those
362. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(5) (2001).
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borrowers, it will cost more in the long run.63 Payments under the
graduated repayment plan are not necessarily similar, in the early years,

to those under income-contingent repayment, and graduated repayment
over a long term can be the most expensive method of repayment,36
especially compared to income-contingent repayment that includes some
degree of forgiveness. The repayment options offered by FFELP lenders

may be less attractive for high-debt, low-income borrowers, because
while the "income-sensitive" repayment option offered by FFELP
lenders may lower payments for a few years, it does not lower them as

much as the income-contingent repayment option does, and it does not
offer any forgiveness.3 65 Deferments3' 6 and forbearances367 are available

under all federal repayment options, including income-contingent
repayment,36 although the reduced payments under income-contingent
repayment may make them less necessary. And not all law graduates
measure369their "success" by the amount of money they make in their
careers.

In addition, these comments may represent isolated overstatements,
since a majority of the financial aid advisors reported in the survey that
income-contingent repayment would be useful for at least 5% of their

363. See supra tbl.34.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
365. Sallie Mae provides a Web-based calculator. See Repayment Calculator, Sallie Mae,
Calculators, at http://www.salliemae.com/calculators/repayment.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
On this Web site, a borrower may obtain information about income-sensitive (and other) repayment
of Sallie Mae loans. See id. It shows two income-sensitive plans. Under the first, Larry Lifer's
$75,500 debt would be repaid over eleven years. His monthly payments during the first year would
be $533 (more than the $396 under income-contingent repayment), but in the second year, his
payments would balloon to $924 per month and remain there for the next ten years. Under the
second plan, he would repay the debt over thirty-one years (compared with twenty-five years under
income-contingent repayment). In the first year the payment would be $533 monthly, increasing to
$566 in the second and subsequent years. Payments in the early years under this plan would still be
larger than under income-contingent repayment, and the total payment over thirty-one years would
be $210,116, larger than under income-contingent repayment using any assumption about Larry
Lifer's salary increases. See supratbl.34.
366. 34 C.F.R. § 685.204. A deferment is a period of up to three years during which payments
need not be made, though interest usually continues to accrue and is capitalized. See id.
§ 685.204(a)(1), (c). They are granted for various reasons specified in regulations-for example,
while the borrower is unemployed, experiencing "economic hardship," has a graduate fellowship, or
is pursuing a rehabilitation training program for individuals with disabilities. See id. § 685,204(b).
367. 34 C.F.R. § 685.205. A forbearance is a temporary cessation or reduction of payments
approved by the Secretary of Education based on poor health, public service under the National and
Community Service Trust Act, and various other reasons. See id. § 685.205(a).
368. Nothing in 34 C.F.R § 685.204 (deferment), § 685.205 (forbearance), or § 685.209
(income-contingent repayment) prohibits this combination.
369. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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students.370 Nevertheless, one reason for the program's low use rate by
law graduates may be that many financial aid advisors do not know very
much about the option, and even those who think that it would be useful
for 5% of those they advise may be so leery of the program that they
actually commend it to fewer than that 5%.
The inherent unattractiveness of the option, the financial aid
advisors' poor familiarity with the program, and the advisors' wariness
of it, may all result from the desire of Department officials to give the
option a low political profile throughout the Clinton Administration,
despite the President's personal enthusiasm for it. FFELP lenders, eager
to preserve billions of dollars of virtually risk-free federally-guaranteed
profit, bitterly fought against the creation of the federal direct lending
program. 7 After 1993, FFELP and direct lending co-existed as
competitors, and by 1998, the federal government had persuaded 20% of
the nation's colleges to grant direct federal loans.7-' But the lenders and
their congressional allies spent years trying to repeal federal direct
lending, or at least to prevent it from being used by borrowers at more
than a statutorily fixed percentage of schools.'" Because the "foremost"
advantage of the direct lending program over the FFELP program was
the availability of income-contingent repayment in the direct lending
program,374 and the lending industry feared that this repayment option
"would give the direct-loan program a competitive edge,"'15 the industry
targeted that plan for ridicule and attack. In 1996, three industry groups
issued a report attacking the plan as too costly for students.7 It
purported to show that income-contingent repayment was "[a]n
expensive option," compared to other repayment plans, and that the
Department's literature gulled students into choosing this option without
warning them sufficiently of the costs.'" Somewhat misleadingly, the
report prominently featured a chart showing that for a student with a
370. Seesupratbl.31.
371. See generally WALDMAN, supranote 11, at 56-57. 63.

372. See Burd, supra note 351. By volume, the direct loan program's share was even highr:
31% of unsubsidized Stafford loan originations (S3.4 billion of SI 1.2 billion) were federal direct
at
372.
iasilable
at
loans.
See
BUDGET,
supra
note
350,
http'//v3.access.gpo.gov/usbudgetlfy200llpdf/edu.pdf (last visited Feb. 15. 2001).
373. See, e.g., Student Loan Puivatization Act of 1995. H.R. 1501, 104th Cong. § 201 11995)
(potentially phasing out the direct lending program).
374. See Stephen Burd, Despitean Apparent Cease-Fire,the Battle OerStudent l.vans Rages
On, CHRON. IGHER EDrC., Jan. 24, 1997, at AI9.
375. Burd, supra note 351.
376. See EDUC. FIN. CoUNCIL, NATL COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. LOAN PROGRAMS, A_,
EXAMINATION OF THE LONG-TERM COSTS TO STUDENT BORRowEs OF INCOME CO.'MNGENT
REPAYMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM (1996).
377. See id. at 1, 5.
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$15,000 loan and a $15,000 starting salary, all other repayment methods
would be less expensive.7
lawmakers and financial aid
kill direct lending, but some
effective' at discrediting

The study was circulated widely among
advisors. It failed to persuade Congress to
observers thought that it was "'remarkably
income contingency" and that "'aid

administrators became much more wary of recommending that option to
their students.' ' ' 379 The industry's animosity toward the federal direct

lending program continues to this day. In October 2000, the Bank of
America, Sallie Mae, and other industry leaders sued the Department to
restrain it from reducing by 1% the loan origination fee that students are
charged when they accept a direct loan. Success in the litigation would
make direct loans less attractive to student borrowers. 38 0
Fear of industry and congressional counter-attacks may have
caused the Department to shy away from trying to make the program

more attractive by forgiving loans sooner, and even from more
effectively informing the public about this repayment method. Most

Department officials spoken with agreed to talk to the Author only on
condition that their remarks were not attributed to them by name or
position, but one stated that when the Department was developing its
regulations in 1994, it never considered whether it could amortize
income-contingent loans over a period shorter than the statutory

maximum of twenty-five years, because "the whole program was
378. See id. at 3. The report was fair in some ways. It acknowledged that income-contingent
repayment "can be a help to some" borrowers, and it sensibly recommended that "[s]tudent loan
borrowers need to be counseled thoroughly." Id. at 1. Its critique of the Department for not
providing information about the amount of forgiveness and the full repayment tables as part of its
calculator was well-founded. But the report was misleading in three ways. First, it highlighted only
a single example ($15,000 debt/$15,000 income), and in this example, income-contingent
repayment was the most expensive option. See id. at 1, 3. If the authors had either doubled the
assumed debt to $30,000, or doubled both income and debt, income-contingent repayment would
have been less expensive, rather than more expensive, than graduated repayment. Second, the
authors counted dollars expended in twenty-five years as equally valuable as dollars expended in
fifteen years, rather than discounting any of their results to present value. See id. Third, the authors
(like the govemment) assumed an annual income growth of 5%, rather than displaying the fact that
income-contingent repayment becomes more valuable to the borrower as income growth rates fall
below 5%. See id. at 5.
379. Burd, supra note 351 (quoting John Dean, counsel to the Consumer Bankers Ass'n), One
advisor concluded that income-contingent repayment could "'double or even triple the cost of a
loan"' and recommends it "'only as a last resort' to the most desperate borrowers." Id. (quoting an
advisor). If advisors erroneously believed that the option was a good one for a large fraction of
students and became more realistic, the report served a useful function. But if they concluded that
only "the most desperate borrowers," should use it, they may have misinterpreted the authors' stated
conclusions. Id.
380. See Kenneth J. Cooper, Lawsuit May Affect Student Loan Costs, WASH. PoST, Nov. 27,
2000, at A19; Corrections,WASH. PoST, Nov. 28, 2000, at A2.
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controversial at the time, so we had no inclination to do so. And it
remains controversial today, as direct lending is still under attack..... A
former official told a reporter that "'[the Department has just been gunshy [about promoting the income-contingent repayment plan] because it
doesn't want to rankle any feathers with the Republicans who oppose
direct lending.' 3
Politics may not deserve the entire blame for poor public relations,
however. At least as presently structured, the income-contingent
repayment plan would benefit only a small percentage of students, and
the Department might reasonably place a higher priority on educating
the public about programs affecting larger numbers of students. For
whatever reason, however, the effort to make students and their advisors
aware of the option has certainly diminished over the years. Shortly after
the pertinent regulations were issued at the end of 1994,1" Department
officials launched a national outreach effort to explain federal loan
consolidation and its sub-options. It sent teams to universities, produced
a handbook, and created a videotape. The handbook is now out of print,
though its essentials are on the Department's Web site. The video is no
longer used. The systematic visits to financial aid advisors have stopped,
though they may never have reached law school advisors in any event,
because the Department officials visited only the main university
advisors, expecting them to pass the word to individual components of
their universities?.
Even if the information from those briefings was passed to the law
school advisors in 1995, it may not have been perpetuated to the current
advisors, as there is rapid turnover and lateral movement among
professionals in that field.' In addition, though the Web seems to be the
Department's main method for propagating information about incomecontingent repayment to students, using the Web to learn about the fine
print of this program, or even fairly basic information, can be
challenging. In July 2000, starting with the Department's home page,"'
381. Telephone Interview with an anonymous Department of Education Official (July 5. 2000).
382. Alexandra Starr, St'ron's Chance: There Have Been Promising Innovations to Help Pay

for College, but None Match the GiBill, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1999. at 30,33 (quoting a former
Department employee).
383. See Kathy Kristof, Loan ConsolidationPlan Would Epand Direct Lending Program for
Students, DENY. PosT, Dec. 26, 1994, at C-03.
384. See Interview with Department of Education Official (June 11, 1999).

385. Collection of the data from the survey of financial aid advisors took six months, in part
because so many of the advisors listed in the 1998-99 Let School Admission Council Directory

(1999) were no longer in those positions in May 1999, and others left their positions at the end of
the spring semester, 1999, and were not replaced until later in the summer.
386. U.S. Dep't of Educ., http://wv6Nv.ed.gov/ (last modified Feb. 12,2001).
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and knowing what to look for, it took six levels and thirteen hyperlinks
before finding a description of income-contingent loans. 7 Searching a
different way, the Department's calculator388 was eventually found, but it
was not very helpful in computing the repayment information for Larry

Lifer, Cindy Civic, or the other characters in this Article. The calculator
does not permit the borrower to assume an income growth rate of other

than 5%, and does not permit him or her to assume a sudden increase in
income (as in the case of Cindy Civic). The Department's Web site also

is not updated promptly, causing its calculations to be inaccurate. For
example, federal poverty level figures for the year 2000 were published
by the federal government in February 2000, but as of late August of that
year, the Department's Web site was still basing its calculations on 1999
poverty levels.389 Most seriously, both the Department's calculator and

its Web-based chart of representative income-contingent repayments 3
display the current-dollar costs of repaying a loan under four different
repayment options, but none of them discounts the stream of payments
to present value. The result is that the apparent difference between the
costs of ten-year repayment and income-contingent repayment seems

much greater than it really is, because the user is lulled into comparing
apples and oranges while thinking that she is comparing apples and
apples.39'
Besides the inherent weakness of the program, the possible
disinclination of Department officials to trumpet it even to those
387. From the Department's homepage, the following hyperlinks led to a description of
income-contingent loans: a click on Student FinancialAssistance, then on Financial Aid for
Students, then on Finding OutAbout FinancialAid,then on DirectLoans (knowing that the incomecontingent option was part of the direct loan program), then on Publications and Guides for
Students, and then on Direct Loans: A Better Way to Borrow (as opposed to All About Direct
Loans). Seven more clicks on the "next" hyperlink at the bottom of the page led to a one-page
description of income-contingent repayment. Even then, the Department's calculator that would
compute repayment schedules could not be found, though backing up and clicking other options
would eventually locate it. The process could have been shortened by clicking Search on the home
page and entering the words Income-Contingent; this would have led to a list of documents from
which the top selection would have led to a page about income-contingent repayment from the Exit
Counseling Guide for Borrowers.One more hyperlink would have led to a chart with some sample
income-contingent repayments, but because the incomes on the chart are only $15,000, $25,000,
and $45,000, Larry Lifer's repayments could not be computed. Still one would not have come to the
calculator.
388. See supra note 272.
389. Mark Kantrowitz discovered this anomaly while creating the more up-to-date FinAld
income-contingent loan repayment calculator.
390. See Exit Counseling Guide for Borrowers, U.S. Dep't of Educ., at
http:llwww.ed.gov/DirectLoan/pubs/exitborr/exb8.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
391. For example, compare the current-dollar and present value numbers in Table 33 of this
Article.
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students whom it would significantly help, and the poor quality of the
Department's public information, three additional factors may contribute
to disaffection by advisors and students." First, the program includes
the horrendous marriage penalty noted earlier in this Article. Many
students are single when they graduate but expect that they might marry
within a few years. They do not know whether they will marry a person
with debts or without debts, but if they elect income-contingent
repayment and consider marrying someone without debts, they will have
to consider changing payment plans in mid-stream or cohabiting without
marrying. This factor complicates financial planning. Second,
forgiveness at the end of the twenty-five-year repayment period is
presently taxable, though that could change during the two decades
before anyone pays this tax. The tax is small for most borrowers, its
present value is much smaller, and financial aid advisors responding to
the Author's survey did not rate this factor strongly in their reasons for
skepticism about income contingency. But some of them did mention it
in comments on their questionnaires. " The third factor is one that the
students surveyed ranked second in their view of why they would not
want to use income-contingent repayment, and which could loom even
larger over the next few years. Only debts subject to federal
consolidation can be scheduled for income-contingent repayment, and
commercial debt cannot be so consolidated. But commercial debt is
already a significant factor for law graduates. None of the examples
involving Mr. Lifer and his colleagues assumed that they had
commercial debt, but many law graduates have $30,000 or more of
commercial debt in addition to their Stafford loan debt. This number will
grow higher as the cost of legal education increases, and with it will rise
the percentage of debt not subject to income-contingent repayment. The
standard monthly payment on $30,000 of debt is $368, nearly as much
as Larry Lifer has to pay each month during the first year of incomecontingent repayment on his $75,500 in Stafford loans. He could work
with his commercial lender to try to schedule the payments over a longer
period (escalating the total to be paid, without forgiveness), but if he
392. A third potential negative, the requirement that borrowers permit disclosure of their tax
returns to verify adjusted gross income, is not apparently a serious deterrent, at least for law

students. The government already has this information, and lav.-yers are not likely to think that
information they share with the Department of Treasury should be concealed from the Dlpartment.
393. See discussion supra Part V.G.

394. For example, one said: "Primarily the taxation. Students %%horally need this benfit ...
will have a larger amount at the end of 25 years to be forgiven. The taxation ... can be significant

enough that the student can't pay it." Another said: "I think one of the main concerns is the taxation
of the amount forgiven."
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does not do so, the percentage of his after-tax income that he will have
to pay toward his student debts will rise from 20% to 38%, probably not
a manageable amount. Even if he arranges for twenty-five-year
repayment of both loans, he will have to pay 32% of his first-year
income toward his loans. This significantly reduces the utility of the
income-contingent repayment option. Larry Lifer might well decide to
throw in the towel, giving up his hope of serving the poor in order to pay
off the debt that he incurred so that he could serve the poor.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress and President Clinton tried to develop a program that
would facilitate or even encourage public service by students who felt
that their debts prevented them from undertaking it. But the incomecontingent repayment option that the Department currently administers
primarily serves graduates who are on the brink of default under a
different repayment plan,395 as opposed to high-debt students who want
to do public service work. The recommendations begin with suggestions
for students and financial aid advisors who must take the plan as they
find it. But suggestions are also provided for Congress and the
Department about how they could make this option more effectively
achieve the desired result.
A.

High-Debt Law Students ConsideringLow-Income Jobs

If you are thinking about spending several years in a low-income
job, the income-contingent repayment option may be worth considering.
But before even thinking about that particular plan, it is essential to
come to grips with the more basic issue of the term of years within
which you will repay your loan. Your classmates who are headed for
highly-paid law firm jobs will pay off their loans in ten years or less.
Ten-year repayment may not be possible on the income that you will
earn. Paying off your student debt over a period of fifteen to twenty-five
years may be necessary if you want to follow the career plan you have
set for yourself. There is nothing magical about a ten-year repayment
period; it became conventional before debts were typically as high as
they are now, and it is not suitable for high-debt, low-income graduates.
The surveys reported in this Article show that law graduates who
want to do public interest work have a hard time accepting long
repayment periods, and that the twenty-five-year amortization schedule
395. See supra text accompanying notes 348-52.
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for income-contingent loans is the single greatest barrier to use of this
option, far outdistancing the larger total cost of repayment." ' The

thought of repaying student loans so long after graduation is a daunting
psychological barrier, even if a twenty-five-year plan is economically

advantageous. "97 As noted below, policy makers should shorten this
period. But if you must consider a long-term repayment plan, keep in

mind two factors that may make it easier to accept:
1) Your education is a major asset, like a house. In fact, after a
house, if you buy one, it will probably be the most expensive asset you
ever purchase. Since the 1930s, Americans have become quite used to
purchasing valuable assets with long-term mortgages, and it makes sense
for you to think of your student loan debt as the mortgage with which
you purchased your education, which you have already used or vill

begin to use before you make your first payment. Few home buyers
spend thirty years griping about having had to take out thirty-year
mortgages. They are too busy enjoying their homes."'
396. See supra tbl.21. As one student put it in a response on a Georgetown questionnaire: -A
25 year repayment is alarming when faced with the reality that this repaymnt %illextend through
the years when I may choose to have a family (possibly not working) and up to the point of
retirement." The twenty-five-year period may have been so "alanning" that it diverted this student
from realizing that in years in which income was zero, the repayment obligation would also be zero.
On the other hand, since the plan currently imputes a spouse's income to the borrower, this
respondent may have understood that he or she would have to rely on such a spouse to make debt
repayments during years of child-rearing, and may have found that prospect too confining compared
with giving up a first choice of career in favor of more rapid repayment.
397. The failure of Yale's Tuition Payment Option. an early, privately financed forerunner of
income-contingent repayment, provides additional evidence that very long repaymrnt terms for
educational loans do not work well. From 1971 to 1978, Yale allowed students to borrow from the
University with income-contingent repayment: for every $1000 borrowed. they would hae to pay
0.4% of their incomes until one of two events occurred: either the debt for their entire class was paid
off, or thirty-five years passed. See William M. Bulkeley, Old Blues: Some Ahmni of Yale Realize
Feb. 23. 1999, at Al (describing the program
That They Owe College a Lasting Debt, WALL ST. J.,
and quoting users). The group-based nature of the plan was designed so that wealthy graduates
would subsidize those with low lifetime incomes. See id. As a student, President Clinton himself
borrowed from the plan. See id. Yale predicted that the debts of each class would be retired within
twenty to twenty-five years, but none were. See id. Tying debt retirement to the fortunes of the
group probably killed the plan; students who planned lives of public service borrowed under the
plan, while those aiming to make a lot of money avoided it, and so there was not enough rpaymant
to pay off the class debts. See id. Also, as many years went by, many graduates decided that they
had paid enough, and when they defaulted, Yale was reluctant to sue its alumni. See id. The longterm nature of the obligation bred resentment, with one alumnus, the founder of the Idaho Yale
Club, reporting: "'As much as I love Yale, this is tainting my overall feelings."' I& (quoting Dr.
Bettis); see also WALDMAN, supra note 11, at 10 (describing Clinton's use of the program). After
adverse publicity, Yale announced that it would forgive remaining debts after 2001, though it %ould
pursue defaulters. See William M. Bulkeley, Yale to ForgireDebt, Taie Loss on Old Loans. WALL
ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A6.
398. Of course the asset of a legal education is less tangible than a house, and it cannot be
passed along to your children. But a house cannot free an innocent prisoner from death row, help
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2) As John Kramer noted long ago, when you make debt
repayments twenty years from now, you will be using dollars worth far
less than the ones you hold in your hand today.399 Long-term repayment
plans cost more, in that long term, than short-term plans. But the charts
showing how much more they cost, including those published by the
United States government, are in a sense illusory, because they compare
long and short-term plans in current dollars, as if a dollar paid ten years
from now and a dollar paid twenty-five years from now were equally
valuable. A table in this Article shows that discounting the streams of
payments to their present value, to more appropriately compare them,
significantly reduces the difference in their actual cost." You can
generate a similar table of current dollar and discounted comparisons to
reflect your own circumstances.
If you are willing to consider repayment over a term longer than ten
years, income-contingent repayment may be worth thinking about, but
you have other options as well, and different plans will be better for
different individuals. For example, you might choose graduated
repayment, through which (as in income-contingent repayment), the
monthly payments rise over time. On debts of at least $60,000, the
graduated payments may be extended over a period as long as thirty
years, but you can elect a shorter period if you can afford the monthly
payments. On the other hand, for some borrowers, income-contingent
repayment may be superior to graduated repayment. For example, for
Larry Lifer, our career legal services lawyer, even with 7% annual
raises, income-contingent repayment both more greatly reduces the
initial payments (when he can least afford them) and costs less over time
than thirty-year graduated repayment (which keeps initial payments
lower than any other alternative payment plan)."1
No simple formula can tell you which of the many available
repayment options is best for you, but you really do have alternatives to
ten-year repayment. Spending a few hours with Web-based calculators
could save you tens of thousands of dollars and make it possible for you
to have the career you want. Unofficial calculators 401 may be better than
protect a crusading journalist from reprisals by a dictatorial government, restore disability benefits
to an elderly person who was wrongfully denied them, or stop racial discrimination in employment.
Also, a law degree could enable borrowers to make the money needed to more rapidly repay their
debt, if they ever choose to do so.
399. See Kramer, supra note 14, at 267.
400. See supra tbl.3.
401. See supra tbls.33-34.
402. See Tai-yeu Hsia & Philip G. Schrag, Income-contingent Loan Repayment and Steady
Repayment
Calculators,
Georgetown
University
Law
Center,
at
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the government's calculator, because they may permit you to make more
flexible assumptions about your future income, and because the
government does not compute present value, which is an important
aspect of comparing plans of different durations. But do not neglect to
use the government's calculator as well, because it is the most
authoritative, and if the discrepancies between the unofficial calculators
and the government's calculator are significant, you should do further
research to try to understand the cause of the discrepancy. If the
calculators show that you will benefit from forgiveness at the end of
twenty-five years, do not forget to take into account the effect of
possible income taxation on the amount forgiven, though Congress
could eliminate the tax before then. Assume a reasonable tax rate,
compute the one-time tax, and then discount the amount to its present
value to see how much it would cost you in today's currency. Finally,
keep in mind that only government-guaranteed debts (and direct federal
loans) are subject to consolidation:" To determine your full repayment
obligation, analyze the repayment plans available for your commercial
debt (which may include extended repayment options, but are unlikely to
involve forgiveness), and add those monthly obligations to those
resulting from the new federal obligation that you will assume.
If you are at a school with a good LRAP for which the work you
plan to do will qualify, it will almost always pay to use the LRAP and
then, taking that program's subsidy formula into account, figure out
which repayment formula would be best for your 5 If your school has no
LRAP, or only a poor program that will not provide a significant
subsidy, it is more likely that you will want to give the federal incomecontingent repayment option serious consideration as a debt
management device.
Keep in mind that a decision to consolidate your loan with the
federal direct loan program and to choose the income-contingent
http://data.law.georgetosv.edulfaculty/schragiloanrepaymenthtml (last modified July 20. 2000);
Mark Kantrowitz, Income Contingent Repayment Calculator,FmAid: The SmartStudent Guide to
Financial Aid, at http.//,wvw.finaid.org/calculatorsicr.phtml (last visited Feb. 13. 2001) (providing
the F'mAid income-contingent repayment calculator).
403. Small discrepancies are to be expected, because people who construct different calculators

may use somewhat different conventions for rounding numbers, different assumptions about what
happens during the first month of repayment, or different projections about the rate of increase of

the federal poverty level. But differences in outcome of more than 1%are worth investigating.
404. See supra text accompanying note 269.

405. Some employers also have LRAPs for their employees, and students could inquire about
this when they interview for jobs. The National Association for Public Interest Law ("NAPIL1
collects information on LRAPs, and periodic consultation of its Web site is useful. See Nat'l Ass'n
for Pub. Interest Law (NAPIL), at http'Jvwwv.napiLorL (last visited Feb. 14. 2001).
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repayment option is not permanent. You can switch out of incomecontingent repayment, accelerate your payments within the option, or
prepay your loan. Only borrowers who remain in the program for
twenty-five years can obtain forgiveness, but borrowers who plan to do
public interest work for a few years may benefit from the plan by using
it temporarily to minimize loan repayments, and then switching to much
more rapid repayment.0 Other borrowers may have special
circumstances warranting temporary use of income-contingent
repayment. For example, a recent law graduate who is not necessarily
going to have a very low income may need to sign a mortgage to buy a
house. But the mortgage company, looking at her student loan
repayment obligations if she elects ten-year repayment, may decide that
she does not qualify for its credit. She might elect income-contingent
repayment to reduce her student loan repayment obligations to a
minimum level, obtain her mortgage, and convert to a different
repayment plan when it is convenient to do so.
Finally, unless the Department accepts the recommendation of this
Article to change its policy of imputing all of a spouse's income to the
borrower, be aware of the income-contingent repayment option's
potential "marriage penalty" trap. If you elect this option and become
married, your marriage will affect your loan repayment obligations. The
magnitude of the effect will be greatest if your spouse has significant
income and low student debt. Your repayment obligation will be
affected even if your spouse keeps his or her own money separate from
yours and you have no right to spend it.
B. Law School FinancialAid Advisors
Financial aid advisors are incredibly important resources for law
students generally, and they are indispensable in helping students who
want public interest careers to figure out how to afford them."0 7 At
schools with good LRAPs, the financial aid advisors usually administer
the programs, and in some cases, that may be sufficient to meet the
needs of students who do not plan to go to well-paying law firms. But
some jobs that would qualify in many people's minds as "public
service," such as hanging out a shingle and serving the needs of ordinary

406. See supra Part V.C (providing the example of Cindy Civic). As noted earlier, borrowers

who believe that they can invest money to achieve an after-tax return better than their student loan
rate might want to elect a much less rapid repayment plan. See supra note 298.
407. See generally supraPart IV.B. and tbls.23-26, 31.
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working families, will not qualify under most LRAPs: 3 And most
schools do not have well-financed LRAPs. Therefore, financial aid
advisors need to be fully conversant with alternatives to standard
repayment.
Unfortunately, most of them do not understand the details of
income-contingent repayment very well, ' at least in significant part
because the Department has not helped them very much to do so."O The
best advice is to play with the income-contingent repayment calculators
and the hypothetical career plans of students for whom it might be
beneficial. Financial aid advisors may be correct in thinking that most
students will not remain in income-contingent repayment long enough to
earn forgiveness. But advisors should note that some subsidization can
occur relatively early, when unpaid interest ceases to be capitalized, and
that some students would benefit by using income-contingent repayment
for a few years, even if they were to obtain no subsidy at all.
Recognizing that because of its present terms, the incomecontingent repayment option is helpful only for a fraction of graduates
who seek low-income careers, financial aid advisors also have a
significant role to play in reforming the program. Better than anyone
else, they understand its value and limitations, and because of their
hands-on familiarity with students' needs and this repayment option,
they have credibility with Congress and with the Department. Financial
aid advisors (and career services advisors) should therefore be active in
urging improvements in the program, both on Capitol Hill and with the
Secretary of Education and other Department officials.
C. Congress and the Department

Congress and the Department must make the income-contingent
loan repayment option more generous in order to achieve the goals they
set in 1993 and 1994. Above all else, they must shorten the period,
currently twenty-five years, during which a borrower must repay the
loan before forgiveness of the remaining debt occurs."' This period
408. See generallyNAT'L ASS'NFOR PUB. INTERESTLNV, supranote 110, at 97 (providing the
eligibility criteria). A few law schools with very large LRAPs. notably Harvard, Yale, and New
York University, cover graduates earning low incomes in private practice. See id.
409. See supratbl.23.
410. See supratext accompanying notes 371-91.

411. The statistics reported in the Georgetown and Catholic student surveys do not do justice to
the disbelief and disgust expressed in comments that respondents wrote at the end of their

questionnaires-for example, "I can't believe that anyone would sign up to the terms for the 25
years. Everything is weighted in the government's favor and doesn't scem a good deal for the
student"; "Twenty-five years is a very long time"; "Two to three years at a good firm is better than
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could be abbreviated either for all users of the program or, if that is too

costly, at least for borrowers who in fact have spent a long time doing
public service. The period should not be so far beyond the standard tenyear repayment period that it becomes unthinkable for students who are
not already at the brink of default. A fifteen to seventeen-year period
seems plausible.4" 2

Consider what forgiving the loan after fifteen years would do for
some of the borrowers that we have considered. It would essentially

double or more than double their subsidies, while freeing them from the
psychological burdens of twenty-five-year repayment schedules. Table

47 compares forgiveness after fifteen years with the current plan, for
several of the hypothetical borrowers featured in this Article.

25 years of living under debt"; "The federal program seems to be a band-aid"; "I don't want to be
paying student loans at retirement"; "Frankly, I'm a little insulted by the tone of a 'forgiveness'
program that requires 25 years. People should be rewarded for doing public interest when it is
hardest-straight out of law school," and "I will be 31 when I graduate, and would be VERY
UNHAPPY to be paying off law school until I am 56 years old, no matter how low the payments
are. My own children would be OUT of law school by that point."
412. Even forgiving student loans after ten years of income-contingent repayment is not
unthinkable, and it was recently suggested by experts on educational financing from the University
of Missouri:
Since the income-contingent plan was conceptually developed to promote employment
in low-paying public service jobs, we wonder if the current program, when the full
economic impact is known, will help meet its objective. we think not.... we propose
[that] ...after a maximum of ten years, the loan is closed, and no additional payments
are required.... [Ain individual would not be saddled with a lifetime of debt and would,
we think, be more likely to select public service employment.
PATRICIA SOMERS & JAMES COFER, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, MORTGAGING THEIR
FUTURE: STUDENT DEBTLOAD IN THE U.S.: TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE U.S. SENATE
GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
FEB.
10,
2000,
at

http:llwww.senate.gov/-gov-affairslO2100Csomers.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001) (underscoring
omitted). Under the Somers and Cofer proposal, some high-income borrowers might choose
standard ten-year repayment because it would lead to slower repayment than income-contingent
repayment, but most borrowers would probably choose income-contingent repayment because of its
built-in subsidy. See id. Thus, income-contingent repayment would become the new standard norm.
In their testimony, Somers and Cofer did not estimate the cost of implementing their suggestion. See
id.
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TABLE47: BORROWER REPAYMENTS AND SUBSIDIES ON $75,500
DEBT, COMPARING INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT PLANS
OFFERING FORGIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIvE YEARS AND
AFrER FIFTEEN YEARS (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

Larry Lifer,

Larry Lifer,

Lisa Lifer,

$32,000,4%

$32,000, 3%

$27,000,4%

raises, with
forgiveness

raises, with
forgiveness

raises, with
forgiveness after

after

after

Years

25

15

25

15

25

15

Payments

194

97

171

88

162

77

94

63

84

57

77

50

30

79

71

88

83

100

7

34

17

38

20

43

(current dollars)

Payments
(present value)

Cost or value of
forgiveness
(current dollars)

Cost or value of
forgiveness
(present value)

Shortening the period may not require new legislation, though
paying for it would require the Secretary of Education to reprogram
other funds or to obtain additional appropriations for the years in which
the cost would be incurred. The statute provides that the period of
income-contingent repayment is "not to exceed 25 years.""1 This is a
statutory maximum, not necessarily also a minimum. As noted earlier,
the Department did not even consider whether it had authority to provide
for income-contingent loans for shorter durations.4 4 The time for such
consideration is at hand. At the very least, the Department should make a
careful estimate of the cost to the taxpayers of shortening the period.
Because the percentage of users of this option is far smaller than the
percentage estimated when the Department established a twenty-fiveyear repayment plan in 1994, ' the costs of forgiving loans must be
much lower than those estimated at the time, and at least some liberality
might be permitted within the original budget. In fact, there is some
evidence that the program the Department created costs only 4% to 12%
413. 20U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D) (1994).
414. See supratext accompanying notes 381-82.
415. See supratext accompanying note 383.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

115

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:733

as much as the Department's original projection."' In addition, the
program was created in times of budget deficit, whereas by the year
2000, legislators were having trouble deciding how to spend huge
federal budget surpluses. 7 The cost to the taxpayers of reducing the
period for repayment for law graduates is shown in the following table,
which assumes that 5% of all law school graduates would use an
improved income-contingent repayment option. At present, virtually no
law graduates use income-contingent repayment, but 2.8% of all law
students take initial jobs as public interest lawyers.4 8 In addition, some
state government and private jobs offer salaries so low that incomecontingent repayment might be attractive. Not all of these graduates
would elect any variant of income-contingent repayment, because not all
students borrow, not all public service jobs are low-paying, and some
lawyers who start at very low salaries will quickly advance in salary
(some of them joining high-paying law firms after a year or two of
public service). So 5% usage is intended to be a conservative guess.

416. The Department predicted that "if interest is not capitalized at all, [the program) would
cost the Federal government $300 million over the cost of ... 10 year fixed loan repayment,"
REPAYMENT OF FEDERAL DIRECT STUDENr LOANS, supra note 348, at 13. But three years later,
after the program was operating, the projected cost of forgiveness was only 13.8 million dollars for
the year 2021 (the first year of forgiveness), rising to 36.1 million dollars by 2030. See Fed. Student
Loan Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Conn. on
Econ. and Educ. Opportunities H.R., 104th Cong. 324, 328 (1995) ("Department of Education
Responses to Congressman Gordon's Questionnaire"). In both cases, these projections appear to be
in future dollars, so in terms of current purchasing power, they are much smaller, in fact, than they
might appear.
417. In 2000, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the federal budget surplus would
reach 2.17 trillion dollars during the following decade. See CBO Projecting a Whopping $2.17
Trillion in Surpluses, SEATrLE TIMES, July 18, 2000, at A4. The Social Security Administration was
projected to have an additional 2.39 trillion dollar surplus over the same period. See id.
418. See EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES 1999, supra note 71, at 13.
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TABLE 48:

MENT OPTION

COST OF REDUCING THE PERIOD AFTER WHICH

OUTSTANDING BALANCES WOULD BE FORGIVEN FOR LAW GRADUATE
BORROWERS IN INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT41
Number of years after which debt would
be forgiven
19

Additional annual per cohort cost
to taxpayers (S in millions)f
3

17

5

15

8

To put in context the eight million dollar annual per cohort cost of
reducing the forgiveness period to fifteen years, the annual per cohort
cost of the entire Stafford loan program for graduate students is about
one billion dollars4 2' lowered default rates on student loans have saved
the taxpayers eighteen billion dollars since 1993 2 and the projected
budget surplus for fiscal year 2001 is $102 billion. '

419. See E-mail from the U.S. Department of Education to the Author (Aug. 28. 2000, 12:42
EST) (on file with author). Reducing the period to fifteen years for all graduate student borrowers
(not only law students) would increase the annual per cohort cost to S44 million (assumin. Y1
usage). E-mail from the U.S. Department of Education to the Author (Jan. 23, 2001. 10:47 EST) (on
file with author). The messages included the following caveat: "Estimates are provided as technical
assistance only. Numbers do not reflect the policy positions or official cost estimates of the
Department of Education or the Administration." E-mail from the U.S. Dapartment of Eduction to
the Author (Aug. 31, 2000, 16:45 EST) (on file with author).
420. The Department computes costs of subsidizing loan repayment in terms of annual per
cohort costs. A cohort is the set of all students who borrow in a particular year.
421. See E-mail from the U.S. Department of Education to the Author (Aug, 31, 2000. 16:45
EST) (on file with author). The annual federal appropriation for all federal student financial
assistance is currently 9.4 billion dollars. See HLR. 3424. 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). Thus,
shortening the forgiveness period for law students to fifteen years would probably increase the cost
of financial aid for graduate students by less than Mc. and would increase the cost of federal
financial aid by less than one-tenth of 1%. The Secretary of Education might want to offer
forgiveness after fewer years to all borrowers who had completed graduate and professional degrees
and used income-contingent repayment, not just to law graduates. Of course this will be more
expensive, but it may only be two or three times as costly as the numbers in this chart show, and
therefore still an infinitesimal increase in the cost of the national student loan program.
422. See Ellen Nakashima, Record Low Default Rate in Student Lean Program: Strong
Economy and IncreasedEnforcement Are Cited, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2000, at A-) Thus, in 1993
and 1994, when Department officials computed how much money they could afford to allocate for
subsidies through the income-contingent option, they were unaware of billions of dollars that would
be saved as a result of fewer defaults.
423. See CBO's CurrentBudget Projections,Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, at
http.//www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfmindex=1944&sequence=0&from7 (last visited Feb. 14,2001) .
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If reducing the loan period for all users is nevertheless deemed too

expensive,U policy makers could consider offering forgiveness at the
end of a shorter period only to those who had fulfilled a public service
requirement, such as having spent at least ten of the previous fifteen
years in full-time public service work. To avoid controversy about what
constitutes "public service" work, the term should be defined broadly-

for example, full-time work for any tax-exempt organization, any agency
of any level of government, any international organization (such as an
agency of the United Nations, or an international war crimes tribunal), or
any combination of these entities. If necessary to prevent abuse, an
income ceiling could also be imposed-for example, forgiveness could
be phased out for borrowers whose adjusted gross income, averaged
over the years of the loan, exceeded specified levels.
For lawyers, the next most important reform would be to raise the
annual ceiling on borrowing under the unsubsidized Stafford loan

program. Students studying medicine and other health-related subjects
(including public health and health administration) can already borrow

$30,000 a year in unsubsidized Stafford loans (and $8500 in subsidized
Stafford loans), 426 but law students (as well as Ph.D. candidates and other
424. The cost could be deemed too expensive because eight million dollars is deemed an
unacceptably large number. Alternatively, policy makers could determine that the author's estimate
of 5% usage is too low, or that use of more generous income-contingent repayment by borrowers
other than law graduates would excessively raise the price. It should be noted, however, that few
types of graduates have debt-to-income ratios higher than those of public interest lawyers.
425. Congress has drawn a similar line in recent legislation to encourage students to perform
public service. In making LRAP loan forgiveness non-taxable, Congress applied the benefit to loans
forgiven
pursuant to a program of such educational organization which is designed to encourage
its students to serve in occupations with unmet needs or in areas with unmet needs and
under which the services provided by the students (or former students) are for or under
the direction of a governmental unit or an organization described in section 501(e)(3)of
the tax law.
26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. IV 1999).
426. In 1998, when Congress phased out the Health Education Assistance Loan Program for
students in medical and related professions, unsubsidized Stafford loan eligibility was expanded
from $18,500 per year to $38,500 per year for students at schools that had disbursed loans through
the phased out program. See Dear Partner, Colleague Letters, U.S. Dep't of Educ., GEN-98-18,
Aug. 1999, at http:/ifap.ed.gov/dev_csb/newlhome (last visited Feb. 14, 2001) (following
hyperlinks to Dear Partner, Colleague Letters). This authority was expanded a year later to all
students in the health professions, regardless of whether their schools had participated in the
program that had been phased out. See Dear Partner, Colleague Letters, U.S. Dep't of Edue., GEN99-21, July 1999, at http://ifap.ed.gov/devcsb/nevl/home (last visited Feb. 14, 2001) (following
hyperlinks to Dear Partner, Colleague Letters). Students eligible for these larger Stafford loans were
those studying allopathic medicine, osteopathy, dentistry, veterinary medicine, optometry, podiatry,
pharmacy, public health, chiropractic medicine, and clinical psychology, as well as those in
graduate programs in health administration. See id.
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graduate students) can borrow only $10,000 per year (plus $8500 in
subsidized loans). 7
Increasing the amount of annual Stafford loan eligbility4 ' would
benefit all law students, because it would substitute lower-interest
federally-guaranteed debt, with a statutory ceiling of 8.25% on the
interest rate, for commercial debt at interest rates that can exceed the
federally guaranteed loan rate by a percentage point or more."" But in

addition, raising the annual loan eligibility limit would particularly assist
high-debt, low-income borrowers who might use the income-contingent

repayment option, because a larger fraction of such students' debt would
be eligible for consolidation and payment through the option. Compare
Larry Lifer's situation under two scenarios. Assume that he attends

Catholic,4' borrows $75,500 in Stafford loans for undergraduate and law
school study, and borrows an additional $24,500 commercially over

three years, at the rates prevailing in September, 2000. Assume that his
commercial debt is payable over twenty years, and that, as in some
earlier examples, he goes to work at a starting salary of $32,000 and has
annual 3% raises.

427. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.204(a)(5), (b)(5) (2001).
428. Regulations also provide for a lifetime Stafford loan borrowing limit of S138,500. See id.
§ 682.204(e). This limit would not have to be changed, because three $38,500 loans %ould equal
only $115,500, and few students borrow as much as another S23,OO as undergraduates.
429. As of July 2000, the Access Group, a major lender to law students, charged Georgetown
and George Washington students 8.594% on its commercial loans. The interest rate for students at
the Howard Law School, or the D.C. School of Law, each a few miles away, was 9.562%. TheeS
rates understate the interest rate, however, because students are also charged a one-time "guarantee
fee" just before repayment. In the case of a Georgetown or George Washington borrower, the fee
was at least 6.9% (and up to 12.9%); in the case of Howard or D.C. School of Law students, it vas
at least 7.5%. The interest rates vary because the Access Group starts with a rate based on the and
market and then adds a percentage that "varies] by loan program and institution." Federal &
Private Loan Tetrs, Access Group, at http'/ ,,v.accessgroup.org
w
Ilast visited Feb. 23. 2001)
(following hyperlinks to Federal & Private Loan Terms); see also FederalSrafford Loan, Access
Group, School Selection, at http'J/www.accessgroup.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (following
hyperlinks to Federal & Private Loan Terms: School Selection) (providing the instructions as to
how to access the percentages for the above schools).
430. For such a student, the commercial loan rate is assumed to be 9.562q- plus a one-time fee
of 7.5%.
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TABLE 49: INCOME-CONTINGENT REPAYMENT FOR LARRY LIFER'S
$100,000 AGGREGATE LOAN, COMPARING (A) THE CURRENT $18,500
ANNUAL LIMIT ON STAFFORD BORROWING, AND (B) His SITUATION IF
THE LIMIT WERE RAISED So THAT HE COULD BORROW ENTIRELY

THROUGH FFELP OR A FEDERAL DIRECT LOAN

Monthly payments,
year one

$75,500 debt subject to
income-contingent
repayment, plus $24,500
commercial borrowing,
payable over twenty years:
federal repayment,
commercial repayment (in
parenthesis) and total
repayment
$394 (+ $230) = $624
(26% of after-tax income)43'

$100,000 debt subject
to income-contingent
repayment

Monthly payments,
year six

$457 (+ $230) = $687
(25% of after-tax income)42

Total of payments,
current dollars
Present value of total
of future payments
Amount the
government forgives,

$171,440 (+ $55,288) =
$226,988413
$84,443 (+ $33,077) =
$117,520
$71,427

$172,452

$17,447

$37,331

$394
(16% of after-tax
income)
$457
(17% of after-tax
income)

$84,705
$152,831

current dollars

Present value of
government
forgiveness

This table shows that if we factor in a reasonable amount of
commercial debt,M would-be legal services lawyers graduating today
from private, non-LRAP law schools with an average amount of
indebtedness will have to pay, in their first year on the job, about 26% of
their after-tax income toward their student loans, in excess of even the
most forgiving estimates of what is affordable. But simply by sweeping
more of the debt into the unsubsidized Stafford loan program, the federal
431.
432.
$1808.
433.
434.
oriented

This assumes federal income tax of $3746 and state and local income tax of $1124.
This assumes gross income of $40,500, federal tax of $6062, and state and local tax of
To this, the commercial lender would add a guarantee fee of $2625 in the twentieth year.
Recall that the average total debt anticipated by Georgetown and Catholic public-interest
students in 1999 was $95,000. See supra tbl.6.
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government could make it possible for these public servants to afford the
burdens of their debt, lowering repayment, through the incomecontingent option, to 16% of after-tax income. Furthermore, if such
graduates' incomes remained low for twenty-five years, they would
qualify for more than twice as much forgiveness as under the present
law.
This reform also would not require new authorizing legislation but
would require the Secretary of Education to reprogram funds or seek an
increased appropriation. 3 ' Congress established a presumptive $10,000
annual limit on the amount of the unsubsidized Stafford loan extended to
a graduate or professional student. " But it also authorized the Secretary
of Education to raise the amount where he or she determines "that a
higher amount is warranted in order to carry out the purpose" of the
Higher Education Act "with respect to students engaged in specialized
training requiring exceptionally high costs of education."'" It can hardly
be doubted that legal education involves "specialized training" or that it
' The Secretary should raise
now involves "exceptionally high costs.'""
the unsubsidized Stafford loan limit for law school students to the lower
of $30,000 (as it is for students in the medical professions) or the actual
cost of attendance at the student's school. If the limit were raised for
all law students, and every law student in the United States borrowed
$38,500 per year in subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loans the
annual additional per cohort cost would be sixty-nine million dollars,
compared to the one billion dollar annual per cohort cost of the Stafford
loan program for all graduate students. However, "[i]f the combined
volume was transferred exclusively into d[irect] l[ending] [i.e., if the
federal government rather than banks extended all Stafford loans to law
students,] the savings related to the increased loan volume would more
than offset the costs of increasing ... the annual maximum Stafford

unsubsidized amount."4'Another option would be for the Department to
435. Of course Congress could direct this reform itself, but Congress is not scheduled to bzgin
to review the Higher Education Act until 2002-03.

436. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-8(d)(2)(C) (Supp. IV. 1999).
437. Id. § 1078-8(d)(2)(D).
438. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 29-30.

439. Raising it to a flat $30,000 could risk encouraging over-borrowing at so=e statesubsidized law schools where the annual cost of attendance is less than $38,500.

440. This is an unrealistic and very conservative assumption because S38,500 exceeds the
actual cost of attendance for in-state students at many public law schools.

441. E-mail from the U.S. Department ofEducation to the Author (Aug. 31, 2000. 16:45 EST)
(on file with author). In the e-mail, estimates were provided as technical assistance only. See id.

This estimate was based on the assumption that all 40,000 law students in the United States would
borrow the entire $20,000 of additional Stafford funds, for an additional 800 million dollars of
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raise the annual limit on Stafford loans not only for law students but also

for all graduate students. This would cost taxpayers still more money if
the loans were extended through FFELP, or reap greater profit for
taxpayers if accomplished through direct lending.
It might be objected that making larger loans available to law
students (or to graduate students generally) would simply enable

universities to raise tuition. If valid, this objection applies with equal
force to all government subsidies for education, including the existing

loan programs, grant programs, and education tax credits and
deductions. Nobody is proposing to end those subsidies, and leading
politicians often suggest expanding them."2 In addition, the link between

loan availability and tuition levels is a "hotly contested" issue, but there
are apparently no studies proving that the availability of loan funds is the

only factor or even a major factor in tuition increases." 3 Other factors
strongly affecting tuition, particularly at law schools, include the effects
of rapidly rising salaries in the private sector (which make it more
difficult for law schools to retain their faculties without raising salaries),
the rising costs of books and technology, the level of alumni
contributions, and competition from other schools for talented
students. 4
The Department should also consider simplifying the income-

contingent repayment formula. The complexity of the mathematical
computations is itself a deterrent to using this program. As one

Georgetown student respondent to my questionnaire put it,

loans. A sixty-nine million dollar annual per cohort federal cost for making those loans works out to
an 8.6% subsidy rate, and the estimated subsidy rate on all FFEL Stafford loans to graduate
students, which was 5.9% in Fiscal Year ("FY") 1999, is expected to be 6.5% in FY 2000, and 3.8%
available
at
supra
note
350,
at
374,
in
FY
2001.
See
BUDGET,
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2OOl/pdf/edu.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2001). The reason why
the government could turn a loss into a profit by lending the money directly to law students rather
than by paying subsidies to banks under FFELP, is that, although the default rate in unsubsidized
FFEL and direct lending to graduate students is virtually the same (8.75% for FFEL and 8.83% for
direct loans), the subsidy rate for FFEL unsubsidized Stafford loans to graduate students was 5.9%
in FY 1999, whereas the profit rate on federal direct unsubsidized Stafford loans to graduate
students was 13.4%. See id. Presumably the direct loan advantage lies in not having to pay
commercial lending institutions to make risk-free loans.
442. See The 2000 Campaign: A Presidential Debate: Transcript of Debate Betveen Vice
President Gore and Governor Bush, N.Y. TimES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A30 (describing a Gore proposal
for a federal tax deduction of up to $10,000 for college education).
443. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 106TH CONG., RIsING COST
OF COLLEGE TUITION AND THE EFFEcTIvENEss OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL AID 28-29 (Comm.
Print 2000) (providing the testimony of David W. Breneman, University Professor and Dean of the
Curry School of Education, University of Virginia).
444. See supra notes 16-37.
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Too complicated! It's easier for me to just get a firm job, pay the
money, and be done with it than try to figure out how this will work

over 25 years.... If the government really wished to assist me they
would make it easier. After all, it's a piece of cake to take out the loan,
why is the payback plan so complex?
Three other reforms should also be undertaken. Frst, the
Department should significantly improve the quantity and quality of
information about income-contingent repayment that it offers to students
and to financial aid advisors. Recognizing that new financial aid
advisors enter the profession regularly, and that central university
officials may not communicate the full details of all federal programs to
all of the advisors in particular graduate schools, the Department should
develop effective materials for explaining the income-contingent option,
including its advantages and disadvantages for various types of students,
and make them available directly to the financial aid advisors in all of
the nation's law schools, and probably other types of graduate schools as
well. If the repayment formula remains complex, a video, distributed
either as a tape or over the Web, might be desirable. In addition, the
Department should significantly upgrade its Web-based calculators. It
should allow students considering various repayment plans to make
flexible assumptions about the rate of income growth, including the
assumption that they will change careers at some point during the life of
their loan. All of the Department's calculators should show present value
calculations for the total cost of loan repayment, so that repayment plans
of different durations can be more accurately compared.
Better information about the program should be made available not
only to advisors in graduate schools, but also to advisors in college
financial aid and career planning offices. Some students who aspire to
public service careers may be refraining from applying to graduate and
professional schools, assuming that the cost of attending those
institutions would frustrate their service goals. Better information about
government loan repayment assistance could enable college students to
make better choices about their higher education.
Second, Congress should make federal forgiveness of incomecontingent loans tax-exempt. The fact that forgiveness is not tax-exempt
seems to be only a minor factor, to date, in students' distrust of the
program, accounting for about 1% of student concerns and 8% of
financial aid advisors' concerns. " ' But this may reflect only the fact that
any taxation is still twenty years off, or that other aspects of the program
445. See supra tbls.21, 30.
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are more disagreeable to those polled for this Article. As the program is
improved, concerns about taxation could grow. It makes no sense for the
federal government to give with one hand, because it has determined the
beneficiaries to be needy, and take back with the other. The Department
and the Department of the Treasury made a joint commitment to seek
congressional repeal of the tax on forgiveness. '" 6 In addition, Congress

has already made law school LRAP forgiveness non-taxable;

7

it should

do the same for its own forgiveness program.
Finally, the Department should repeal its marriage penalty on
borrowers using income-contingent repayment. Ideally, it should allow
married borrowers to elect to have assets and debts treated either on an

individual or a joint basis." s Alternatively, it should regard a borrower's
income as the higher of (a) the borrower's own income or (b) one-half of
the combined income of the borrower and the borrower's spouse."'S
Though the Department's motive in attributing the income of both
spouses to a borrower was apparently to more accurately reflect ability
to pay,450 not all spouses share their incomes, spouses generally have
expenses as well as income, and the amount of the penalty under the

Department's formula can be so great that it may encourage cohabitation
without wedlock, or even divorce. As Martin D. Ginsburg has shown,
Sweden's tax law once did what the Department has now done, simply
requiring married couples to add their incomes together.4 " The result

was a rash of divorces.452 When the law was amended so that divorce

446. See William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 61820, 61823 (Dec. 1,
1995) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c)(4)(iv) (2001)).
447. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
448. Repeal would be consistent with the recent drive by members of Congress and the
President to repeal the marriage penalty in the income tax. In the summer of 2000, Congress passed
legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code so that married couples would no longer pay more
tax than if they were single. See R.G. Ratcliffe, Spouse Tax Relief Bill Gets Vetoed: Bush Seizes
Opportunity to Link Gore to Decision, HOuS. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2000, at Al. President Clinton
vetoed the bill because it would have cost nearly 300 billion dollars over ten years, and more than
half of the relief would have gone to families earning over 100,000 dollars. See id. George Bush, the
Republican presidential candidate, supported the bill; Al Gore, the Democratic presidential
candidate, supported the veto but said that he favored the right kind of repeal of the marriage tax.
See id.
449. This alternative, less favorable to borrowers, is how the major LRAP programs treat
marriage for the purpose of computing the borrower's eligibility for subsidies. See NAT'L ASS'N
FOR PUB. INTEREsT LAW, supra note 110, at 107, 136, 297 (Harvard, New York University, Yale).
Georgetown simply averages the incomes (after deducting the spouse's loan repayments from his or
her gross income). See id. at 100.
450. See supra notes 345-47 (describing the "marriage penalty").
451. See Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Components of Income: A U.S. Perspective, 86 GEO.
L.J. 123, 134-35 (1997).
452. See id. at 134.
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could not free the couple from higher taxation, hundreds of thousands of
Swedes began living together without the formalities of marriage, and
the rate of children born out of wedlock in stable, two-parent homes,
soared."5 3' "It was not immorality," notes Ginsburg. "It was the idiotic
tax law." 1
The income-contingent repayment option represents a fine idea, but
as a government program, it has not yet come into its own. It could be an
important component of how the United States supports its young people
who want to commit years, or even their whole lives, to public service.
Specialized training for public service is very expensive,! so a good and
generous income-contingent loan repayment plan can help new law
graduates to follow their hearts. But the plan we now have benefits too
few, too little. American policy makers, and especially the Secretary of
Education, should make the improvements necessary to bring into force
the farsighted program that President Clinton and Congress envisioned
in 1993.

453.
454.
455.
456.

See id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
Id.
See supraPart IL
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This Article recommends several ways in which the incomecontingent repayment option could be improved by making it slightly
more generous and therefore more attractive to students who desire
public service careers. ' 5' Unfortunately, as this Article goes to press,
some political winds may be blowing in the opposite direction. While
neither the new Administration of President George W. Bush nor
Congressional leaders have made definitive statements on the subject, it
is possible that the entire federal direct lending program could come
under attack during 2001 or 2002. If the federal direct lending program
is terminated, the income-contingent repayment option, which exists
only within the direct lending program, will probably be ended rather
than reformed.
Two straws in the wind suggest that the direct lending program may
come under new attack. First, when the Republican leadership organized
the House of Representatives in January, 2001, it had to select a new
chair for the Committee on Education and the Workforce. Thomas E.
Petri, the Wisconsin Republican who had been an early and enthusiastic
supporter of direct lending, ' was next in line in seniority and was
expected to become the committee's chair. However, the leaders passed
over him in favor of John A. Boehner, reportedly because Representative
Petri had "long supported the direct-lending program that ...many
Republican lawmakers-and the bankers and student-loan-guarantee
agencies that contribute to them-have sought to eliminate.', 4 9 "Lenders
believe him [Boehner] to be more sympathetic to their views," a former
committee staffer explained.4 °
Second, President George W. Bush appointed William D. Hansen
as Deputy Secretary of Education. 6 ' Prior to his appointment, Hansen
was the executive director of the Education Finance Council, the trade
association that lobbied for non-profit lenders in the FFEL Program.462
The Council co-authored the 1996 Report criticizing the incomecontingent repayment option, 463 and ithad sued the Department to
457. See generally supraPart VII.C.
458. See supra text accompanying note 146.
459. Stephen Burd & Jeffrey Brainard, House GOP Shuns Seniority Rules in Choosing
Boehner to HeadEducation Panel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 12, 2001, at A22.
460. Id.
461. See Piper Fogg, People, 33 NAT'LJ. 821, 821 (2001).
462. See Stephen Burd et al., Cautiously Watching the President-Elect: Colleges Hopefor the
Best, but Some ProgramsMay Be Vulnerable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 5,2001, at A34.
463. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
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prevent it from lowering the fees charged to students for federal direct
loans.464
These signs do not necessarily mean that direct lending will be
attacked or that any such attack will succeed. ' Furthermore, private
lenders could try to build into FFELP an income-contingent repayment
option that is more forgiving than the one that is part of the direct
lending program (and, by definition, more forgiving than the incomesensitive repayment options that private lenders now offer, which
provide no debt forgiveness)."' They could, in other words, build into
private lending plans a cross-subsidy feature through which the vast
majority of graduates who earn more substantial incomes, or those who
enter the private sector, provide funds that could be used for partial
forgiveness of loans to graduates who have low incomes, or who do
public service. But private lenders generally regard their missions as
providing lending services and profit-maximization, and they do not
have the explicit mandate to support public service that Congress gave
the Department in 1993. Therefore, if the direct lending lending program
is demolished, the income-contingent repayment option may disappear
into the rubble.4

464. See Burd et al., supranote 462 (listing Education Finance Council is a participant in the,
lawsuit); see also supranote 380 and accompanying text (describing the lawsuit).
465. One Republican staff member believed that it would be "foolish" for the Bush

administration to try to eliminate the direct lending program, because that program is "vithering on
the vine on its own" after some prominent Universities left it. Burd et al.. supranote 462.

466. See supra note 365.
467. Another possibility would be that direct lending would end, but that proponents of the
income-contingent repayment option might extract, as a price of its termination, the continuation of
a small federal direct lending program for the sole purpose of extending incon-contingent loans,
on terms such as those advocated in this article, to high-debt, low-income graduates, or to the sub-st
of those graduates in public service. The subsidy funds would then be appropriated by Congress
rather than emerging from the profits of a large federal direct lending program.
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APPENDIX
DISCOUNTING TO PRESENT VALUE WITH THE
LONG BOND RATE
A rational person would rather repay one thousand dollars after ten
years than repay this sum tomorrow, because inflation will reduce the
value of the dollar and because money that is not expended at a given
moment could be earning interest or could enable the borrower to buy
and enjoy the use of goods and services until it is expended. Therefore,
the cost of future repayments must be discounted to their present value,
particularly when a borrower is considering competing repayment plans
of different durations and different payment schedules.
The present value of a stream of future repayments is quite
sensitive to the discount rate selected. This is evident from Table 50,
which compares the present values of repaying $75,500 in steady
monthly installments over ten and twenty-five years, using four different
discount rates. The rates chosen for this table are 2.5% (roughly the
annual rate of inflation from 1995 to 1999); 5.8% (the thirty year
treasury bond or "long bond" rate in late summer, 2000), 8.25% (the
maximum interest rate on federal consolidated student loans), and 12%
(the typical rate at which a recent graduate with heavy student debt can
borrow additional money-for example, on a credit card).
TABLE 50:

NET PRESENT VALUE OF REPAYING $75,500 AT

8.25%

INTEREST OVER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, WITH
VARIOUS DISCOUNT RATES

Discount rate
2.5%

Ten-year repayment
($111,123 in current
dollars)
$98,363

Twenty-five-year
repayment ($178,584 in
current dollars)
$133,122

5.8%

$84,738

$95,526

8.25%

$76,476

$77,435

12%

$66,167

$59,044

These large variations suggest the importance of selecting the most
appropriate rate. A higher assumed rate will make the long-term
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repayment plan more attractive. For rates lower than the annual
percentage rate on the loan, the higher the assumed rate, the smaller will
be the reported additional cost of repaying a long-term (e.g., twentyfive-year) loan, compared to repaying the same amount of money over a
short term (e.g., ten years) loan. And if the assumed rate is greater than
the annual percentage rate on the loan, the net present value of the longterm repayment plan will actually be lower than that of the short-term
repayment plan. Thus, lower discount rates are "conservative" in the
sense that they are less likely to make long-term loan repayment look
attractive. But the lowest rate in the table, the rate reflecting only recent
increases in the consumer price index, is unrealistically low, both
because the inflation rate has been unusually low in recent years and
because this rate does not take into account the fact that money that is
not immediately repaid can be invested-for example, in liquid assets or
in consumer goods-to produce value.
Unfortunately, there is not a single "correct" answer to the question
of what discount rate a student borrower should use for the purpose of
considering loan repayment. Each individual's discount rate will be
different, depending on the individual's expected circumstances. In fact,
each individual's discount rate will change annually, depending on
changes in those circumstances.
Mark Kantrowitz, who created the FinAid Web site to help students
to analyze loan repayment, made it possible for each student using the
income-contingent loan repayment calculator to insert an individual
discount rate for use in present value calculations. But he also offers this
advice on selecting a rate:
The discount rate should be the APR [annual percentage rate] of the
highest risk-adjusted rate of the return th[at] you can obtain by
investing your money, or the lowest rate at which you can borrow
money, whichever is higher. The reason is [that] your decision of
whether to pay off your student loan depends on whether you can earn
more by investing the payoff funds in a different vehicle or spend less
by refinancing the loan with a lower cost source of funds. If you have
both a lower borrowing cost with a different loan and a higher
investment return, the higher rate wins, because you could use the
other loan to borrow money to invest, and therefore be financially
better off than you would be by paying off the student loan.

Clearly, no student would rationally accept a loan with a higher
NPV [net present value] than the amount borrowed, so perhaps the
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discount rate should also be at least as much as the APR of the student
loan interest rate. On the other hand, if the student has access to no
other loans, and their highest [risk-adjusted] investment rate of return
is the [risk-free] long bond (30-year Treasury), then the long bond is
the correct discount rate to use. The difference between the amount
borrowed and the NPV could be considere[d] a premium the student is
paying for cash flow assistance. 4

Kantrowitz uses the current thirty-year bond rate as the default
value for net present value in the FinAid calculator.4 In this Article, the
thirty year bond rate has also been selected as the discount rate because
it represents a conservative point between the extremes of a low recent
inflation rate 7 and the high rate at which most high-debt, low-income
students could borrow additional funds. It could be objected that the
thirty-year bond rate is much too low of a rate to use, and is excessively
conservative, because no ordinary civilian (such as the graduate of a law
school) could borrow money at the thirty-year bond rate. But a student
using the FinAid calculator may select a higher (or lower) discount rate.
On September 14, 2000, as this Article was being completed, the
thirty-year bond rate was 5.8%, and that is the rate used in tables in this
Article. The FinAid Web site permits the user to find the current thirtyyear bond rate. Alternatively, the CNN Financial Network Web site,47' or
any other convenient online financial report, contains this current rate.
It seems likely that the federal government will cease issuing thirtyyear bonds in the year 2001 .4 2 If so, the next-best measure might be the
longest-term federal bonds available in the market, or whatever other
indicator Wall Street adopts to measure the present cost of long-term
revenue streams.
468. Mark Kantrowitz, Net Present Value, FinAid: The SmartStudent Guide to Financial Aid,
at http://www.finaid.org/loans/npv.phtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
469. Another possible choice would be the historical thirty-year bond rate-for example, for
the last ten years or the last twenty-five years. But these measures would produce higher and
therefore less conservative rates: 7% for the last ten years, and about 9% to 10% for the last twentyfive years. See Historical 30 Year Bond Chart 1977 to 1999, StockMotons.com, at
http://www.stockmotions.com/charts/historic30yearbond.77_to._99.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001).
Using a 7% or 9% rate might make long-term income-contingent and extended repayment plans
seem very attractive compared to ten-year repayment.
470. Recent inflation has been unusually low. However, the low rate has been sustained for
only a short time, and it may already be increasing. Over a longer term, inflation has exceeded the
current thirty-year bond rate. The average inflation rate between 1977 and 1999 was 8% annually,
For the period from 1969 to 1999, it was about 12%.
471. CNNfn,
The
Financial
Network,
Markets:
Bonds
&
Rates,
at
http:llcnnfn.cnn.comlmarketslbondcenter/rates.html (lastvisited Feb. 28, 2001).
472. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Treasury Gives 30-Year Bond a Reprieve, and Price Falls,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at C8.
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